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EDUCATION, SOCIAL SECURITY, AND THE WELFARE STATE:
ALTERNATIVE POLICY CHOICES IN THE
UNITED STATES AND GERMANY
Karl G. Hokenmaier, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 2002
Western welfare states have not all followed the same path in their social
policy development. Still, certain similarities have been identified in the types and
combinations of social insurance supported by specific groupings of these states.
Titmuss (1974) described "three contrasting models or functions of social policy."
Heclo (1985) argued "three broad groups of nations can be distinguished” with
different models of social welfare policy. Esping-Andersen (1990) identified "three
worlds of welfare capitalism," each with a unique social policy agenda and
distinctive social insurance system.
Education is typically not included with other social programs in depicting
the policy profiles of welfare states. I argue it should because a state’s education
policy is associated with, and a component of, its overall welfare strategy.
Education policy can be made an instrument to serve welfare, labor, and any
number of other policy objectives. Moreover, the socioeconomic benefits an
individual may realize with educational achievement can become functionally
equivalent to, and even exceed, what may be received through social insurance.
Heidenheimer (1981) argued a relationship between education and social
insurance policies was determined during the initial stages of welfare state
development. For America and Europe, "the emphasis on education and social
security programs are viewed as the cores o f alternative strategies pursued by
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emerging welfare states* (269). Heclo (1983) spoke of an ‘implicit trade-off,” a
choice made between state investment in educational opportunities or the
expansion of social insurance programs. Castles (1989) recommended that
preferential state support of education or social insurance may be considered as
alternative policy strategies followed by welfare states today.
Both case studies and a quantitative analysis examine the policy record for
evidence of different welfare state types with such alternative policy strategies, and
a "trade-off between state investment in education and other social programs. The
results indicate an association does exist between the education and social
programs welfare states support. Specifically, the liberal, conservative and social
democratic welfare regimes Esping-Andersen described can be linked with
characteristic education policies. There is also evidence of a "trade-off.” Certain
kinds of welfare regimes exhibit a preference to invest in education or social
insurance programs.
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CHAPTER!
INTRODUCTION
Western industrial nations differ greatly in the kinds of social welfare systems
they support—in the types, combinations, and measures o f public assistance they
provide. They bear the mark, and are reflective of the socioeconomic and political
environment of their origin. A nation’s social welfare provisions are the product of
different intentions, capacities, structures, and histories, of the unique combinations
of a myriad of variable factors and their interaction over time: levels o f economic
development and the global economy, war and revolution, governmental institutions
and political leadership, the resources of the state and the nation, demographics,
cultural and religious influences, social movements, etc. There is also the
phenomenon of path dependence that affects the making o f public policy. Past and
present public expenditures, commitments and preferences for certain programs, may
limit the available options and capacity of the state and its government to make and
pursue alternative policy strategies in the future (Esping-Andersen 1996; Flora 1986;
Heidenheimer 1981; March and Olsen 1989; Pierson 1994; Skocpol and Amenta
1986,149-51).
However, and despite dissimilar evolutionary paths, scholarly research
indicates a good deal of commonality exists between the welfare systems of many
Western nations. Indeed, the social welfare systems o f certain Western regimes have
been found to be so much alike that they have collectively been characterized as

1
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representative of a specific family, type or model o f the welfare state. Even allowing
for cross-national variation attributable to distinctive “national policy styles,”
Freeman (198S) spoke of “significant trends toward the convergence of public
policies” in Western societies. He observed that policymakers more and more tended
to react in a similar way to like policy issues, and this was especially true in the area
of social insurance. Castles (1993) has distinguished “families o f nations” that feature
similar and characteristic social welfare systems. Titmuss (1974) developed a
typology o f welfare states based on his finding o f “three contrasting models or
functions of social policy.” Heclo (1985) argued that “three broad groups o f nations
can be distinguished” with different models of social welfare policy. Esping-Andersen
(1990) identified “three worlds of welfare capitalism”—liberal, conservative, and
social democratic—that could be distinguished by the similarity of their social policy
agendas and coverage for old-age benefits, healthcare, and unemployment.
Typically, education policy is not mentioned in the literature o f the welfare
state, nor is it included with other social programs when the policy profiles o f welfare
states are depicted. I argue that it should be because a state's education policy is
associated with, and is an integral component o f its overall welfare strategy.
Education policy both affects and reflects the welfare strategy o f the state. The
education system can be made an instrument to serve welfare, economic, labor, and
any number of other policy objectives. Moreover, as it concerns social welfare
generally and the social security systems in particular, educational achievement is
widely recognized as a vehicle of upward social mobility (Becker 1964; Janowitz
1976; Kaelble 1981). The socioeconomic benefits an individual may realize with
educational achievement—particularly at the secondary and higher levels—can
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become functionally equivalent to, and even exceed, what may be secured with social
insurance. As a consequence, an individual’s long-term reliance on social insurance
may be lessened by their educational achievement—and so can the welfare state’s
long-term requirements for income assistance and other social programs. I submit,
therefore, that preferential state support of educational opportunities over social
insurance may be viewed as an alternative strategy that welfare regimes may choose
to follow.
Heidenheimer (1981) has argued that the basis for the relationship between
education and social insurance policies in Western societies was determined during
the initial stages of welfare state development. In particular, for the United States and
Europe, “the emphasis on education and social security programs are viewed as the
cores of alternative strategies pursued by emerging welfare states” (Heidenheimer
1981, 269). Over time, such a policy association was manifested by a kind o f trade
off where relatively greater state attention and investment was given to the
development of one sector than the other. In this vein, Heclo (1985) has written of an
“implicit trade-off” made by the United States, that its welfare state has invested in
public education and encouraged educational achievement over the expansion of its
social insurance system. Acknowledging Heclo, Castles (1989) has submitted that
“countries [generally] may choose to trade-off resources against the building of a
welfare state” (431). Even today, preferential investment in education or social
protection programs may be considered as alternative policy strategies that welfare
states may choose to follow.
It is the work of the scholars above, and especially that of Esping-Andersen,
Heclo, and Heidenheimer, that serves as the foundation for this endeavor. My object
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4
is to discover if there is a relationship between the kinds of social programs and types
o f education systems that Western welfare regimes support. In particular, can the
three kinds o f welfare regimes described by Esping-Andersen (1990)— liberal,
conservative, and social democratic—be linked with characteristic profiles for
education policy, and is there evidence o f a trade-off between investment in
educational opportunities and other social programs?
In the following pages of this chapter I will address my research problem in
greater detail. I will state and operationalize my specific research hypotheses,
describe my research methodology and the organizational format that will direct this
study, offer a limited discussion of some preliminary findings, and conclude with what
I anticipate will be the overall findings of this study. In the second chapter I will
present a review of the scholarly literature and major theoretical explanations for the
making o f social welfare and education policy. Because of the great similarity in
theories and variables, I will propose that a single model might be used to better
explain both education and social policy. A quantitative analysis of education and
social insurance data for 18 OECD nations over the 1960-1990 time period is the
subject o f the third chapter. The purpose o f that analysis is two-fold. First, EspingAndersen’s welfare state typology shall be evaluated for its usefulness as an
explanation for education, as well as social policy outcomes. Specifically, is it
possible to associate liberal, conservative and social democratic welfare regimes with
particular tendencies in education policy? Second, the national data will be analyzed
to determine if there is evidence of a “trade-off’ between welfare state expenditures
for education and other social programs. In particular, do certain kinds o f welfare
regimes demonstrate a preference to invest in education or social insurance programs
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5
as alternative policy strategies? Chapters IV and V provide case studies o f Germany
and the United States that examine the development of social insurance programs and
education policy in welfare regimes that Esping-Andersen has classified respectively
as “conservative” and “liberal.” The final chapter contains a summary report of my
findings and conclusions, recommendations for subsequent research, concluding with
a discussion of the current “crisis” o f the welfare state and its implications for social
welfare and education policymaking.
Research Problem
A Typology of Western Welfare States
At the same time Western societies may be found to differ in “national style”
(Freeman 1985), they tend to support the same types of social programs in some
form or another. The welfare systems of all these nations typically includes some
provision for old-age pensions, healthcare, unemployment insurance, and work injury
compensation (Esping-Andersen 1990; Heidenheimer, Heclo, and Adams, 1990). If
these common areas of social policy are taken as a starting point, it is possible to
distinguish and group those Western welfare regimes for whom the content and
measure of these provisions is similar. In other words, particular types of welfare
regimes may be identified according to their similar social welfare profiles, by their
tendency to produce and support comparable and distinctive public policies. Scholars
finding such groupings of welfare states with similar social policies have identified
them as “contrasting models or functions o f social policy” (Titmuss 1974, 30),
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“worlds o f welfare capitalism” (Esping-Andersen 1990), and “families of nations”
(Castles 1993).
Titmuss (1974), Heclo (1985) and Esping-Andersen (1990) have advanced
nearly identical classifications of Western welfare regimes. Based upon their separate
cross-national evaluations of Western social welfare systems, each distinguished and
similarly characterized three general groupings of welfare states. They even
associated many o f the same countries with their corresponding models of welfare
regime types. In particular, Esping-Andersen argued that three kinds o f welfare states
could be found in advanced industrial societies—liberal, conservative, and social
democratic.1 His typology arranged Western welfare states into three clusters, “each
organized around its own discrete logic of organization, stratification, and societal
integration.” Each cluster represented “qualitatively different arrangements between
state, market, and the family” (Esping-Andersen 1990, 3, 26). These three groups
could be distinguished by the similarity of their social policy agendas and coverage
for healthcare, unemployment, and old-age benefits, by a likeness in the manner and
extent to which their welfare policies “decommodify.”
The key to Esping-Andersen’s distinction between kinds of Western welfare
states—"the three worlds of welfare capitalism”—is the concept o f
decommodification. Decommodification describes “the degree to which individuals,

titm uss (1974) describes “three contrasting models or functions of social
policy.” What he terms the “residual welfare” model corresponds to EspingAndersen’s liberal welfare regime type, the “industrial achievement-performance” to
the conservative, and the “institutional redistributive” to the social democratic. Heclo
(1985, 14-5) identified “three broad groups of nations [that] can be distinguished”
based on the similarity o f their social policies. Heclo’s description and the countries
he assigns to each group closely resembles that of Esping-Andersen’s three-fold
classification.
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or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living” without reliance on
wage labor and independent of market participation (Esping-Andersen 1990, 37).
With respect to the welfare state, decommodification is a function of its social
programs, the degree to which those benefits make “living standards independent of
pure market forces. It is in this sense that social rights diminish citizens’ status as
‘commodities’” (Esping-Andersen 1990, 3). But decommodification is not necessarily
just a function of a state’s social programs; there are often private and market
alternatives. In many Western countries it is not unusual to find that an individual’s
level of decommodification is the product of some combination of private insurance,
personal accumulation, workforce-related benefits, and public assistance programs. It
may even be possible for an individual to achieve decommodification without relying
on any of the state’s social insurance provisions. Retirement income and insurance
coverage for disability, healthcare and unemployment may often be obtained through
market alternatives. Frequently, the benefits or return on these instruments is even
more generous—more decommodifying—than those provided by the state’s safety
nets.
Each o f the three welfare “worlds” Esping-Andersen describes has a
distinctive social policy profile, a unique package o f social security programs that
supports a particular welfare strategy and level o f citizen decommodification. The
highest levels of decommodification are achieved by social democratic regimes,
where the state is the provider of a universal and comprehensive social security
system. The goal of welfare policy is to guarantee individuals and families “a socially
acceptable standard of living independent of market participation,” but without
discouraging individual aspirations or denying the opportunity for private
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socioeconomic achievement (Esping-Andersen 1990,26-8,37). Next are the welfare
systems o f conservative nations, which tend to support preservation o f the status quo
and its inequalities. Social rights and benefits are attached to class, status, and what
one has earned by their work effort. The primary provider o f welfare insurance is the
state, with the market and private insurance having marginal roles. The lowest levels
of decommodification are achieved in the liberal cluster, where welfare coverage by
the state is typically minimal, means-tested, and often stigmatized. The market and
private insurance plans may be encouraged as alternatives to public welfare
programs.
Esping-Andersen’s contributions to welfare state research have been very
significant. His studies of decommodification, the causes for different welfare state
development, and o f the different types of Western welfare states have been widely
recognized (Goodin et al. 1999; Hicks 1991, 1999; Offe 1991; van Kersbergen
1995). The welfare state model he proposed in The Three Worlds o f Welfare

Capitalism (1990) has been the object of particular critical attention, albeit typically
in a constructive fashion and as the starting point for other scholarly research (Castles
and Mitchell 1992; Mitchell 1992; Hicks 1999; Hicks, Misra, and Ng 1995; Janoski
and Hicks 1994; O’Connor 1996; Schmid 1996). Three criticisms have been
foremost: that his three-fold classification o f welfare regimes is not enough because
other unique welfare “worlds” and regime types may also be distinguished; that

2This criticism is addressed here only as it relates to the sample of 18 OECD
nations studied by Esping-Andersen (1990), which is the same set examined by this
work. I do not question that wholly different welfare “worlds” and kinds o f regimes
may exist outside this group. However, whether or not other models and kinds of
welfare regimes may be identified when the sample o f nations is changed and/or
(continued...)
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particular nations have been misclassified; and that Esping-Andersen’s welfare state
typology does not consider the redistributive effect of social policies, the way welfare
dollars are actually spent Mitchell (1992) contends that countries which have been
similarly classified, because o f their comparable social policy instruments and levels
o f expenditure, may not be associated with similar welfare outcomes (73). What is
even more, typologies like Esping-Andersen’s suffer from “boundary problems which
result in the misclassification o f some countries” (Mitchell 1992, 73). Castles and
Mitchell (1992) argue that there is actually a fourth “radical” world o f welfare
capitalism when income redistribution is taken into consideration—what has been
achieved by a country’s expenditures for social programs. Hicks, Misra, and Ng
(1995) also make the case for other and additional kinds of welfare regimes. They
assert that working class mobilization and the unique state institutions o f the 18801930 time period caused the adoption of social security programs and established
paths o f welfare state development that are distinctly different than EspingAndersen’s classification of liberal, conservative and social democratic regimes.
Therefore, “long, common, homogeneous political histories can not be inferred from
common recent policy configurations—the basis for Esping-Andersen’s typology of
regimes” (Hicks, Misra, and Ng 1995, 346).

2(...continued)
expanded to include any or a combination of countries from Southern Europe, Latin
America, East Asia, Eastern Europe, communist states, or different types o f capitalist
states is beyond the scope o f this study. A discussion o f these other welfare state
models that are based on country sets different than Esping-Andersen’s OECD
sample may be found in Cavanna (1998), Esping-Andersen (1996), o r Goodin et al.
(1999).
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I argue Esping-Andersen’s welfare state model is an effective vehicle for the
meaningful differentiation and classification of Western welfare regimes according to

the similarity—not the equivalence—of the social insurance systems they support.
Esping-Andersen’s purpose was not to define mutually exclusive and exhaustive
categories o f Western welfare states. His model only “show[s] that welfare states
cluster bu t . . . there is no single pure case” (Esping-Andersen 1990,28). Because
there are no real welfare states that are perfect liberal, conservative, or social
democratic regime types, Esping-Andersen classified nations according to their
“predominant” regime traits, even though they might possess some “elements” of
other welfare state types. This is akin to Weber’s notion of “ideal types,” a
conceptual device that permits a categorization of phenomena around referent types
that are defined to possess certain key aspects of reality but need not exist in their
“pure form.” In other words, the ideal type need not exist; it is an analytical tool
constructed to provide a baseline for comparison. Esping-Andersen could certainly
have defined other types of welfare regime based on residual, non-dominant traits, or
some other criteria of differentiation. He chose not to do so, and I would argue that a
further classification would only have diminished the significance of his model.
Moreover, given the small sample o f nations, anything more than a parsimonious
typology would have tended toward national explanations and been inappropriate for
more general theory-building.
Castles and Mitchell (1992) and Hicks, Misra, and Ng (199S) are prominent
among those scholars that have defined other and additional categories o f welfare
regimes. They did so, however, based on research questions and classification criteria
that were very different than Esping-Andersen’s. Esping-Andersen (1990) typology is
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based on the “clustering” he observed by three groups of countries with similar social
policy instruments and levels of expenditure effort. In essence, he measured the kind
o f welfare “effort” exhibited by each o f the eighteen OECD nations in his sample,
“scoring” the character of the social insurance system—tapping into “key attributes”
o f liberalism, socialism and corporatism—and the “potential” decommodification that
might be achieved through its provisions for old-age pensions, sickness and
unemployment benefits (Esping-Andersen 1990, 73, SO). Based on how groups of
nations tended to cluster according to the comparable nature and measure of their
welfare effort, Esping-Andersen then distinguished three kinds of welfare
regimes—liberal, conservative and social democratic. It is a typology that separates
countries into three groups according to which of three alternative welfare strategies
their social security systems most closely resembles, not the redistributive outcome of
those welfare policies a regime may support.
Castles and Mitchell (1992) identify another and “fourth world o f welfare
capitalism” by including the redistributive outcome of a country’s social programs as
another criteria for welfare regime differentiation, in addition to its welfare effort and
policy instruments. It can hardly be a surprise that they produced a model and welfare
state typology different than Esping-Andersen ’s. There is no question that they are
right when they point out that Esping-Andersen did not distinguish between types of
welfare regime based on the redistributive effects of their social programs, but that
was not his intent. They are also correct when they insist their “four worlds model is
a better predictor of redistributive outcomes than either a conventional welfare effort
‘leaders and laggards’ model or Esping-Andersen’s typology based on social policy
instruments” (Castles and Mitchell 1992, 24). That may be so, but once again, and it
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is worth repeating, Esping-Andersen’s model is concerned with alternative policy
strategies for social welfare and the potential decommodification that might be
achieved by a regime’s welfare effort. That is also the concern o f this work, and not
the particular redistributive outcome of a regime’s welfare strategy. There is no
denying the significance o f income redistribution to an evaluation o f welfare regime
performance, but that is not the purpose of this examination. If it w ere, EspingAndersen’s model would be inappropriate.
Hicks, Misra, and Ng (1995) contend that there are “other categorizations of
advanced capitalist states” (346). This follows upon their examination o f the
development paths for social security programs at the time of the welfare state’s
emergence, ranging over the 1880-1930 time period. Just like with Castles and
Mitchell (1992), it should be expected that such a different study w ould produce
another and unique typology o f Western welfare states. Moreover, given the separate
and very different research agendas and objectives, no finding or m odel can really be
stipulated to invalidate any o f the others.
It has also been claimed that Esping-Andersen is wrong to assert that the
kinds o f welfare states he describes are the product of similar political histories
(Hicks, Misra, and Ng 1995; Offe 1991). That does not matter, his three-fold
typology of welfare regimes would remain. The method Esping-Andersen employed
to determine a state’s welfare regime type—the group or cluster to which it
belongs—by evaluating its welfare strategy and the potential decommodification its
social programs might achieve, does not finally depend on that historical inference
(Esping-Andersen 1990, Chapters 2-3). That is critical to the integrity o f this
examination and the use of Esping-Andersen’s welfare state model.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

13
Finally, it has been argued that Esping-Andersen has other misclassified
certain nations or they simply do not fit well in any one o f three welfare state groups
described by his model. In particular, it has been suggested that the Netherlands
should other be classified as a conservative rather than social democratic regime or
as another “Christian Democratic” type o f welfare regime (Schmid 1996; van
Kersbergen 199S). My reply is framed by Esping-Andersen’s own acknowledgement
and response to this criticism (1999, 86-8).
First, Esping-Andersen advises that the majority of data he used to distinguish
the “three worlds of welfare capitalism” are from the 1980 period. Second, he
cautions of his welfare state model and its application that “no regime, let alone
country, is pure” and that there may be “slippery or ambiguous cases” because his
typology represents, “in a sense, ideal types.” Although Esping-Andersen concedes
that some countries will just not fit as well as others, he maintains there is good
support for his notion o f three welfare state clusters.
The real problem is how to deal with systematic deviants. The issue here is
whether a three-way typology adequately exhausts the variance. If there are
cases that follow a wholly different underlying logic, we would have to
construct yet another, separate ideal-type—a fourth “world o f welfare
capitalism” (Esping-Andersen 1999, 88).
This problem is best exemplified by the Netherlands, a country that exhibits
elements of both the social democratic and conservative welfare regime types. Van
Kersbergen (199S) has referred to the Netherlands as an “enigma,” a Christian
democracy built on corporatist foundations with extensive and generous social
welfare benefits (128). Esping-Andersen classified the Dutch welfare state as social
democratic because he found those traits predominant. According to his evaluation,
the potential decommodification that might be achieved through the Netherlands’s
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social insurance programs was so high, its welfare provisions so universal and
comprehensive—factors that weigh heavily in distinguishing between types of welfare
regimes—that it “appears ‘social democratic.’” Esping-Andersen is not alone in
making that determination. Goodin et al. (1999) have judged the Netherlands to be a
“social democratic exemplar,” even choosing that country for their case study o f a
social democratic nation (IS). Esping-Andersen has also recognized, however, that
the Dutch welfare state is “Janus-headed” in the respect that its social welfare system
makes a male bread-winner assumption and private associations play such an
important role in the delivery o f social services—which would make it appear
conservative. As it affects this analysis, the issue is two-fold. First, has there been a
lack of due consideration for its conservative traits that has caused the Dutch welfare
state to be misclassified? Second, is the welfare policy o f the Netherlands
fundamentally different than the three ideal types Esping-Andersen has already
identified? The answer to both questions is a definite “no.” Despite its variation from
ideal social democratic type—the Christian democratic legacy, its family assumption,
and the role played by private associations in the administration of social
services—the Netherlands is neither misclassified nor does it represent a “wholly
different” and deviant welfare strategy that warrants identification o f another welfare
regime type. It may be the worst fitting of those nations identified as social
democratic—and one country in the group has to be just that—but the Netherlands
clearly belongs in that cluster. The logic and attributes o f the Dutch welfare state are
predominantly social democratic, even though it does possess other and residual traits
at variance with the ideal type.
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Education. Social Policy, and Classifying Western Welfare States
Although education is not always recognized as part o f the welfare state’s
social policy package it is, no less than other public programs, recognized as a core
entitlement in most Western societies. After securing internal order and providing a
national defense, public education was one of the earliest functions undertaken by
modem governments—sometimes dating back to the late eighteenth century
(Schneider 1982). Education is today an integral part of the total social policy
package in all advanced industrial societies. Attendance at a public o r private school
is normally mandated by law for children at about five years o f age until their mid
teens, and literacy levels now approach 100 percent in most Western states (OECD
1997).
Education was not included with other social programs in the policy profiles
of the welfare states described by Thmuss, Heclo, or Esping-Andersen. In particular,
Esping-Andersen did not identify the kinds of education systems typically supported
by liberal, conservative, and social democratic welfare regimes. I argue that omission
makes his depiction o f welfare regime types and explanations for their overall
decommodification strategies incomplete. The education system and education policy
a state supports is closely associated with its welfare strategy. It is a two-way street:
the education system and education policy both affect, and are affected by, the
welfare strategy of the state. A regime’s education system and policy can be made to
serve its welfare, labor, and any number of other policy objectives. Education is both
a vehicle of commodification and a means to greater decommodification. As
education prepares an individual for entry into the labor market as a wage-eamer, it
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has a commodifying effect. However, as educational achievement enhances an
individual’s workplace opportunities and ability to establish the means and financial
resources for an existence apart from their dependence and participation in the labor
market, it can be an agency of decommodification (FurSker, Johansson, and Lind
1990). In this way, the socioeconomic benefits that may be realized as a result of
educational achievement can become functionally equivalent to, and even exceed, the
decommodification that may be achieved through the social security programs of the
welfare state.
Castles has remarked that “education offers social protection in a sense rather
different than social policy” (1989,431). Educational achievement, particularly at the
secondary and higher levels, is a recognized vehicle of social mobility (Becker 1964;
Janowitz 1976; Kaelble 1981). Educational achievement can diminish an individual’s
commodification by broadening future economic opportunities and enhancing their
ability to accumulate personal wealth, thereby reducing dependence o n wage labor
and market forces over the long run. Moreover, just as an individual’s long-term
reliance on social safety nets may be lessened by education, so can the welfare state’s
long-term requirements for income assistance and other social programs. Therefore, I
submit that state support o f public educational opportunities may be viewed as
alternative decommodification strategy that welfare regimes may choose to follow,
and an exhibited preference for one or the other may be an additional way to
distinguish between kinds o f Western welfare states.
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Educational Opportunity as an Alternative to Social Insurance
Kaelble (1981) traced the evolution o f modem education policy in France,
Germany, and Britain beginning in the nineteenth century. He focused on the social
changes that accompanied the growth in postprimary educational opportunities with
early industrialization until 1914. Particular attention was given to the historical
expansion o f educational opportunity—“the proportion o f children o f different social
or occupational classes obtaining secondary or higher education” (Kaelble 1981,
240).3
According to Kaelble’s account, neither secondary nor higher education
opportunities were normally associated with economic growth and development prior
to industrialization or during its initial stages (see also de Swaan 1988). The labor
market for those with postprimary training was limited—to the clergy, a few
professions, and the state bureaucracy. Moreover, access to a higher education was
the privilege of only a few—the elite and the wealthy—who appreciated postprimary
education as an instrument o f mobility into important church and state positions
(Kaelble 1981,241-2). With industrialization came a new and growing requirement
for a more highly educated workforce, and increasing recognition by aspiring persons
o f all soda! classes that postprimary education represented a “gateway” to

The operative definitions o f educational opportunity and the expansion o f
educational opportunities utilized in this work are consistent with Kaelble’s. First,
educational opportunity is the chance to obtain a postprimary level education.
Second, the expansion o f educational opportunities means growing enrollments and
increasing societal inclusiveness at the secondary and higher education levels. It is
crucial to recognize the exclusion o f mass, primary level educational achievement and
expansion from these definitions. This sets them distinctly apart from the educational
literature and theory like that represented by Boli, Ramirez, and Meyer (1985).
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socioeconomic opportunity. “Secondary and higher education began to gain
recognition as a transmitter of social status, though it was still not as important as in
the second half of the twentieth century relative to other instruments such as property
and ferniiy” (Kaelble 1981,243).
Kaelble considers the period at the turn of the twentieth century a transitional
era for educational opportunity and the role o f the state in public education (cf. Boli,
Ramirez and Meyer 1985). In what he has termed “the era o f welfare opportunities,”
the rules o f the game were changing. “The most important characteristic of the era of
welfare opportunities is the change in political structure and in educational policy
goals” (Kaelble 1981, 244). The state bureaucracy, organized business, and labor had
emerged as the dominant forces in a new political order beginning to take shape. It
was a goal of this new political constellation to make educational facilities and
opportunities more available and equal, at least at a basic level. Educational
opportunity was considered to be a public gateway, one that should have wide
access. Therefore, it was both expected and desirable that the government should and
must play a positive role in leveling the playing field and increasing educational
opportunities for the benefit o f everyone. Though real change and improvement in
educational opportunities would occur only slowly, “the new educational entitlements
were often recognized as constitutional or at least legal rights” (Kaelble 1981,244).
Today, the belief that one is “entitled” and has a “right” to a basic education and the
benefits of state-supported social welfare programs is typical o f public attitudes
prevalent in Europe and the United States.
Heidenheimer (1981) examined the long-term development o f public
entitlements in social welfare and education that occurred in Europe and the United
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States with the rise o f the welfare state. In particular, he hoped to discover why the
social insurance and postprimary education policies of the U.S. had developed
differently than those o f the larger states of Western Europe. He recommends a
possible explanation might be found during the initial stages o f welfare state
development, in a regime’s preference to champion social insurance o r postprimary
educational expansion as policy alternatives. “Postprimary education is perceived
here as an instrument for the realization of states’ concern with equality and security
goals, and hence the emphasis on education and social security programs are viewed
as alternative strategies pursued by emerging welfare states” (Heidenheimer 1981,
269). How welfare states have come to be institutionalized—what is their particular
kind and blend o f social welfare and education programs—is a legacy of this early
choice. Preferential support of educational opportunity or social insurance remains
today a policy option o f welfare regimes (Boix 1998; Castles 1989).
Heclo (198S) believes the development o f the American welfare state reflects
such a choice. He claims an “implicit trade-off” was made between investment in
social protections or educational opportunity in welfare state development, with
public and private education emphasized over other social programs. Janowitz (1976)
asserts this emphasis on education over social assistance is consistent with the
American concept o f welfare.
Massive support for the expansion o f public education, including higher
education, in the United States, must be seen as a central component of the
American notion o f welfare—the idea that through public education both
personal betterment and national and social and economic development would
take place (Janowitz 1976, 34-5).
The making o f education policy is not a random exercise o f government; it is
dearly not independent o f other public poiides. Education policy is a key component
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of a welfare state's total social policy package. It may be the object o f certain welfare
regimes to support and encourage postprimary educational opportunities, as an agent
of social mobility and vehicle to personal security, as an alternative to income and
other social insurance guarantees. Higher levels o f public investment in postprimary
educational opportunities—like that by the United States—may be viewed as an
alternative policy strategy to income maintenance programs and other social
insurance guarantees. On the other hand, it may be the strategy o f a welfare regime to
provide generous social insurance benefits as a quidpro quo for more restricted
public access to the education gateway, i.e., social security in exchange for limited
social mobility. Particular welfare regimes—like Germany—have historically given
political and budgetary preference to social insurance over education programs,
tending to limit its commitment to educational expansion and, therefore, the
opportunities for social mobility (Heidenheimer 1981, 27S).
Thus, where the political will and means do not exist to maintain the existing
socioeconomic order, educational opportunities—particularly postprimary—may be
publicly supported and encouraged as an agent o f social mobility. It may be the
purpose o f fewer and minimal state provisions for income security to encourage
greater self-reliance and to convey the message that public safety nets exist only as
temporary assistance and to buffer the effects of extreme socioeconomic change, not
to insulate the individual from every meanness o f life, societal competition, and
market forces. Under such a welfare state regime, public support o f educational
opportunities represents the individual’s chance for protection against life’s
uncertainties; it is the intended alternative to other social security guarantees by the
state.
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. . . it may be argued that education offers social protection in a sense rather
different from social policy in general. Certainly, state intervention is directed
to the provision of a guaranteed minimum standard, but its aim is equality of
opportunity rather than the equality of condition which is the rationale in
other welfhre arenas. Indeed, as Heclo has noted of the United States,
countries may choose to trade-off resources for education against the building
o f a welfare state (Castles 1989,431).
Research Questions
Is there evidence of a relationship, perhaps a trade-off, between government
spending for education and social insurance programs in Western welfare states? Do
some regimes exhibit a preference to invest relatively more in education, while others
direct a greater share o f public spending to social insurance programs? Is a welfare
state’s level o f financial commitment to social welfare programs a good predictor of
its investment in public education, and vice versa? Do welfare states with similar
social insurance provisions also support comparable education systems? Is there a
difference in education systems between welfare regime types? Does the typology of
liberal, conservative, and social democratic welfare states also apply to education
policy? Do Western welfare states “cluster” for the similarity o f their education
policies, just as they do for their social welfare programs?
Significance of the Research Problem
State-supported soda! welfare programs and the expansion of postprimary
educational opportunities are relatively recent phenomena in Western societies. Both
are assodated with industrialization, political democratization, the emergence and

^ u g h Heclo, The Welfare State in Hard Times (Washington, D.C.:
American Political Sdence Assodation, 1985), 16.
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evolution o f the welfare state. This is not meant to suggest, however, a condition o f
causality between industrialization or political development and the social policies o f
welfare states. The same must also be said for the expansion o f educational
opportunities. Such connections, as well as other explanations for social welfare and
education policies, are the continuing subjects of debate in the literatures of education
and the welfare state. The same applies to whether a welfare regime’s demonstrated
preference to support social insurance programs or educational opportunities may
reflect a choice between alternative policy strategies. If these are alternative policy
options that welfare states may elect to follow, is there any consequence or “trade
off’ in choosing one over the other? Furthermore, can particular kinds of welfare
states be discerned by the similarity of their policy profiles, by the different emphasis
they place on educational opportunities and social insurance programs? These are but
a few of the many questions about the nature of Western welfare states, their social
insurance and education policies. Most remain unanswered and many more are yet to
be asked. By exploring a select few of those questions and issues, I believe this work
can make a valuable contribution to the literature and what we know about the
welfare state.
At issue first is a better definition o f the Western welfare state and its policy
portfolio. I contend that most definitions o f the welfare state—including analytical
models and policy profiles—are incomplete for the omission of education policy. A
comprehensive definition and model of the welfare state would include education
with its other social policies. It is a central component o f a regime’s overall welfare
strategy. As it concerns typologies like those developed by Titmuss (1974) or
Esping-Andersen (1990), I would submit their models are incomplete rather than
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inaccurate. Second, it then follows, can it be shown that the kinds of welfare regimes
Esping-Andersen has identified—liberal, conservative, and social democratic—have
characteristic education policies as well? When education policy is the basis for cross
national differentiation, will welfare states array in clusters like those for social
policy? Third, if the clustering by regime type for education holds close to that for
social policy, with only limited exceptions,5 it makes sense that education policy
would be included in a more comprehensive definition o f the welfare state and its
policy profile. It also suggests a single analytical model might be more appropriate,
more powerful, and able to simultaneously explain both the education and social
policies o f the welfare state. Fourth, is there any evidence o f a “trade-off” between a
welfare regime’s support of education and social security programs? Are there certain
kinds o f welfare states that tend to view an emphasis on educational opportunities or
social insurance programs as alternative welfare strategies? Fifth, should the literature
concerning the expansion o f educational opportunities continue to be considered
separately and apart from that o f the welfare state? If analysis does indicate an
association between the two policy areas, and if a review o f the relevant literature
reveals a great similarity o f explanations for both welfare state development and
educational expansion, a melding of the two would seem both appropriate and
necessary.

A pure and perfect match between arrays or within regime types should not
be expected. Exceptions are possible. As Esping-Andersen has instructed, his model
only “show[s] that welfare states cluster, but we must recognize that there is no
single pure case” (1990,28). There are no real welfare states that are perfect liberal,
conservative, or social democratic regime types. Nations are classified according to
their predominant regime traits, even though they may possess elements of other
welfare state types.
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Finally, there is a more general issue. The specific nature of provisions for
healthcare, work injury, unemployment compensation, old-age pensions and
education bear important consequences for the socioeconomic opportunities and
outcomes of individuals, groups, the greater society, and the state. They say much
about the meaning and value of citizenship, about society’s view of the state and the
responsibility of the political community to protect the individual, families, and
groups. It is important that everyone know—scholars, policymakers, and citizens—if
certain types of welfare states are associated with specific education and social policy
outcomes. It is the job o f the scholarly community to find this out, to explain and
predict so that the political leadership may understand its policy options and the
consequences of its choices, and that the citizenry may be aware and appreciate the
nature and effect of the social programs and policies that affect their daily lives and
life’s opportunities for them.
Hypotheses
Esping-Andersen’s Welfare State Typology and Education Policy
Along with whatever provisions are defined for old-age pensions,
unemployment compensation, sickness benefits, and sundry other social assistance,
citizens o f every Western state also have a right to at least a basic education;6 it is
one component of the total social benefits package to which every citizen is entitled.
The specific nature o f a state’s social welfare system, along with the educational

6That right today is to a secondary level education, or ten to twelve years o f
formal education.
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entitlements and opportunities offered, reflect a particular welfare strategy. Once
again, I submit, any meaningful depiction o f a welfare state’s policy profile or
strategy is incomplete unless its education policy is also included.
Esping-Andersen associated unique social welfare policy agendas for
unemployment, health, and old-age compensation with three welfare state
types—liberal, conservative, and social democratic. Although education policy is not
considered in that welfare state model, I contend the typology will continue to hold
with its inclusion. In other words, just as Western welfare regimes tend to “cluster”
into three groups according to Esping-Andersen’s social insurance criteria, I
hypothesize they will gather in comparable arrays because of the similarity of their
education policies. This will be indicated by the “goodness of fit” of regressions on
national education expenditure data, when welfare regime type is controlled for as an
independent variable and specific source of cross-national variation.7 Evidence of
clustering can also be observed on graphs and plots of social insurance and education
data for the 1960-1990 time period, including: real education expenditures per capita
by welfare regime type, education’s share o f total public spending by regime type,
real social insurance expenditures by real education expenditures by welfare regime,
and the percentage of the secondary level students enrolled in general education
programs by real education expenditures.

7National data records have been coded as liberal, conservative, or social
democratic as specified by Esping-Andersen (1990).
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The Trade-off Between Educational Opportunities and Social Insurance
I hypothesize that certain Western states may exhibit a preference to support
educational opportunities or social insurance as part o f an overall welfare strategy.
Although public education and social insurance are but two of many programs that
must compete—and policymakers must consider—for public sector support and
budgetary allocations, there is also a specific competition between education and
social insurance that goes beyond the common battle for a piece of the budgetary pie.
This is manifested by a choice and may take the form of a “trade-ofT between
alternative welfare strategies. Preferential investment in educational opportunities or
social insurance are alternative decommodification options welfare regimes may
choose to support. Social insurance programs typically provide immediate financial
benefits, decommodification in the here and now for the individual and are a current
expense for the state. Spending for public education is also a current state expense,
but it offers only the means for individual decommodification. Benefits are neither
immediate nor guaranteed. State support o f public education opportunities is an
o

investment in the future; the social security it offers the individual is time-lagged. As
educational achievement is an agency of upward social mobility it may enhance the
potential for the accumulation o f personal wealth, and thereby enable future social
security and market independence. In this sense, support o f educational opportunities
represents another decommodification option that welfare states may elect to

*It would be wrong to consider the payment o f social insurance benefits an
expense incurred by the state without any expectation o f return, however. For both
the short- and long-term it may be argued that the safety net of social insurance
supported by the state adds to its legitimacy in the public eye, promotes domestic
tranquility, and helps to preserve the fabric o f the existing social order.
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support. Increasing levels of support for public education programs, measured as a
proportion of total public spending, is an alternative to the greater
decommodification that may be achieved through more generous income substitution
and health provisions.
I argue that such alternative decommodification strategies—and their
blend—can be demonstrated in the policy profiles o f the liberal, conservative, and
social democratic welfare states that Esping-Andersen describes, by their unique
implementations o f social insurance and education programs. In particular, I
hypothesize that liberal welfare regimes can be expected to spend more on education
as a proportion of their total public sector spending than either the social democratic
or conservative states. Furthermore, I hypothesize that regression modeling will show
that state expenditures for public education are inversely related to support for social
welfare policies in liberal and conservative welfare regimes. In liberal states there is a
policy trade-off that favors the allocation of public monies to education over social
welfare provisions. In conservative nations the relationship is reversed. In liberal
welfare regimes educational opportunity is viewed as an alternative to the
decommodification policies supported by social democratic states and the emphasis
on work-related insurance or “earned” benefits found in conservative welfare states.
Rather than broad and universal safety nets o f social insurance provisions, liberal
states offer educational opportunity as the individual’s protection against the
meanness o f life, and the individual is held responsible for his or her own outcome.
Given their emphasis on collective responsibility and greater concern for social order
and stability, I hypothesize that conservative welfare states can be expected to favor
social insurance programs over expanded educational opportunities. The trade-off in
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social democratic regimes will be less clear, however, where there is emphasis both
on collective responsibility and the opportunity for individual achievement
Social Mobility. Curriculum Emphasis and Educational Spending
I argue the three types o f Western welfare regimes—liberal, conservative, and
social democratic—have different education strategies and objectives. In particular,
this variation can be demonstrated by the different emphasis given to secondary
vocational and general education programs. Vocational training tends to be less
socially mobilizing given the normally terminal nature of those programs—they define
“end-points” in an education system and, therefore, the last stage of an individual’s
formal education. Vocational training is also a lesser vehicle of social mobilization
because of its workforce and working class orientation. General education, on the
other hand, often serves as preparation for higher education; it is the gateway to the
university and other advanced studies. Educational achievement at that level is an
important vehicle o f social mobility and means to greater socioeconomic
opportunities. In this sense, an emphasis on vocational training or general education
are alternative education policies that welfare states may support.
Because o f the belief in self-reliance and emphasis on educational
opportunities as an agency of upward social mobility, I hypothesize that liberal
welfare states can be expected to direct the highest share of public sector dollars to
education and have the highest rate of secondary-level students enrolled in general
education curriculums. Given their larger concern for collective decommodification,
but without sacrificing individual freedom and socioeconomic opportunities, I predict
social democratic states will be found to spend less on education than liberal regimes
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as a percentage of total public spending. They will also rank behind liberal regimes in
secondary general education enrollments for their greater support of vocational
training. However, they may demonstrate a comparable or even greater education
“effort,” as indicated by a higher level o f spending for education as a percentage o f
their GDP and a larger commitment o f real education dollars per capita. Finally, given
their concern for socioeconomic order and stability over social mobility, I
hypothesize that conservative welfare states can be expected to score behind both the
liberal and social democratic states in all educational spending categories analyzed,
but to rank slightly ahead of social democratic nations in vocational training
enrollments at the secondary level.
Preliminary Findings
A preliminary study of the association between education and the social
insurance programs in Western societies was performed using a sample of eighteen
OECD nations for which the most current and complete data were available from
OECD sources (Hokenmaier 1998). Country data were organized using EspingAndersen’s (1990) welfare state typology as the basis for cross-national and group
comparisons o f education and social insurance spending. Welfare regime type was
also utilized as an independent variable in regression modeling to ascertain what, if
any, cross-national variation in education and social welfare spending might be

N ational data were coded as liberal, conservative, or social democratic
according to Esping-Andersen’s specification. Australia, Canada, Ireland, Japan, New
Zealand, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States were assigned to
the liberal category. Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy were put in the
conservative group. Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden were
classified as social democratic.
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associated with particular constitutions o f the welfare state. Castles’ (1989) model to
explain the different patterns of education expenditure by OECD countries provided
the starting point, that equation modified to include Esping-Andersen’s welfare state
typology and enable an evaluation o f its explanatory power.
That initial investigation offered confirmation o f the relationship hypothesized
between education policy and the kinds o f welfare regimes described by EspingAndersen. Evidence of that association was provided by the calculations o f the
regression analyses, descriptive statistics, and variable graphing of education and
social insurance data by country and welfare state type. The data showed that liberal
states spent the greatest proportion of total public sector dollars on education, social
democratic states ranked second, and conservative nations last. However, while
liberal welfare states displayed leadership in education spending as a share o f total
public sector expenditures, social democratic regimes exhibited a tendency to put
more “effort” behind their education policies—as indicated by the higher real
education dollars spent per capita and the larger percentage of their GDP given to
education programs. Liberal states came in second and conservative nations brought
up the rear. The data also showed that liberal welfare states led in general education
enrollment rates at the secondary level, by such a wide margin that it might be
considered an alternative to the education policies o f social democratic and
conservative nations. The liberal emphasis on general education over vocational
training, together with the greater share o f public sector expenditures devoted to
education—and relatively less to social insurance programs—represents evidence
confirming Heidenheimer’s hypothesis that support of educational opportunities, as
an instrument o f state policy, may be an alternative to other social welfare strategies.
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Conversely, so does the greater stress by conservative regimes on vocational training
and the greater share of public monies given to social insurance programs.
Further Avenues o f Investigation
I recognize that the conclusions drawn from such a preliminary investigation
are necessarily limited. They pertain only to the data from a single cross-national
sample o f eighteen advanced industrial states in the early 1990s. Thus, the findings
may only reflect a one-time historical phenomenon relating specific welfare state
types to distinctive social and education policies. Moreover, there is no evidence o f a
previous or more enduring association linking these or other kinds o f Western
welfare regimes with specific social and education policies. It remains for additional
research to determine whether such distinctive policy profiles also existed in prior
periods, to the beginnings of welfare state development in the later nineteenth
century. Likewise, in the case o f Heidenheimer’s hypothesis, examination o f the
policy records of several nations is necessary to confirm whether or not an emphasis
on public education over other social insurance programs has been an ongoing and
alternative policy path followed by the governments o f particular kinds o f welfare
states.
Research Methodology
Further evidence is required to support or reject my hypothesis o f a trade-off
between public investment in education and other social programs. Without a further
examination o f specific national policy development and data, it is impossible to do
anything more than speculate about distinctive policy profiles or the causes for
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different and particular welfare state development. Gathering and analyzing additional
data is necessary to demonstrate the continuity or discontinuity o f possible causal
and variable associations with specific kinds of welfare regimes and policy
profiles. In order to accomplish this task, subsequent research employs two different,
but complementary methodologies: a case study of social policy development and
educational expansion for the German and American welfare states and, second, a
pooled and time-series cross-sectional analysis o f social welfare and education
expenditures for a large sample of OECD nations since 1960.
Population Definition and Sample Selection
In addition to Germany and the United States, the countries included in this
study are those for whom the OECD has compiled the most complete data for the
1960-1990 time period. The eighteen nations making up this group are Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. Where it was necessary to obtain supplemental information
from other sources it has been appropriately noted.
Literature Review
Three major theoretical explanations for welfare state development may be
distinguished that can direct this investigation—structural, political conflict, and
institutional models. First, that the change from pre- to industrial to post-industrial
society, associated socioeconomic transformations and demographic shifts, provided
the context for alternative policy choices between public education and social
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insurance (Wilensky 1975; Pontusson 1995). Second, that changes in the distribution
o f political power among actors in the social and education policy arenas have
affected the development of public policy. Democratization, mass enfranchisement,
and partisan control of the policy process have affected the evolution o f the welfare
state and its programs (Castles 1982; Hicks and Swank 1984, 1989, 1992). Third, the
initial institutionalization and subsequent path dependence of the maturing welfare
state affected the policy choices between public education and other social programs
(Skocpol 1979, 1985; March and Olsen 1984, 1989; North 1990). The level of
bureaucratic development and control over public policy, whether the state
organization is federal or unitary, the different political arenas and actors for
education and social policymaking, and the degree o f local support over education
and social policies—all these impact the trade-off between public investment in
education and other social programs (Weaver and Rockman 1993).
Additional and specific literature to be drawn upon includes that o f EspingAndersen (1990), who identified three kinds o f welfare regimes in advanced industrial
societies. The simplicity of that typology makes it attractive for use in this analysis.
That Esping-Andersen’s model has built-in assumptions about the objectives,
preferences, and tendencies of each welfare regime type for its social programs makes
it more so, especially as those “traits” might be associated with other public programs
receiving government support. Also included is the work of Castles (1989, 1994a) to
develop policy models that identify the causes for variation in education and social
welfare spending by Western societies. Added to these is that o f Heclo (1985), who
argued an “implicit trade-off’ was made between investment in social protections and
educational opportunity in the development o f the American welfare state, and
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Heidenheimer (198IX who recommended a preference to support postprimary
education or social insurance might be “viewed as the cores of alternative strategies
pursued by emerging welfare states” (269).
Organization o f the Study
Both a cross-national quantitative analysis and case studies o f Western
welfare states will be utilized in an effort to determine whether different kinds of
welfare regimes can be associated with specific policy outcomes, to see if variation in
social programs and education systems can be related to particular policy profiles and
constitutions o f the welfare state. The case studies will examine social and education
policy development and the “trade-off* thesis for Germany and the United States,
beginning in the later nineteenth century. Both nations began industrialization in the
nineteenth century and are today advanced industrial democracies, but each followed
a very different path of welfare state development. While they share some common
attributes of socioeconomic and political development, their institutional structures
and public policies are very different. There are clear differences, both in the kinds of
social and education programs found, and in the institutions o f government that
make, support, and implement public policy. According to Esping-Andersen’s
classification, they are different kinds o f welfare regimes. Germany fits the
conservative welfare state model and the United States the liberal.
Particular attention will focus on landmark events in social and education
policy (e.g., the establishment o f a public old-age pension system, the adoption of
comprehensive schools). Three major theoretical explanations for social policy and
welfare state development—structural, political conflict, and institutional
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nunHgk —will be analyzed for their power to explain these events. WKether an event
may demonstrate a preference by a welfare regime for education or social programs
as policy alternatives will also be examined.
Another chapter wQl undertake a quantitative examination o f th e “trade-off”
thesis. A pooled and time-series cross-sectional analysis will be performed using the
public expenditure data for a large sample o f OECD nations, beginning in 1960 and
continuing through 1990. Castles’ model to explain education spending is modified to
test the applicability o f Esping-Andersen’s welfare state model to the field of
education policy. The three welfare state types—liberal, conservative, and social
democratic—are tested for their association with unique education policies, to see if
variation in education policy can be explained by the particular constitution o f the
welfare state. While more limited in time horizon than the case study, it will involve
the evaluation o f many more data points from a wider sample of nations. Education
and social policy data will be taken from the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) editions of Education at a Glance: OECD Indicators and
national accounts data from OECD in Figures: Statistics on the Member Countries
and the OECD Political Handbook. Three hypotheses o f welfare state
development—structural, political conflict, and institutional—will be investigated as
possible explanations for public policy development, a relationship between kinds of
public expenditure and regime type, and a “trade-off” between social and education
policy—by welfare regime type and over time.
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Anticipated Findings and Conclusions
I argue that a more accurate and comprehensive policy model o f the Western
welfare state must include education with other social programs. Education policy is
a core component and not independent o f a welfare regime’s other social programs.
Indeed, there is a specific relationship between the types o f social welfare programs
found in Western societies and the kinds o f education policies their governments
support. I hypothesize this association is demonstrated by the three kinds of welfare
states Esping-Andersen describes. In other words, Esping-Andersen’s typology can
also be applied to the field of education policy, and Western welfare regimes will also
cluster according to similarity of their education policy profiles.
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CHAPTERn
THEORIES OF THE WELFARE STATE AND EDUCATIONAL EXPANSION
This chapter examines the leading explanations and factors associated with
welfare state development and the expansion of educational opportunities in
advanced industrial nations. Theories of welfare regime and social policy
development are considered first, followed by those for educational expansion. Each
section is organized according to a three-fold division—between structural, political
conflict,1 and institutional approaches—that predominates the welfare state literature.
Based on this review and analysis, three findings are submitted. Fust, very similar
theories and variables have been offered by scholars to explain both the social
programs and education policies supported by welfare states. Second, given the
correlation o f theories and explanatory variables, a single analytical model may be
more appropriate, powerful, and provide a simultaneous explanation o f both social
welfare and education policy. Third, such a model must take into account the
different timing and character of mass and postprimary educational expansion,
particularly as the latter paralleled and is associated with the development of the
modem state system, the process o f industrialization, the maturation o f the welfare
state and its social programs. Such a policy model is specified at the end of this
chapter.

Political conflict theory is used in this text as a general heading that includes
what other scholars refer to as conflict theory, political resource theory, or resource
mobilization theory.
37
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Theories of the Welfare State
Structural Theories
The “logic o f industrialism” is the most frequently offered o f structural
explanations for welfare state development. A Western theory o f modernization, it
states that welfare regimes and their social programs are the by-products o f economic
growth, sociocultural changes and demographic shifts. As nations undergo industrial
development, become more urban and their populations age, increased public
spending and new social programs are developed by the state as a structuralfunctional response to the expanding social needs of the national population (Cutright
1965; Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965; Wilensky 1975). An important assumption of this
“logic” is that the process of industrialization will also bring a convergence in
sociopolitical structures and public policies—regardless of political ideology and
regime type—as states move from pre- to modem to post-industrial stages (Skocpol
and Amenta 1986, 133). The tendency of this view is to emphasize w hat is similar
among nations and overlook that which is different. Partisan politics, ideology or
institutions are considered to matter little, or hardly, as structural forces are assumed
to drive specific policy outcomes. This also means that comparable sequences of
policy adoption for similar kinds o f social programs should be expected across
nations (Collier and Messick 1975). According to the “logic,” alternate paths of
welfare state development and differences in the timing for social program
implementation are attributable to different sociocultural conditions and variation in
levels o f economic development
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As with modernization theory generally, the logic of industrialism seemed to
be a good explanation for Western welfare state development in the decades
following World War Two. That period o f economic growth and prosperity
witnessed the expansion o f and increased spending for, social programs by many
Western nations. Implicit too, in the Western “logic,” was the wishful assumption
that political development would take place as a result of economic development, i.e.,
there would be a movement from less to more popular and democratic forms of
government as a consequence of economic growth and development. However, the
failure of many new and developing nations to become more democratic with
economic development, and setbacks to democratic development—the widespread
military takeovers in Latin America and elsewhere—forced a critical reexamination of
the logic o f industrialism as an adequate explanation of welfare state and social
program development. Skocpol and Amenta (1986) advise that many studies of
comparative social policy development have concluded that industrialization was
never a good indicator of welfare state development:
For the origins of welfare state programs, Flora and Alber (1981)
demonstrate that levels of industrialization fail to predict the timing of the
adoption o f a social insurance program by twelve European nations between
the 1880s and 1920s; Orloff and Skocpol (1984) show that in the same period
policy developments in Britain and Massachusetts cannot be differentiated
according to logic-of-industrialism variables; and Collier and Messick (197S)
find that neither levels nor significant thresholds o f industrialization explain
the tuning o f social insurance program adoptions in 59 nations between the
1880s and the 1960s. Examining Die expansion of various categories of social
public expenditures in 18 democratic capitalist nations during the 1960s and
1970s, Castles (1982b, 61-70) reinforces the conclusion o f the OECD (1978)
that these nations have recently diverged rather than converged and that
neither economic level nor economic growth can account for recent
expenditure changes. Furthermore, both Stephens (1979, Ch 4) and Myles
(1984, 94-7) adduce evidence against Wilensky’s (1975) pivotal argument
that national social welfare efforts are determined by the proportions of aged
in the population (Skocpol and Amenta 1986,133-4).
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A variation on the structural theme, a neo-Marxist alternative to the logic o f
industrialism, is the “logic o f capitalist development” or theory o f “monopoly
capitalism” (Gough 1975, 1979; O’Connor 1973; Offe 1984; Therbom 1978). The
argument o f this school is that the growth of the welfare state is caused by modem
capitalism’s need to “socially reproduce”; that is, the capitalist state must implement
public welfare programs—income and other social security guarantees—to safeguard
and perpetuate the socioeconomic and political order upon which it is based. Like
with the logic o f industrialism, social programs are supported by the capitalist order
as a consequence of economic development, but in order to buy-off and avoid a
working class revolt against the capitalist state (Piven and Cloward 1971). Precisely
such a strategy has been recognized in the social policies of the German chancellor
Bismarck, by which “he sought to conciliate the working classes.” The similarity of
the logic o f industrialism and the logic of capitalism is clear—both consider increased
social spending by the state a response to the changes brought by economic
development—but they differ according to the presumption of political competition
by the former and the importance placed on the class struggle and the domination of
monopoly capitalists by the latter.
There has been limited systematic cross-national research to test this neoMarxist explanation of the welfare state, and the findings have been inconclusive

2

Elmer Roberts, Monarchical Socialism in Germany (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1913), 118. Contemporary political observer Max Weber saw it
similarly, and considered “a grave political error” Bismarck’s conviction “that he
could create a positive attitude toward the state, and political gratitude, by granting
welfare benefits out of public funds or compulsory funds.” Max Weber, Economy
and Society: An Outline o fInterpretive Sociology, vol. 3, ed. Guenther Roth and
Claus Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press), 1390-1.
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(Pampel and Williamson 1988, 1428; Skocpol and Amenta 1986, 135-6). Three
particular, and related, issues remain and require explanation by those who advocate
this approach. First, what is the cause for cross-national variation in welfare regime
development between capitalist states? The timing and content of social programs
supported by the advanced industrial nations are not the same. This criticism applies
also to the logic o f industrialism. Second, it has seldom been the ruling class or their
capitalist state that has initiated and driven the expansion o f social programs. What is
the explanation for the welfare agendas of traditional liberal and authoritarian
governments? Finally, how and why is the development o f social welfare policy in
capitalist states any different than that for other societies undergoing
industrialization? The social problems and state responses seem largely the same
whether the economy is capitalist-dominated or not (Skocpol and Amenta 1986,
136).
OriofF and Skocpol (1984) argue that neither the logic o f industrialism nor
class-based (working class strength) theories can adequately explain the emergence of
welfare states and the very different social welfare paths taken by modem industrial
states. They claim this is particularly true for America and Great Britain. More
significant were the effects and timing of political democratization, a more inclusive
electorate, the process o f modem state-building (especially a professional
bureaucracy), and the emergence o f programmatic political parties.
Political Conflict Theories
Political conflict theory developed largely as a critical alternative to the logic
o f industrialism and modernization perspectives. Its proponents argue that the
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political process and the societal groups and interests represented in tlie decision*
making for public policy explain the development o f the welfare state and its social
programs. According to this view, political struggle and changes in th e distribution of
power among political actors in the policy arena matter greatly, affecting the timing
and development of social policy. Therefore, the process o f democratization, mass
enfranchisement, and partisan control of the policy process all influence the
development o f the welfare state and its social programs. This school does not deny
the importance o f economic factors in the shaping of public policy. They would insist,
however, that even as economic changes and demographic shifts may have a
tendency to increase social spending, it is a nation’s politics that explains the making
o f its particular social policies. An increase in state expenditures for old-age pensions
may well be associated with the growth of an elderly population, but it was through
the conflict and compromise o f mobilized interests within the political process that
the decision was made to do so.
There is a major division in this school between scholars who favor a
“democratic politics” approach and those who prefer a class-oriented or “social
democratic hypothesis.” Those who advocate the “democratic politics” variant
consider welfare state development to be the product of political democracy and the

3State support o f public welfare assistance and other entitlement programs is
not limited to a particular kind o f political regime. In particular, there is not a
necessary association between social welfare programs, other public entitlements, and
political democracy. Dictators may also invest in human capital and provide social
insurance against die meanness o f life. Social policy is often made and public goods
distributed by authoritarian states and their rulers in order to maintain order, stability,
and privilege—and even for the good of the individual or the larger community. This
does not mean that democratic nations never support social policies th a t are intended
to serve status quo objectives or protect privilege—some d<>—but they are more
inclined to serve a greater public good than the benefit o f just a few.
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peaceful competition o f societal groups seeking to implement their own policy
agendas

Social welfare policy is explained by the pluralism and competition o f the

political arena, its beneficiaries by the ability of citizens, social groups, and economic
interests to control the decisionmaking process (Dahl 1982; Downs 19S7; Flora and
Alber 1981; Getting, Haug, and Hinrichs 1994; Janowitz 1976; Lindert 1994;
Marshall 1964; Pampel and Williamson 198S, 1988, 1989; Reese 1986). Key to this
view is the idea that the conflict and compromise of groups is ongoing, that policy
coalitions are ever-shifting and never permanent. Little or no consideration is given to
more permanent socioeconomic structures or factors—like class or religion—as
significant variables affecting public policy (Uusitalo 1984,414). What is important
to welfare state development is the ongoing political struggle and compromise
between the potential recipients of social programs, the mobilization o f demographic
and interest groups that cross-cut and transcend socioeconomic, religious, cultural,
and other societal cleavages.
A larger group of the political conflict school focuses on the different
sociopolitical actors, the dynamics of class struggle, and the structure o f political
power within the welfare state. These scholars distinguish particular societal
groups—principally the working class and organized labor—their political
mobilization and resources, as central to the explanation o f welfare state and social
policy development. While they overlap, a general division falls between those
advocating a “power resource,” working class mobilization or social democratic
approach (Esping-Andersen 1985a, 1985b, 1990; Korpi 1983, 1989), and those who
concentrate on the role of the political right—o f bourgeois, conservative and
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Christian Democratic political parties—and the mobilization of religious interests
(Castles 1978, 1982a, 1989; Wilensky 1981).
Proponents o f the power resource approach consider the changing
distribution o f political power that occurred with the rise o f organized labor and
parties o f the left—associated with industrialization, socioeconomic change, and
democratization—crucial to the explanation o f the welfare state and the expansion o f
its social programs. According to this view, class divisions and conflict are significant
and ongoing factors in the making of public policy. It is hypothesized that working
class strength, as determined by the mobilization of the working class and its
representation in government by leftist or social democratic parties, is critical to
development of the welfare state and the expansion o f its social programs. In
particular, because the working class is the primary beneficiary, the increasing
political strength o f organized labor and parties of the left are considered major
factors in growth o f social welfare spending (Castles 1982a; Esping-Andersen 1985a,
1985b, 1990; Heclo 1974; Hicks 1999; Hicks and Misra 1993; Hicks and Swank
1984, 1992; Korpi 1983).
Social democratic corporatist theory stresses the mutually reinforcing roles of
strong left (i.e., Socialist, Labor, and Social Democratic) parties and strong
Labor movements. This is the case both for works o f Marxian origins, in
which government control by left parties and the existence of strong unions
are effective, albeit reformist, manifestations o f working-class mobilization
(Korpi 1983; Stephens 1979) and for neopluralist studies, in which these
parties and unions represent consequential political forces in democratic
societies (Cameron 1978; Hibbs 1987). Moreover, some scholars working in
this tradition have argued that governments led by centrist secular and
Christian Democratic parties have advanced income-security policy (e.g.,
Castles 1982; Wilensky 1981). From the social democratic corporatist
perspective, the most central proposition to emerge has been that left and
center (non-right) party leadership of government generates higher welfare
effort than right and “indeterminate” party leadership. However, some have
suggested important roles for oppositional, as well as governing, parties.
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The growth of electorally consequential left parties, or “contagion
from the Left, has sometimes led conservative governments to welfiireexpanding reforms (Esping-Andersen 1990; Heclo 1974) (Hicks and Swank
1992,659).
Castles (1978, 1982, 1989) is foremost among practitioners o f the political
conflict approach who would see other social actors—and even allow for structural
effects—as the critical forces in welfare state development and the making o f social
policy. Particularly important would be the strength and representation in government
of religious interests and political parties of the right (see also, Wilensky 1981).
Proponents o f this view would argue that increased social spending would be
expected where parties o f the political right are weak, or where denominational
interests are politically mobilized, or a combination (Kangas 1994, 349). Castles’
perspective is captured well in a 1981 article in which he evaluates another scholar’s
investigation of the causes for increased social welfare spending. Cameron (1978)
argued that a nation’s openness to the international economy was an important
determinant of its social spending. He argued that a nation’s dependence on foreign
markets created the internal conditions necessary—a strong labor movement and
mobilized working class electorate—that facilitated the rise to power of Labor and
social democratic parties. These parties o f the left, whose primary beneficiaries were
organized labor and the working class, then tended to expand social welfare

“Contagion from the left” is a term credited to Maurice Duverger, Political
Parties:Their Organization and Activity in the Modem State (New York: John Wiley
& Sons, 1954), xxvii). It refers to the action of political parties on the right that take
up certain policy issues of a mobilized left in order to gain electoral advantage.
Similarly, it may be used to explain why conservative governments—like that o f
Bismarck—undertake social program initiatives to gain popular support when the
distribution o f power resources is changing to favor more leftward-inclined
sociopolitical forces.
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expenditures when they held the reins of governmental power. In his reaction, Castles
(1981) cautioned Cameron and others similarly inclined not to become too bound by
reductionist explanations that purport similar outcomes for given societies based on
one or just a few socioeconomic factors. He advised that, although the international
political economy may certainly have a significant structuring effect, a nation’s own
institutional arrangements and partisan politics may also shape its social policies. In
particular, the influence of different societal arrangements and political contexts
should be recognized as important causes for cross-national variation in social policy.
In other words, a nation’s unique politics and institutional arrangements matter, too.
Institutional Theories
Historical institutionalists would not necessarily argue that proponents of
structural or political conflict theories are wrong, but that the significance of political,
social and economic institutions and institutional organization must be considered in
any satisfactory explanation of welfare states and their social policies. Institutions
structure, order, and modify political activities (North 1990). A nation’s institutional
setting, its organization and the rules for political competition, affects its
policymaking process and outcomes (Hicks, Misra and Ng 199S; Lijphart 1984;
March and Olsen 1984; Weaver and Rockman 1993). Institutional differences
provide a powerful explanation for cross-national variation in welfare state and social
policy development. An institutional perspective can provide the analyst with a
“theoretical bridge” between the individuals who made history and the context in
which they made it (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992,10).
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. . . in general, institutionalists are interested in the whole range of state and
societal institutions that shape how political actors define their interests and
that structure their relations o f power to other groups. Thus, clearly included
in the definition are such features of the institutional context as the rules o f
electoral competition, the structure o f party systems, the relations among
various branches o f government, and the structure and organization o f
economic actors like trade unions (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992, 2).
Institutions are also important political actors, autonomous in their own right
and participants both in the making and implementation o f public policy (Skocpol
1979, 1985). Institutions tend to develop vested interests in, and seek to influence,
current and future public policy (March and Olsen 1989; Skocpol and Amenta 1986,
149-51). Therefore, the particular institutionalization o f the state—its structure,
capacity, and autonomous interests—must be considered a critical differentiating
variable that affects the timing and development of the welfare state and the
substance of its social programs (DeViney 1983; Pampel and Williamson 1989;
Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992; Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol 1988). The level of
bureaucratic development and control over public policy, whether the state
organization is federal or unitary, the different political arenas and actors for
education and social policymaking, and the degree o f local support and control over
education and other social policies—all these impact the development and public
investment in social programs (Heidenheimer 1973, 1981; Huber, Ragin and
Stephens 1993; Lipset 1959). Moreover, the initial institutionalization and subsequent
path dependence of the maturing welfare state must affect its policy choices (EspingAndersen 1990; North 1990).
According to this school, institutions may structure and influence but do not
necessarily predetermine the outcome o f political conflict. As they represent the
legacy o f prior policies and past partisan struggles, institutional arrangements may,
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however, be predisposed to perpetuate certain inequalities and favor specific parties.
This property o f institutions, that they bear the legacy o f previous political relations
and policies, establishes path dependence as an important characteristic of
institutional operation. Thus, as institutions cany the past into the present and into
the future, they do not necessarily respond in the most efficient and effective fashion
to real system requirements, contrary to assumptions o f the functionalist approach. In
fact, they may inhibit rather than lead to needed solutions in the most efficient manner
(North 1990).
March and Olsen (1989) claim that the social programs o f the American
welfare state, once they become institutionalized, tend to have such a structuring and
self-perpetuating effect. Programs like Medicare and Social Security’ s old-age
pension system have created their own clientele—from recipient groups and within
the administrative apparatus of the state—that have a vested interest in the ongoing
policymaking and the government’s continued support o f those social policies. In a
similar vein, Skocpol and Amenta (1986, 149-50), Skocpol (1992, 57-60), Pierson
(1993, 1996) speak o f a comparable “policy feedback” effect, that existing public
policies may have an impact on subsequent policymaking.
Going further still, and although he is associated chiefly with the social
democratic model, Esping-Andersen (1990) contends that the social policy legacies
of advanced industrial societies have been institutionalized in three distinctive “worlds
of welfare capitalism,” in three different kinds of Western welfare state (see also
Goodin et al. 1999). He claims that those welfare regime types-liberal, conservative,
and social democratic—can be associated with unique policy profiles for health,
unemployment, and retirement benefits. Esping-Andersen’s powerful institutional
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argument has not been without controversy in the scholarly community, but less for
his assertion about the institutionalization o f three particular lands of welfare regime
types than for the modifications others would make to his three-fold classification
(Castles and Mitchell 1992; Mitchell 1992; Hicks, Misra, and Ng 1995).
Theories o f Educational Expansion
Self-perpetuation is the least complicated o f the explanations for educational
expansion. From generation to generation, sons and daughters have tended at least to
match the educational achievement of their parents. As populations have grown with
the passage of time, so have educational institutions and student enrollments.
Moreover, as ever larger segments of national populations received at least primary,
and then secondary and university educations, so did a growing proportion of
children as they followed in their parents’ footsteps. Such an “inheritance effect” is
far from a satisfactory explanation o f educational expansion by itself however. It
does not account for the influence of other socioeconomic and political forces that
are external to population growth and education as a self-perpetuating process
(Windolf 1997, 3).
The Different Literatures of Mass and Postprimarv Educational Expansion
Most studies o f educational expansion have focused on the mass, or primary
level. I have termed that literature the “John Meyer” school for his prominence in
those works.5 Scholars who have investigated the expansion o f secondary and higher

5See, for example: Meyer, Ramirez, Rubinson, and Boli (1977); Meyer,
Tyack, Nagel, and Gordon (1979); Ramirez and Meyer (1980); Boli, Ramirez, and
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education are fewer in number. They include Ringer (1979), who examined the
changes in secondary and higher education systems in Europe during th e nineteenth
century and Kaelble (1981), who explored the expansion of “educational
opportunities”—growing school enrollments and increasing societal inclusiveness at
the postprimaiy level—as a gateway to upward social mobility. Heidenheimer (1973,
1981, 1993, 1997) studied the relationship of postprimaiy education to other social
programs, the role of the state in the expansion of higher education, education
reforms, and state support of postprimary educational opportunities as an alternative
policy strategy to investment in social insurance programs by emerging welfare
states. Windolf (1992, 1993, 1997) has analyzed the structural changes and
expansion of higher education in many of today’s advanced industrial nations, paying
particular attention to the possible effects of economic development and business
cycles on higher education enrollments since the late nineteenth century.
Mass education has been linked to the process o f modem state-building, to
the stage of incorporation when “individuals are being reconstituted as active,
purposive members of the rational society or national state” (Boli, Ramirez, and
Meyer 1985, 170). While this explanation generally describes the Western
experience, taking place before large-scale industrialization, the expansion o f
secondary and higher education followed a different pattern. The takeoff in those
sectors was associated with the emergence and growth o f the welfare state, after
incorporation by the modem national state, when the process o f industrialization was
well underway. Given the relative coincidence in time and the contrary societal

Meyer (1985); Meyer, Scott and Strang (1987); Ramirez and Boli (1987); Meyer,
Ramirez, and Soysal (1992).
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objectives of postprimaiy educational expansion and social security programs—the
former a vehicle of upward mobility and the latter a mechanism for status quo
preservation—the political regimes of many Western societies were confronted by a
most important decision to make about a policy strategy to follow with respect to the
level o f state investment in education versus other social programs. Where secondary
and higher education opportunities were considered an alternative to social security
programs “as an instrument for the realization o f states’ concern with equality and
security goals,” it was a choice between an “emphasis on education and social
security programs. . . as the cores of alternative strategies pursued by emerging
welfare states” (Heidenheimer 1981,269).
Heidenheimer’s claim is examined in more detail in the cross-national
quantitative analysis and case studies that follow, along with the other hypotheses of
this work that stipulate there is a relationship between the education and social
policies of Western welfare states. Even before those presentations, though, some
evidence o f that association is furnished by the discussion below. The literature on
educational expansion will be found to be remarkably similar to that for the welfare
state; the arguments and logic are often the same. This is not simply a matter o f
happenstance. There are a number o f scholars who have combined study of the
welfare state’s education policy with its other social programs (Castles 1989; de
Swaan 1988; Heclo 1985; Heidenheimer 1973, 1981; Lindert 1994). At the outset
they assumed there was an association between the two policy areas and, therefore,
they utilized in their research many o f the same or similar variables and explanations
for both educational expansion and social welfare development. That was for their
appreciation that the policymaking for both education and social welfare was a
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response io and was affected by many of the same or similar social problems,
structural forces, political actors and institutions.
Structural Theories
Structural explanations for the growth o f public education systems are much
like those for the development of the welfare state and its social programs.
Educational expansion is viewed as the necessary technical-functional response by the
state to the logic o f industrialism and the imperatives of modernization. According to
this argument, a more highly educated, skilled, and differentiated work force is
required to support economic growth and modernization. The most typical structural
theories are those that link educational expansion with socioeconomic growth and
development (Cutright 1965; Kaelble 1981; Lipset 1959; Wilensky 1975), with
economic development and investment in human capital (Becker 1964, 1993; Schultz
1961), or to the modem state-building project (Boli, Ramirez, and Meyer 1985;
Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 1992).
Most structural arguments predict the timing of educational expansion to
coincide with industrialization and economic development. Accordingly, the growth
of education systems is associated with the other political and sociocultural changes
and demographic shifts that accompany economic growth and development—
increasing national wealth, urbanization, modem infrastructures, a healthier and aging
population, etc. Urban populations and industrial areas are expected to expand earlier
and more than rural, with higher overall participation rates and greater proportions of
male than female enrollments. Some have even suggested the possibility that political
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democratization might be associated with rising national literacy (Almond and Verba
1965; Dewey 1930; Lipset 1959; Cutrigfat 1963).
Like its counterpart in the literature on the welfare state, a neo-Marxist
alternative to the logic o f industrialism would charge that the primary function o f
public education and educational expansion is to reproduce die class order and wage
labor for the capitalist economic system (Bowles and Gintis 1976; Hus6n 1972, 1975;
Levin 1978). As this conviction is interpreted by Rubinson (1986), educational
expansion may be viewed as a capitalist strategy to control or pacify the working
class. The growth o f educational opportunities for the working class is expected to
occur during periods o f increasing immigration and labor militancy, to reinforce the
class structure, absorb excess labor, and buffer potential social unrest (Rubinson
1986, 524-5).
An important variation of the technical-functional argument is offered by
human capital theorists. They explain educational expansion and increasing literacy as
a response to the requirement for skilled labor by economic development To help
meet this demand, the state may increase its support o f education and training
opportunities—invest in its human capital. These theorists claim that state investment
in education and training systems is returned with value added. Educational
achievement can both better the individual and benefit the nation, increasing the value
and productivity of each. The expansion o f educational opportunities and a
workforce trained in modem skills can fuel the economic growth o f the nation,
reduce poverty, and be an agent of socioeconomic mobility—the gateway to
individual opportunity. According to Becker (1993),
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[the] evidence is now available for many points in time from over one hundred
countries with different cultures and economic systems. The earnings o f more
educated people are almost always well above average, although the gains are
generally larger in less-developed countries (17).
Proponents o f human capital theory expect that citizens wfll behave as rational
economic actors, act in their seif-interest and take advantage o f expanding
educational and training opportunities to better their advantage in the job market
Indeed, for the socioeconomic opportunity it represents, there is powerful incentive
for the individual to take advantage o f such state-supported educational opportunities
(Fuller and Rubinson 1992,10-11).
The modernization argument o f the logic o f industrialism and its logic o f
capitalism alternative have been critically received by the scholarly community. As
with their cousin theories concerning the development o f the welfare state and social
policies in early industrializing nations, the historical record simply does not support
such arguments. In the particular case o f the United States:
primary enrollments were already high before industrialization, and the
pattern o f school expansion his never moved to the rhythm o f
industrialization. Schooling was initially a rural, agrarian phenomenon, and
enrollments in rural areas were higher than in urban, indukrial areas until at
least the 1920s. Enrollment rates in high schools were higher in white-collar
than in blue-collar areas, and these rates have always been higher for girls
than for boys. During the 1890-1924 immigration o f people from the militant
working class, the effect o f immigration on the growth of public secondary
schooling was negative, not positive (Rubinson 1986,525-6).
The “John Meyer” school rejects those explanations for the growth o f mass
education that would make it a logical response to the functional requirements o f
industrialization, a solution to problems o f socioeconomic change, an effort to
reproduce the class order, or the consequence o f some self-perpetuating “inheritance
effect” Instead, they contend that universal primary education is part o f the greater
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nation-building project in the modem world. In what has been termed the “world
institution theory” (Fuller and Rubinson 1992), and a Western view o f human
progress, mass education is viewed as the instrument which prepares individuals for
their incorporation into the nrp niMrtraw and institutions of the modem nation-state.
We argue that mass schooling made sense in so many contexts because it
became a central feature o f the Western, and subsequently the world, model
o f the nation-state and its development Nation-states expand schooling
because they adhere to world models o f the organization o f sovereignty (the
modem state) and the organization o f society as composed o f individuals (the
modem nation) (Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 1992,129).
Hence, compulsory and universal primary-level education systems were
instituted by modernizing political regimes as part o f their effort to make from
traditional societies the kind o f citizens required by the political and economic
institutions o f the modem administrative state (see also de Swaan 1988, Ch. 3).
Through the device of mass schooling—an instrument of common socialization—
traditional social groupings and linkages based on religion, culture, family or village
were deliberately weakened or severed so that an individual's identification and
allegiance would be transferred to the new “rational” state (Boli, Ramirez, and Meyer
1985,156). Ergo, mass education was not necessarily caused by industrialization or
the events associated with it Mass education, like industrialization, is considered a
necessary part o f the larger process of modernization. In particular, the histories of
educational expansion in the United States, Japan, and much o f Europe do not
support such a causal relationship, where large-scale industrialization actually
followed mass education (Boli, Ramirez, and Meyer 1985, 153; Meyer, Ramirez, and
Soysal 1992,130).
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Politic*! Conflict Theories
lilre its welfare state counterpart, political conflict explanations for
educational expansion developed largely is a critical alternative to the logic of
industrialism and class reproduction theories (Centre for Contemporary Cultural
Studies 1981). It is similarly argued that such grand theories fail to account for cross
national variation in the timing and development of education policy and systems.
Those differences can only be explained by the societal groups and interests involved
in the policymaking for education, by the straggle and changes in the distribution o f
political power among actors in that policy arena (Archer 1979,1989; Boix 1998;
Castles 1989; de Swaan 1988; Kaelble 1981; Lindert 1994; Ringer 1979; South 1991;
Windolf 1992,1997; Windolf and Haas 1993). The level of democratization, mass
enfranchisement, and partisan control of the policy process—all these affect the
evolution o f education policy. Economic development and demographic factors may
also help to explain, but it is a nation's own particular politics that determines the
making o f its unique social policies. Increases in education expenditures may be
aymfHitgH with economic growth and increases in the school-age population, but it
talraa the conffict and compromise of societal groups and interests that are mobilized
and have political agency to make it happen.
Some have coupled the expansion o f primary-level educational opportunities
with religious influences and then with democratization. Rokkan suggests that in the
Protestant nations o f northern Europe “the early development of literacy encouraged
the mobilization o f lower strata into mass politics” (Flora 1983,21). However, for
those European states where the Catholic Church enjoyed great influence over the
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state and society, “the late development o f literacy retarded spontaneous mass
mobifization and the conflicts over the control o f the educational system led to efforts
by the Church to mobilize against the state” (Rokkan, in Flora 1983,22). As w dl as
with democratization, mass mobilization is also associated with the development o f
West European welfare states beginning in the late nineteenth century. The extension
o f suffrage to all adult males, the appearance o f mass political parties, and the
initiation o f state-supported social welfare programs, all occurred at roughly the same
time (Rokkan, in Flora 1983,24). Primary-level literacy also rose during this period,
but it was only with the large expansion o f the welfare state following the Second
World War that the great increases in postprimary educational opportunities took
place.
Ringer (1979) studied the changes in European secondary and higher
education systems starting with those prior to the beginnings o f intensive
industrialization in the later nineteenth century. Although he acknowledges parallels
can be made between European industrialization and the expansion o f secondary and
higher education, Ringer challenges economic functionalist explanations. He rejects
technical-functional theories that suggest a strong relationship between economic
development and the growth of education systems, especially prior to the “late
industrial phase” that began in the 1930s. Quite simply, early industrial development
did not require a highly trained workforce. Only with the take-off o f the “high
industrial phase” in the 1860s did postprimary and technical education start to
acquire greater economic significance. Enrollments in new curriculums that
emphasized technical and applied studies began to increase significantly, but “it
played a really decisive role only within specific sectors of the educational systems”
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(Ringer 1979,3). Not until the later nineteenth century, and into the twentieth, did
educational expansion, particularly o f secondary and higher education opportunities,
begin to coincide with the changing manpower requirements of the economy—that is,
in relation to the demands o f economic development Only in the “late industrial
phase,” with the great expansion o f mass education systems already completed, did
the changing workforce requirements o f advanced industrial economies make
secondary and university preparation essential and a prerequisite to many career
occupations.
. . . the specific contribution o f education to economic development could not
have been as great in 1850 as in 1900 or in 1950. The needs o f the early
industrial economy differed from those o f its high industrial successor, for
there were dramatic changes in the technological and scientific “contents” o f
industry___ In short, a clear and direct relationship between higher education
and the economy probably did not emerge until the high industrial phase in
the history of European education, when certain forms of scientific and
technical instruction became at least contributing causes o f further economic
growth (Ringer 1979,5).
Ringer observes a better explanation for educational expansion might be
found in the social conflict and political struggle that was characteristic o f many
Western societies during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Increasing
democratization and political reforms accompanied—and may have been a force
behind—the expansion of educational opportunities. Such an examination might
identify the array of social groups and interests behind the social changes and political
reforms o f that period. Also to be explained are the increases in secondary and higher
education enrollments that occurred during times of economic recession in the
nineteenth century. Given the assumed resistance o f education systems to change and
the influence o f economic forces, this is a “curious phenomenon” that should not
have happened (Ringer 1979,4-6). These examples may be evidence o f a linkage
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between education, the economy, and political competition that requires further
exploration. Likewise does the great expansion o f secondary and higher education
systems that occurred in the context o f the “late industrial phase.” No longer was the
education system a limited transmitter o f socioeconomic power and social status for
just a few. The significant increase in public education facilities at the secondary and
higher levels made educational attainment—for almost everyone—a virtual gateway
to socioeconomic opportunity. By itsel£ the logic of industrialism is not an adequate
explanation. The education system had undergone changes far more than that
necessary to meet the functional requirements o f industrialization. It had been remade
as an institution. Social and political ownership o f the education system had changed
hands. Its primary beneficiaries were a different and greatly enlarged group. The
education system’s societal mission was updated and its curriculum modernized. The
real story lies in the analysis o f the struggle of the social and political forces that were
behind this transformation o f the public education system.
Archer (1979) also looks to a society and its political system for explanations
o f education policy. Who is in control o f the education establishment, and the degree
to which education is politicized, that is what matters. She contends that public
education systems are the product o f the struggle between competing socio-political
groups who seek to “own” them, to control and direct their resources and purpose.
Therefore, the education establishment plays a subordinate role to the social and
political parties and institutions upon which it depends for resources. This
dependence causes a lack o f autonomy for education as an institution, inhibiting
change from within (endogenously), and creating a condition o f high vulnerability and
responsiveness of educational institutions to the group that “owns” the education
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system (Archer 1979,63ff). According to Spring (1980), however, educational
garp«n«nn in the United State* h « established a greater role for the state over time
and, with it, a powerful education bureaucracy that has tended to marginalize
working- and lower- class interests.
Another view, and a critique o f the human capital approach, is advanced by
proponents o f "individual status competition” and "credentialism* arguments (Boudon
1977; Dore 1976). Where other conflict theorists are concerned with the struggle and
political competition o f social groups and other interests, the focus o f these scholars
is the individual. Although Boudon (1977) is associated with the actual formulation
o f status completion theory, it is rooted in the claim o f the Prussian statistician and
economist Eulenburg who, in a 1904 publication, declared that the expansion of
higher education enrollments might be more encouraged by economic downturns and
less, perhaps even discouraged, by economic growth and development It was upon
this idea that Boudon hypothesized his theory o f individual status competition, that
educational expansion might occur in a poor economy as a result o f a tight job
market, one that drove increasing numbers of individuals to compete for the
credentials and social status o f a university education—something that would make
them attractive to prospective employers (Windolf 1992,7). The underlying
assumption was that "employers [would] use credentials and other indicators of
educational attainment to predict the trainability and productivity o f potential
employees or, alternatively, that job seekers [would] use educational attainment to
signal their suitability for desired position** (Craig 1981,1S3). Educational
achievement was a means of social differentiation, a gateway to socioeconomic

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

61
opportunity. Similarly, Dore (1976) speaks of a “diploma disease” that is
characteristic o f many societies and drives educational expansion.
Coffins (1971,1979) also argues that it is not technical-functional
requirements, but the competition for the credentials o f educational achievement that
drives educational expansion in many modem societies. However, Collins sees this
competition as one by groups for control o f the education establishment. Domination
o f the education system could be used to the advantage o f the group and its
members, to enable preferential access to the education system by its members,
permit direction of curriculum development, and even to impose a particular value
system as the societal standard (Boli, Ramirez, and Meyer 1985, 153).
Proponents o f a dass-conffict theories consider the formal education system a
tool o f the ruling class and governing elites to protect and ensure the reproduction o f
the capitalist order that supports their privilege and dominance. According to this
view, mass education systems exist to reproduce the class order and represent the
interests of capital. Also termed the theory of'“class imposition,” it is argued that the
expansion of mass education “has reflected the need o f industrial capitalism for a
mechanism o f class labor control to discipline the working class, to create proper
work attitudes, and to block the growth o f a socialist ideology” (Rubinson 1986,
524-5). Public education is viewed as an instrument of control used to socialize
individuals so that they may “fit” a socioeconomic order that requires their labor but
denies them a fair return. However, as Fuller and Rubinson (1992) point out, the
early development o f mass education in “weak states” like the United States took
place before the state was greatly involved. Moreover, not only does it assume the
“concerted action” o f widely disparate capitalist interests, it was at a time when such
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an alliance of economic interests was highly unlikely. Rubinson (1986), in a study o f
the determinants for educational expansion in the United States, argues that “class
analyses have failed because (1) they neglect the role o f the political process in
transforming class interests into institutional patterns, and (2) they neglect the
process by which political structures themselves become important determinants o f
c1m « formation”

(S19). In many Western nations the expansion o f mass education

took place before large-scale industrialization or building o f the modem
administrative nation-state. Therefore, claims that mass education systems were
created as instruments of ruling class domination through the concerted actions o f
unified economic elites or by modem administrative states lacks historical foundation
(Fuller and Rubinson 1992,11).
Representative of the dass-conflict perspective, de Swaan (1988) explains the
spread of mass primary education in the early industrializing nations as the
consequence of societal struggles to control state institutions and the progress of
nation-state development Although de Swaan’s view does support the “world
institution” thesis (Boli, Ramirez, and Meyer 1985), that mass education systems
were an essential part of the modem nation-building project, his analysis goes a level
further. He attempts to identify the underlying social forces—the specific social,
economic, and political groups—that were mobilized, had political agency, and
participated in the battle over nation-building. According to de Swaan, those engaged
included the state bureaucracy, metropolitan elites, industrialists, middle class
entrepreneurs, rural elites, and the clergy. In a basic sense, it was a contest between
the new metropolitans and the old rural order—an alliance o f modernizing secular vs.
religious and traditional land-owning interests—over what vision o f the state would
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prevail. Those supporting a greater centralization and institutionalization o f the
nation-state, an alliance o f metropolitan dements, favored a standard national
curriculum. Groups that opposed the further centralization o f the state, rural elites
and the clergy, preferred to retain local control over education systems (de Swaan
1988,116-17). The education systems that have resulted reflect a greater similarity of
curricuhuns nationwide, but not without certain provisions for local autonomy and a
place for religion.
In the course of a long century o f competition, local autonomy and
idiosyncrasy disappeared and a single national standard curriculum prevailed,
with variations in religious coloring. The struggle between traditional-local
and metropolitan elites around a centralizing state was fought out in terms of
denominational versus secular control—that is, as a conflict about religion—
the only denominator that could bring regional elites together in a national
coalition.
The outcome was a compulsory national elementary-school system
where all children are trained in the basic skills o f communication in a
standard code valid throughout the nation: speaking; reading and writing the
national language, manipulating the basic operators o f arithmetic,
understanding space and time in terms of a national geography and history
(de Swaan 1988,117).
W indolf(1992,1997) is typical o f many in the academic community who do
not fit neatly into any one theoretical category or school He finds no single
explanation for expansion o f higher education satisfactory fix’all times, conditions,
and places. Instead, he advocates a mixed view o f the causes for higher education
expansion that is part structural-functional part political conflict At base; though,
Windolf believes “the driving force behind university expansion in Germany and other
European countries are political struggles. . . the political struggle of different social
groups for access to universities” (1997, ix, xi). It is his further conclusion that higher
education has expanded with the increasing differentiation o f education systems over
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time, and that differentiation is the means by which elite reproduction is accomplished
(1997).
Windolf particularly discredits explanations o f educational expansion that rely
upon human capital theory. To those who would associate the growth o f enrollment!
in higher education with the conditions o f the market and rational actor decisions,
Windolfresponds that the “data show that it is not economic upswing but precisely
economic downturn which accelerates educational expansion—in apparent contrast
to all the laws of economic rationality” (1997,12). In a 1992 work, Windolf
evaluated the human capital and status competition theories, as well as his own
“political” theory, as explanations for the expansion o f higher education in France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United States between 1870 and 198S. His own
theory belonged in the category o f political conflict, with educational expansion
viewed as a function of “the collective competition among social groups for political
and cultural advancement and for participation in political decision making” (Windolf
1992,8). While he could not confirm the human capital theory for any o f the sample
countries over the period of investigation, the data did confirm support for the
expansion thesis of the status competition theory for most o f the nations. Windolf and
Haas (1993) conducted a similar analysis for the period between 1870 and 1990,
evaluating the human capital and status competition theories as explanations for the
relationship between economic conditions and the expansion o f national education
systems. They report that the data for France, Germany and Italy tended to support
the status competition theory because educational expansion took place under
unfavorable economic conditions. On the other hand, educational expansion in the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

65
United States and Japan generally followed economic growth and development, as
the human capital theory would predict
South (1991) utilized a political conflict approach to investigate the effects o f
group size and political influence by school-age and elderly populations on spending
for social welfare and education programs in the United States. He found that a large
or growing elderly population may negatively affect public spending on programs for
the young.6 South submits that such a conclusion would seem to counter Preston’s
(1984) hypothesis that public expenditures on education and the political power o f
children increases with the size o f the school-age group. He reasons an explanation
might be found in the greater political clout of the elderly, their access to the political
system and ability to advance their own interests, while children must rely upon
others to represent their cause. South also recommends it could make a difference
that the major programs which benefit the elderly—like Social Security and
Medicare—are administered by the federal government, while those for the
young—like education and welfare assistance—are largely funded and administered
by the states and local governments. Given such a division of policy responsibilities
between levels o f government, a more complete explanation might be achieved by
considering an institutional perspective as well.
Certainly, for their greater economic resources and because they can vote, the
elderly have a clear advantage in political agency over school>age children. In
addition, the young are disadvantaged by the institutional process that determines

6A similar finding has been reported by James Poteiba, “Demographic
Structure and the Political Economy o f Public Education,” Journal o fPublic Policy
Analysis andManagement 16 (1997); and Maris A. Vinovskis, Education, Society
and Economic Opportunity (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).
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social welfare and education policy. It is not insignificant that social welfare programs
whichbenefittheelderly are handled by the federal government or that social security
is the “third raiT o f American politics, while most decisions about education spending
are left to state and local politics. The financial support o f Social Security and
Medicare does not depend on locsl approval o f a mfilage proposal The high voter
turnout o f the elderly population, combined with the federal attribute o f public
policymaking, explains much about the different characteristics o f spending for oldage and youth programs in the U.S. In a study o f support for increased federal
funding for education by different age cohorts, Vinovsids (1993) “found that age is
the best overall predictor of support. . . and that the older population is much less
supportive o f these increases than the younger population” (61). Lindert (1994)
suggests that increasing government expenditures for an aging population have
caused a reduction in support for education: “the aging o f the adult population may
well drag down education, presumably through unwillingness to pay more taxes for
schools” (33). The consequence of an aging population for education policymaking in
a democratic political system may be a trade-off between education and other social
policies. This may be particularly true where education is a decentralized state
activity while other social policies are directed from the center. Voter backlash and
welfare state retrenchment may also be factors contributing to a trade-off where
social policies and support are determined by representative bodies and education is
subject to the popular will.
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Institutional Theories
Institutional explanations for educational expansion fall into the mid-range o f
theory. They do not attempt general or grand explanations, like structural or political
conflict theories, but further explication at another level o f detail. Like institutional
theories about the welfare state and social policy, those about education attempt to
expand the analytical perspective. Unlike structural or political conflict theories, that
tend to face-off as critical alternatives and compete for exclusive scholarly
acceptance, institutional approaches often look to such general theories for
supplemental support In contrast to structural theories which presume cross-national
convergence toward similar political institutions and policies, the object of
institutionalism is to determine the causes for, and effects o£ cross-national variation.
To those who concentrate on the struggle; the conflict and compromise o f groups
within the policymaking process, the institutionalist would submit that much more
can be learned through a better appreciation for the political arena. The rules and
norms for political competition and institutional actors also have a very certain affect
on public policy (Heidenheimer, Hedo, and Adams 1990; Steinmo, Thelen, and
Longstreth 1992).
Ringer (1979) argues that education, as an institution and organizational
system within society, possesses a considerable measure o f autonomy that helps
insulate it from the influence o f other external and economic forces. Education
systems possess a natural resistance to change. They tend to be managed by
bureaucrats with a status quo-orientation. Equally important is the vital role
education plays in political and cultural socialization. The education system is

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

68
expected to preserve and communicate a society’s political and cultural traditions.
For these attributes, Ringer refers to education institutions, particularly secondary
and higher, as “vehicles o f a kind o f cultural lag.” By their nature, they may be
expected to obstruct the educational changes and expansion required by economic
growth and development (Ringer 1979,4-9).
Rubinson (1986) has undertaken an exploration o f how an education system’s
rules and structure affects student enrollments and progression from primary through
tertiary levels. He hypothesizes that rates of primary and secondary level participation
are a function o f an education system’s stratification, its tracking o f students into
vocational or academic curricula. He argues that the United States is a more “heavily
schooled population” than West European democracies because there are no formal
rules or tracking systems that stratify the public education system in a way that limits
student entry and progression opportunities. Traditional European systems, on the
other hand may be found to have two or three tracks leading from the primary
schools that determine a student’s educational career and early or later entry into the
workforce. Two of the three tracks are likely terminal, providing some vocational
training to the largest number, while only a small group continues on their academic
work at the secondary level in preparation for university studies.
The edited work o f Fuller and Rubinson (1992) examined the role o f the state
in educational expansion and economic development After considering the
explanatory power of three ugrand explanations o fschool expansiorf—technicalfunctional, world institution, and class conflict—the general finding o f that volume is
that the state can have an important role in the expansion o f education systems,
independent o f other structural and social forces.
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. . . the state's influence on school expansion is enhanced or constrained by
underlying political-economic conditions. And the state’s role—as variously
portrayed by the three grand theories—may be observed with oscillating
salience as conditions change over long stretches o f time. We must keep our
eye on both (1) covariation between state action and school expansion and (2)
how long-tenn political-economic conditions mediate this relationship.
Empirical evidence to date suggests that state actions—material and
symbolic—can influence school enrollments under certain conditions (Fuller
and Rubinson 1992,25).
Heidenheimer (1973,1981,1993,1997) is another scholar who employed an
institutional approach for the comparative study o f education systems and other
public policies. While he does not reject the influence o f structures and factors
external to the state, his analysis focuses on how different state organization,
institutions, and processes may affect cross-national variation in education systems.
O f especial importance to Heidenheimer was the organizational structure and power
o f the state, whether it is centralized or decentralized, federal or unitary, and the
degree of local or regional control over social and education policy.
Archer (1979) believes “political centralization was the most important
variable that affected different paths o f education system development in the
countries she examined, which were all European unitary states” (Heidenheimer
1997,9). According to Heidenheimer, nations with “high stateness"—those with a
unitary or more centralized government and modem bureaucracies—are better able
to implement policy decisions than federal or decentralized governmental systems
with lesser bureaucratic capacity. Countries with “higher stateness” may have more
uniform national curricula and rules, fewer innovations but more effective policy
implementation, and greater equality of spending per capita than systems with “low
stateness” (Heidenheimer, in Flora and Heidenheimer 1981,270-2; Heidenheimer,
Hedo, and Adams 1990,24-31).
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Conditions o f high stateness provide a greater opportunity for a ruling regime
to make education and other social programs effective instruments for the realization
o f their political and socioeconomic objectives (Heidenheimer 1981,270-2). Control
o f social and education policy from the center permits their coordination with other
national programs and goals. Whether it is their desire to preserve the existing
socioeconomic and political order or bring its change, the rulers of “strong” states are
better positioned to promote and implement public programs that match their
ambition. They may champion new educational opportunities and social mobility, or
offer deliberate state compensations like social insurance in exchange for citizen
obedience and compliance with regime objectives. Germany offers the historical
example o f a nation with “high stateness” that instituted social security programs as
an alternative to public education, in order to deflect ambitions of upward mobility by
the lower classes. Britain, on the other hand, a unitary state but less centralized, took
a more middle road and increased both social welfare and educational opportunities
(Heidenheimer 1981,272-5). A third case is represented by America, a federal state
with lower stateness that was a laggard in the provision o f social welfare but a leader
in the expansion o f educational opportunities. Once again, it may be argued that a
preference to support education or other social insurance programs represents
alternative welfare state strategies (Heidenheimer 1981,269).
Extensive state intervention in education can be justified in that the
knowledge and credentials achieved in schools broaden the choices that youth
can make at later stages of their education and employment Thus, the choice
to “drop out” o f education is especially restricted where national goals stress
“equality o f opportunity”; nations must make sure that youth stays in the
education system long enough to be offered this opportunity (Heidenheimer,
Heclo, and Adams 1990,23).
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Findings and Conclusions
The literature on the welfare state and that on educational expansion ire very
comparable. The same three major theoretical streams have been identified for
each—structural, political conflict, and institutional—and will direct my further
investigation o f a linkage between the education policies and other social programs of
Western welfare states. First, the structural changes associated with industrialization
provided the context for development of the welfare state and educational expansion,
and the association between social insurance and education policies. Second, the
struggle and changes in the distribution of power among political actors in the policy
arena influenced the development of social welfare programs and educational
expansion. Increasing democratization, mass enfranchisement, and partisan control of
the policy process affected the evolution of the welfare state, its social assistance
programs, and the relationship between education and social policy. Third, the initial
institutionalization and subsequent path dependence o f the maturing welfare state
have affected the politics and choice between expanding educational opportunities
and state investment in other social programs. Whether the state organization is
unitary or federal, bureaucratic development, the extent o f central government
control over the nation’s public policies, the different political arenas and actors for
social welfare and education policy, the degree of local responsibility and control
over education and other social programs—these factors all affect policymaking,
public expenditures, and the relationship between education and other social
programs.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

72
A Synthesis o f Welfare State and Educational Expansion Theories
Pontusson (1995) offers some valuable counsel to those constructing
analytical models. Although historical institutionalists are his intended audience, his
advice applies as weO to proponents o f structural or political conflict theories. He
cautions institutionalists to not become too narrow-minded, to be aware that the
institutions they study are embedded in a much larger context than states. Institutions
do matter, but the state is simply too confining for an adequate explanation. States
and the institutions within them must be recognized as being influenced by structures
outside and “larger” than the state that “shape the configuration and operation o f
political and economic institutions.” Therefore, political scientists should change their
research agenda to focus on these larger world “structures”—the political economy,
class systems, “advanced capitalism,” etc.—and make “a clean break with the politycenteredness that characterizes” historical institutionalism (Pontusson 1995,120,
143). Such a structural approach would permit a better understanding o f the larger
and underlying economic forces and political relationships that affect—they do not
control—institutional configurations, processes, and change.
Pontusson’s advice is taken in the policy model for education and social
programs that is recommended below. In the first place, no single explanationstructural, political conflict, or institutional—is so powerful that the others are made
superfluous. I subscribe to an eclectic view like that ofHage, Hanneman, and Gargan
(1989), Fuller and Rubinson (1992) and Windolf (1997), that any of many theories
may be able to explain social and education policy at some point in time for a given
nation and situation. As Fuller and Rubinson (1992) submit with reference to the
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competing theories that purport to explain educational expansion: “The three general
theories can be seen as simultaneous oscillating processes, each operating within a
given society but with varying strength over long stretches o f time” (12). I submit
that the same is true for the usefulness o f the structural, political conflict, and
institutional theories for the evaluation o f both social and education policy in Western
welfare states. No one theory adequately explains—for all countries, times, and
circumstances—the development of social welfare programs and educational
expansion in advanced industrial societies. For individual nations, over time and in
changing contexts, different theoretical explanations may prove more appropriate.
What is required, therefore, is a synthesis o f the relevant literature and theory—the
welfare state with educational expansion literature; and structural with political
conflict and institutional models.
A Common Theoretical Model for Social Welfare and Education Policy
I argue that the same analytical model can explain both education policy and
the social programs supported by different types o f welfare states. There is a clear
foundation for this claim in the literature on the welfare state and educational
expansion. In the first place, although a majority o f scholars have focused either on
education or the welfare state and its social programs, a number have examined both
and joined them in their research (Castles 1989; de Swaan 1988; FuriUcer, Johansson,
and Lind 1990; Ginsburg 1992; Hage, Hanncman, and Gargan 1989; Heclo 198S;
Heidenheimer 1973,1981; Lindert 1994). It is not unfair to say that these scholars
have assumed some kind o f relationship between the social and education policies o f
the welfare state. Use o f the same or similar variables and common explanations for
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both education and other social programs is typical o f their research endeavors.
Castles (1989,1994), in separate studies o f the policymaking for education and social
welfare programs by advanced industrial nations, utilized many o f the same
explanatory variables for each investigation. A few scholars have gone so far as to
claim that the preference exhibited by certain regimes to invest in social insurance or
educational opportunities may be viewed as alternative welfare strategies (Hedo
1985; Heidenheimer 1981; Janowhz 1976). Boix (1998) argues that political parties
and partisan control o f government matter greatly in the choice o f strategies a regime
may choose to follow for social welfare, education, and to promote economic growth
and development. According to Boix, the strategy o f social democratic governments
is to favor a greater public investment in human capital—in education and
training—to raise economic productivity, while maintaining social welfare benefits at
the highest possible levels. The strategy o f conservative governments, on the other
hand, is to reduce taxes and levels of public expenditure as a way to encourage
private investment and thereby stimulate economic growth and development. If there
are alternative policy strategies such as those that Bone, Heclo, Heidenheimer and
Janowitz speak ofj and particularly if those strategies bring together education with
the other social programs ofthe welfare state, it is logical that a single model might
be devised to simultaneously explain each policy type.
There is further cause to believe explanations for social welfare and education
polides may be joined in a single theory. This begins by drawing two critical
distinctions between mass (primary) and postprimary education. First, the evidence is
convincing that mass education is not finked with industrialization or development of
the welfare state. The expansion of mass education is better associated with the initial
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process o f modem state-building (Boli, Ramirez, and Meyer 1985). No similar
argument is made about the relationship o f postprimary education, industrialization,
and state-building. Put simply, the historical patterns for the expansion o f mass and
postprimary education are different In fact, the growth o f secondary and higher
educational opportunities more closely parallels that o f industrialization, the
development o f the welfare state and its social programs. The same socioeconomic
changes and demographic shifts

with industrialization and welfare state

emergence—urbanization, increasing social mobility and stratification, an older and
more healthy population—correlate highly with increasing postprimary educational
opportunities and levels o f literacy. Second, it is with educational achievement at the
postprimary level that greater socioeconomic opportunities are linked. Not primary,
but secondary and higher education are the recognized gateways to social mobility
(Janowitz 1976). As educational achievement enhances an individual’s ability to
the ways and means for a future existence independent o f the market and
necessity for public assistance, it may be considered an alternative to state-supported
social welfare programs, hi terms o f Esping-Andersen’s typology o f welfare states,
postprimary educational achievement may be regarded along with social
insurance—but over the long term—as another agency o f decommodification. This
association in time between alternative instruments o f decommodification—the
socioeconomic opportunity of postprimary educational achievement and social
insurance programs—is a strong recommendation for the explanatory power o f a
single model for the simultaneous explanation o f welfare state decommodification in
both policy areas.
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A Single Model for the Explanation o f Social W dftre and Education Policy
A final example is offered as evidence, first, that the literature on education
and the w dftre state can be joined in a common research endeavor and second, that a
single model may be devised for the explanation o f the social and education policies
ofWestern welfare states. This concerns the work o f Hags, Huneman, and Gargan
(1989) who, in State Responsiveness and State Activism present their findings from
an analysis o f the social welfare and education expenditures ofFrance, Great Britain,
Germany and Italy between 1870 and 1968. The questions that motivated the
research o f these scholars are different than my own, but their subject o f study and
variables o f investigative interest are very similar.7 Their object was to provide a
better understanding ofthe causes for different w dftre state devdopment by those
four nations. Specifically they hoped to determine what role the state had played in
the growth of social spending’ whether its actions had been a response to expanding
social needs as described by the logic o f industrialism, a reaction to societal groups
and interests with political agency, or through its own initiative as an “active state.”
They also hoped to discover whether there were particular situations when the state
could be expected to be playing a responsive or active role. Time-series models were
devised to evaluate each of the contending explanations for state activism and
responsiveness: a "pluralist” model for structural theory, a dass-conflict model for

Educational spending was defined as funding for primary and technical
schools. The expenditures for secondary and higher education, the gateway to
socioeconomic opportunity that is o f interest to this study, were not included. But
their puzzle was different; it was not whether preferential investment in social
insurance or educational opportunities are alternative policy strategies Western
welfare regimes may support
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political conflict theory, and a statist model for institutional theory. Although each
model found some support, none offered a conclusive and satisfactory explanation for
die social spending o f the sample countries. While the expanding social needs that
accompanied industrialization were positively associated with increased state
spending for both social welfare and education over the period o f study, available
state resources were not. Higher levels of working class power appeared to
encourage greater social spending; but it provided a less useful explanation, along
with social need, when “high stateness” figured in. “Strong” states, those with more
centralized governments and greater administrative control over social policies,
appeared better able to resist and tended to diminish the influence o f the working
class and social needs over spending. Moreover, once social insurance had been
established as a public program, it tended to increase the state’s own responsiveness
to social need (Amenta 1991).
There is a need for much additional research beyond and complementing the
work o f Castles (1989), Esping-Andersen (1990), Hage, Hanneman, and Gargan
(1989), Heidenheimer (1981), and others. If my preliminary findings are any
indication, there may be much opportunity in bringing such works together. The
modification o f Castles’ (1989) public expenditures model to evaluate EspingAndersen’s (1990) typology of welfare states was one such endeavor. Though it
requires the validation o f additional and separate testing, it represents a new and
different way—through a single model—to examine variation in cross-national social
and education spending and the hypothesis that there is an association between kinds
o f welfare regimes and the education policies they support. It is also notable, and
important to my effort, that both Castles (1989) and Hage, Hanneman, and Gargan
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(1989) employed the same explanatoiy variables for education policy as they dad for
the social programs of the welfare state. Therewith, I would argue, a limited synthesis
has already been established between the literature on w dftre state and that on
educational expansion. However, no one has proposed such a single model for the
simultaneous explanation o f a welfare state’s social and education policies.
Once again, my preliminary finding o f a relationship between the social
programs and education policies o f Western welfare states requires further and more
comprehensive testing. The data of that analysis may only reflect a one-time historical
phenomenon. It remains for additional research to determine if there is evidence o f a
previous and more enduring association linking particular lands o f welfare regimes
with specific social and education policies, whether distinctive social and education
policy profiles existed in prior periods, even to the beginnings o f welfare state
development in the nineteenth century. Likewise, in the case of Heidenheimer’s
hypothesis, a review of the historical record is necessary to confirm whether or not an
emphasis on educational opportunities or social insurance programs has been an
ongoing and alternative policy trajectory followed by particular kinds of welfare
states. In order to accomplish this task, two different but complementary
methodologies wifi be employed in the chapters that follow: a statistical analysis of
the spending data for education and social insurance by a sample o f eighteen OECD
nations, from 1960 through 1990; and case studies o f German and American welfare
state development, countries that represent two o f Esping-Andersen’s three welfare
state types.
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CHAPTER m
SPENDING FOR SOCIAL INSURANCE AND EDUCATION
IN EIGHTEEN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES,
1960-1990: ALTERNATIVE WELFARE STRATEGIES?
Introduction
Government expenditures for social and education programs have increased
with the maturing o f all Western welfare states. These nations have not all followed
the same paths, however, either in policy development or in the growth o f public
spending. Welfare state expansion has occurred at different times and rates, in
particular socioeconomic and political contexts, through different institutions and
implementations o f government, and with distinctive policy emphases and
evolutionary trajectories. Despite their different evolutionary courses, though, certain
similarities have been identified in the combinations o f social insurance programs
supported by specific groupings o f Western welfare states. Titmuss (1974)
distinguished “three contrasting models or functions o f social policy.” Heclo (1985)
described “three broad groups o f nations [that] can be distinguished” based on the
likeness o f their social policies. Esping-Andersen (1990) identified “three worlds o f
welfare capitalism” and Castles (1993) particular “families o f nations” with similar
social welfare systems.
In The Development o f Welfare States in Europe and America (1981), it is
argued that an association between education and social insurance programs was
determined in Western societies long ago, during the initial stages o f welfare state
79
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development. In particular, for the United States and European nations, "the
emphasis on education and soda! security programs are viewed as the cores o f
alternative strategies pursued by emerging welfare states” (Heidenheimer 1981,269).
Hedo, in The Welfare State m Hard Times (1985), speaks o f an "implicit trade-off”
with respect to the development o f the American welfare state, a choice made to
invest in educational opportunities over the expansion of social insurance programs.
More generally, Castles, in "Explaining Public Education Expenditures in OECD
Nations” (1989), recommends that preferential state support of education programs
or social protection programs be considered as alternative welfare state policies
today.
This chapter explores the “trade-off” thesis and the relationship between
education and social insurance policies for eighteen advanced industrial nations
during the 1960-1990 time period. The results indicate there is an association
between the social welfare and education systems of those countries. More
specifically, the lands of welfare states Esping-Andersen (1990) has described—
liberal, conservative, and social democratic—can be linked with characteristic profiles
for education policy. This finding effectively extends the boundary o fth e welfare
state’s policy definition to include education with its social security programs. There
is also evidence of a policy “trade-off” and o f alternative welfare trajectories followed
by Western societies. Certain lands o f welfare regimes exhibit a tendency to invest
relatively more in education or social security programs.
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Research Questions
First, can we distinguish welfare state profiles for education policy like those
Titmuss (1974), Heclo (1985) and Esping-Andersen (1990) described for social
policy? Can education be included with other social programs in the policy profiles
ascribed to Western welfare states? More specifically, does Esping-Andersen’s
typology o f liberal, conservative, and social democratic welfare states also have
application to education policy? Will Western welfare regimes tend to “cluster” for
the similarity of their education system, just as they do for their social insurance
programs?
Second, is there evidence o f a relationship, perhaps a trade-of£ between
government spending for education and social insurance programs in Western welfare
states? Do certain w dftre regimes exhibit a preference to invest relatively more in
education, while others direct a greater share o f public spending to social insurance
programs? Is a welfare state’s levd o f financial commitment to social w dftre
programs a good predictor of its investment in public education, and vice versa?
Third, do the three types o f Western welfare regimes support different
education strategies and objectives? In particular, is there any significant variation in
secondary-levd enrollment rates for vocational training and general education
curriculums? Will it follow that the greater the tendency for a state to support
vocational training, and the less general education opportunities are encouraged as an
agent o f social mobility, the more will public dollars be directed to social insurance
alternatives?
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Hypotheses
Esping-Andersen (1990) has identified “three worlds o f welfare capitalism” in
Western societies—liberal, conservative, and social democratic. Those welfare
regimes differ by their unique combinations o f social insurance and coverage for
health, unemployment, and old-age retirement benefits. I argue that EspingAndersen’s welfare state typology can be applied to the field o f education policy.
There is a specific relationship between the kinds of social insurance programs found
in Western societies and the education policies they support Welfare states that
cluster for the similarity o f their social insurance profiles will also tend to cluster
because of the likeness o f their education policies. Evidence o f that association would
effectively expand the definition o f the welfare state’s policy profile to include
education with its other social programs.
Wagner (1958) argued that government activity and expenditures for public
goods would increase in association with national economic growth and
development This theory has been referred to variously as Wagner’s hypothesis, the
Wagner thesis, the Wagner effect, and Wagner’s Law (Castles 1989; Lindert 1996). I
contend that, although such a relationship may be apparent for all Western societies
over an extended period o f time beginning in the late nineteenth century, there have
been distinctive patterns or types o f welfare state development that are evident today.
In particular, this is reflected in the uneven development o f educational opportunities
and social insurance systems, and by different regime commitments to support those
policy sectors. I hypothesize that certain kinds of welfare regimes may exhibit a
preference to invest in educational opportunities or expanded social insurance
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provisions. These are explicit policy alternatives that welfare regimes may choose to
support This choice may be revealed by a trade-off between state investment in
public education and social insurance programs.
Finally, I contend that the variation between different kinds o f Western
welfare states is demonstrated not only by their particular social insurance profiles
and patterns o f education expenditure, but also by the distinctive mix o f general
education and vocational training they support Secondary level general education
curriculums often serve as preparation for higher education, at the university or other
advanced studies, and is a gateway to greater socioeconomic opportunities. A
vocational training track, on the other hand, is typically terminal. It often completes a
student’s formal education, it is workforce-oriented, and tends to reproduce existing
class divisions in society. I hypothesize that nations with a considerable commitment
to vocational training programs will tend to support complementary social insurance
systems, more comprehensive welfare arrangements intended to sustain the status
quo as well as to protect the individual. The security afforded by social safety nets
will be less broad, though, in countries where there is a greater emphasis on general
education curriculums at the secondary level and educational achievement is
encouraged as a vehicle o f upward social mobility.
Espmy-Andersen’s Welfare State Typology and Education Policy
Along with whatever provisions are defined for old-age pensions,
unemployment compensation, sickness benefits, and sundry other social assistance;
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citizens o f every Western state also have a right to at least a basic education;1 it is
one component o f the total social benefits package to which every citizen is entitled.
The specific nature o f a state’s social welfare system, along with the educational
entitlements and opportunities offered, reflect a particular welfare strategy. Once
again, I submit, any meaningful depiction of a w dftre state’s policy profile or
strategy is incomplete unless its education policy is also included.
Esping-Andersen associated unique social w dftre policy agendas for
unemployment, health, and old-age compensation with three w dftre state
types—liberal, conservative, and social democratic. Although education policy is not
considered in that welfare state model, I contend the typology will continue to hold
with its inclusion. In other words, just as Western welfare regimes tend to “duster”
into three groups according to Esping-Andersen’s social insurance criteria, I
hypothesize they will gather in comparable arrays because ofthe similarity o f their
education policies. This will be indicated by the “goodness o f fit” o f regressions on
national education expenditure data, when welfare regime type is controlled for as an
independent variable and specific source o f cross-national variation.2 Evidence o f
clustering can also be observed on graphs and plots o f social insurance and education
data for the 1960-1990 time period, including: real education expenditures per capita
by welfare regime type; education’s share of total public spending by regime type;
real social insurance expenditures by real education expenditures by w dftre regime;

1That right today is to a secondary level education, or ten to twelve years of
formal education.
National data records have been coded as liberal, conservative, or social
democratic as specified by Esping-Andersen (1990).
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and the percentage o f the secondary level students enrolled in general education
programs by real education expenditures.
The Wagner Effect and the Tmda-offBetween Educational Opportunities
ind Social Insurance
Although it is not the endeavor o f this project to confirm or rqect the Wagner
effect, I would venture that Wagner’s hypothesis is generally confirmed for a span o f
time beginning in the late nineteenth century to the present Indeed, increasing
government expenditures are easily associated with that extended period of national
economic growth and development However, I would hypothesize there is no
specific linkage between growing state expenditures and an expanding economy; nor
o f reductions in public spending when an economy is shrinking or down.3 In
particular, I would argue this applies to expenditures for education and social
insurance systems for the 1960-1990 time period. There is not a necessary
relationship between changes in size o f the national economy—as measured by the
GDP per capita—and state spending for those two policy areas. Examination o f the
data will support a rejection o f Wagner’s hypothesis for education and social
insurance programs.
Second, just as all national economies have not all grown in the same way or
measure, neither have government expenditures for public goods and services. This is
especially true with respect to the expansion of educational opportunities and social

3A Keynesian would even advise that a government should spend more to
stimulate a down economy, and less to slow an economy growing too rapidly. It is
also necessary to recognize that national social insurance systems like Germany’s and
America’s were not established during economic booms, but instead on the back and
in the aftermath o f severe depressions.
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insurance systems. I hypothesize that certain Western states may exhibit a preference
to support educational opportunities or social insurance as part o f an overall welfare
strategy. Although public education and social insurance are but two o f many
programs that must compete—and policymakers must consider—for public sector
support and budgetary allocations, there is also a specific competition between
education and social insurance that goes beyond the common battle for a piece of the
budgetary pie. This is manifested by a choice and may take the form o f a "trade-off*
between alternative welfare strategies. Preferential investment in educational
opportunities or social insurance are alternative decommodification options welfare
regimes may choose to support Social insurance programs typically provide
immediate financial benefits, decommodification in the here and now for the
individual and are a current expense for the state. Spending for public education is
also a current state expense, but it offers only the means for individual
decommodification. Benefits are neither immediate nor guaranteed. State support o f
public education opportunities is an investment in the future; the social security it
offers the individual is time-lagged.4 As educational achievement is an agency of
upward social mobility it may enhance the potential for the accumulation of personal
wealth, and thereby enable future social security and market independence. In this
sense, support of educational opportunities represents another decommodification
option that welfare states may elect to support Increasing levels o f support for public

^ t would be wrong to consider the payment o f social insurance benefits an
expense incurred by the state without any expectation o f return, however. For both
the short- and long-term it may be argued that the safety net o f social insurance
supported by the state adds to its legitimacy in the public eye, promotes domestic
tranquility, and helps to preserve the fabric of the existing social order.
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education programs, measured as a proportion of total public spending, is an
alternative to the greater decommodification that may be achieved through more
generous income substitution and health provisions.
I argue that such alternative decommodification strategies—and their
blend—can be demonstrated in the policy profiles o f the liberal, conservative, and
social democratic welfare states that Esping-Andersen describes, by their unique
implementations o f social insurance and education programs. In particular, I
hypothesize analysis will show that liberal welfare regimes spend less for social
insurance—in real dollars and as a proportion of total public sector expenditures—
than either social democratic or conservative nations. At the same time, the data will
indicate that education expenditures by liberal states—in real dollars and as a share o f
the total public budget—are relatively high in comparison to conservative and social
democratic regimes. I predict conservative regimes will demonstrate a spending
pattern opposite that o f liberal welfare nations—relatively high for social insurance
but the least for education. Social democratic states will be found to spend the most
for social insurance, and at a relatively high level for education. Furthermore, I
hypothesize that regression modeling will show that state expenditures for education
are inversely related to support for social insurance programs. In liberal states there is
a policy trade-off that favors the allocation of public monies to education over social
welfare provisions. In conservative nations the relationship is reversed. In liberal
welfare regimes educational opportunity is viewed as an alternative to the
decommodification policies supported by social democratic states and the emphasis
on work-related insurance or “earned” benefits found in conservative welfare states.
Rather than broad and universal safety nets o f social insurance provisions, liberal
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states offer educational opportunity u the individual’s protection against the
meanness o f life, and the individual is hdd responsible for his or her own outcome.
Given their emphasis on collective responsibility and greater concern for social order
and stability, I hypothesize that conservative welfare states can be expected to favor
social insurance programs over expanded educational opportunities. The trade-off in
social democratic regimes will be less clear, however, where there is emphasis both
on collective responsibility and the opportunity for individual achievement
Social Mobility Curriculum Emphasis, and Educational Spending
I argue the three types of Western welfare regimes—liberal, conservative, and
social democratic—have different education strategies and objectives. In particular,
this variation can be demonstrated by the different emphasis given to secondary
vocational and general education programs. General education at the secondary level
often serves as preparation for higher education; it is the gateway to the university
and other advanced studies. Postprimary educational achievement is an important
vehicle o f social mobility and may lead to greater socioeconomic opportunities.
Vocational training, on the other hand, tends to be less socially mobilizing given the
normally terminal nature o f those programs—they define “end-points” in an
education system and, therefore, the last stage o f an individual's formal education.
Vocational training is also a lesser vehicle of social mobilization because of its
workforce, working class orientation, and its tendency to reinforce the existing class
order. In this sense, as Heidenheimer might have put it, vocational training and
general education represent "the cores of alternative [education] strategies” welfare
regimes may choose to support
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I hypothesize there is a positive association between increasing levds of
enrollments in vocational training at the secondaiy level and the comprehensiveness
o f social insurance systems. Alternatively, public welfare provisions tend to be more
limited where general education is the predominant curriculum offering at the
secondaiy levd. hi particular, I predict that enrollment rates in general education
curricuhims will be highest in liberal welfare nations, in those societies where
individual responsibility is emphasized and the socioeconomic benefits that may be
realized with educational achievement are encouraged as an alternative to social
insurance. Those states are also expected to direct the greatest share of public sector
dollars to education. I predict that the rate o f participation in vocational training
programs wifi be highest in conservative welfare regimes, where social mobility is less
valued and the social insurance system is geared to support societal order and
stability. Conservative nations can be expected to rank last in all categories o f
education spending analyzed. Finally, given their concern for collective
decommodification objectives without sacrificing individual freedoms and
opportunities, I hypothesize that social democratic states will have higher general
education enrollment rates than conservative nations but much less than liberal states.
Social democratic nations wQl also be found to spend less than liberal regimes on
education as a percentage o f total public spending but, at the same time, they may
demonstrate a comparable or even greater education “effort” as indicated by a higher
level o f spending for education as a percentage o f the GDP and a larger commitment
o f real education dollars per capita.
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Methodology

Study Design
The purpose o f this investigation is to determine whether the idnds o f social
insurance systems supported by Western welfare states can be associated with
particular education policies, ft builds on the work o f Esping-Andersen (1990), who
has identified three kinds o f welfare regimes in advanced industrial societies, and
upon Castles' (1989,1994a) efforts to identify the causes for variation in spending
for education and other social programs by Western societies. Specifically, for this
study, Castles' model to explain spending for education is modified to test the
applicability ofEsping-Andersen’s welfare state typology to the field o f education
policy. The three welfare state types are then evaluated for their association with
unique education policies, to determine if variation in education policy can be
explained by the particular constitution o f the welfare state. It is also explored if as
Heidenheimer (1981) and Hedo (198S) have suggested, there is evidence o f a trade
off between spending for educational opportunities and social insurance systems. Do
the two represent a policy choice for the welfare state? Finally, the data are examined
to determine if and how different idnds o f welfare states may vary in their support o f
educational opportunities and social mobility, as indicated by enrollment rates in
general education and vocational training at the secondary level
This study is concerned with the relationship between education and social
insurance in advanced industrial societies during the inclusive 1960-1990 time period,
ft is not intended to discover or analyze any changes in that association over time,
within or between nations, but to determine if different the kinds o f welfare states
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described by Esping-Andersen (1990) displayed distinctive patterns for education
policy during that fixed time period. To that end, cross-sectional demographic and
public spending data have been collected at every five year interval beginning in
1960. For regression modeling, the data have been categorized by welfare state type
and pooled to separately test the effect o f social programs on education policy and
education policy on social programs. If those equations and other descriptive
statistics provide evidence o f an association between social insurance and education
policy, the countries in this study should “cluster” by welfare regime type and the
similarity of their social and education policies.
Population Definition and Sample Selection
The advanced industrial nations included in this cross-sectional study are
those for whom the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and
International Labour Office (D L O ) have compiled the most complete education and
social policy data for the inclusive time period 1960-1990. The eighteen nations
comprising this group include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The
sample is comprised o f 123 observations out o f 126 possible for these eighteen
nations over the 1960-1990 period.5

^ t was not possible to complete the 1960 records for Denmark, France, or
Switzerland because the required spending data for social insurance and education
were not available. Each missing record represents one o f the three different welfare
(continued...)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

92
Variables o f Investigative Interest and Model Design
rasrtes* Public Education E x p e n d itu r e s Model
The regression model developed by Castles (1989) “to explain cross-national
variation in public expenditure levels and change” in OECD nations between 1960
and 1981 is the starting point for this analysis (1989,431). Following is a discussion
o f Castles' equation, its assumptions, and the modifications made to that model to
test the hypotheses o f this study.
Castles operationalized a nation’s public spending for education in two
ways—as a percentage o f the gross domestic product (GDP) and as real expenditures
per capita—for separate hypothesis testing. The regression on education spending as
a percentage o f the GDP allowed examination o f the Wagner effect, that as national
income increases the commitment o f state resources to public spending grows as a
percentage o f the GDP. A finding o f a positive association would support the
Wagner hypothesis. The regression on real education expenditures per capita
permitted testing whether real expenditures per student was simply a function o f
national wealth, that education expenditures were a function o f the state’s capacity to
spend. A positive association in this case would indicate that increasing national
wealth creates the opportunity for additional education spending (Castles 1989,437).
Castles examined five variables for their explanatory power in his model:
right-wing party influence, Roman Catholicism, demographic factors, national

5(...contmued)
state groupings. It is not believed this missing data tend to bias or compromise the
analysis that follows.
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economic resources, and incremental program growth. Right-wing party influence
was included as an independent variable to determine if right-dominated national
politics might be associated with different levels o f education spending and effort
than left-wing governments. Roman Catholicism, operationalized as the percentage of
Catholic adherents in a nation’s population, was inserted to evaluate its usefulness in
explaining variations in education spending. Castles noted a positive association o f
Catholicism with social insurance spending, and looked for the same relationship with
education. Demographic factors were included to examine what effect, if any, the size
and changes in size o f the school-age population might have on spending for
education. National economic resources were operationalized as GDP per capita and
evaluated, as described above, for a possible link between a rising GDP per capita
and growth in education spending as a share o f the GDP, and between an increasing
GDP per capita and rises in real education spending per capita. Finally, incremental
program growth was examined to test the program inertia hypothesis—that the
education expenditures of a previous period could be positively correlated with, and
largely explain, those o f the next
Of the five factors and relationships examined, Castles concluded that
program inertia was the only variable without important explanatory power for
variations in public education expenditures. He also rejected a mono-causal
explanation to any of the remaining variables, attributing their explanatory power
instead to interaction and combined effect This left the search for a direct link
between demographic factors and variation in education spending inconclusive, as
was that for an association between economic wealth and rising public education
expenditures. Right-party political strength was found to be negatively correlated
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with public education expenditures, significantly but not enough to change the
study’s results. Most important was Castles’ finding that Catholicism, though a
significant negative indicator o f public education expenditures in 1960, was a positive
imficatorin 1981. For the period of study, Castles concluded: “Catholic countries
tended to expand educational effort more than others, even if their Catholicism was
not the only reason for such change” (1989,444).
Castles examined the influence o f religion on public policy again in a 1994
study. Tins work considered the impact o f Catholicism on labor market, income
security, family, and gender policies. In this study, education was not included among
the variables under investigation. As he had in 1989, Castles determined that religious
adherence was a significant factor in explaining cross-national policy variation. He
advised he was not forgetting or denying the explanatory importance o f other
socioeconomic factors, just that “religious differences matter” (1994,20).
Specifically, for a “family o f nations” defined as Catholic6 there is a characteristic set
of policy outcomes that may be identified (Castles 1994a, 24). Analyzing OECD
social security transfers expenditure data from 1960 and 1990, Castles found that
Catholic nations spent on social insurance programs—as a portion o f GDP—at a rate
4 percent higher than non-Catholic nations in 1960. This increased to 9 percent in
1990. “There is enough in these findings to vindicate amply the conclusion that in
respect o f social security spending at least, the notion o f a Catholic world o f welfare
is a reality” (Castles 1994a, 25). Castles submitted that this was also support for what

N ations were defined as Catholic if 75 percent or more o f the national
population were baptized Catholic or the Christian Democratic Party had played a
“pivotal” role in the formation of governments for the ten years prior to the point of
analysis (Castles 1994,24).
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Esping-Andersen (1990) had proposed about types o f welfare state types with
characteristic social policy packages7 and what van Kersbergen (1991) had offered
about “patterns o f expenditure” (1994,25).
Public and Private Expenditure Data for Social Insurance and Education
Like Castles’ examinations, this study also seeks an explanation for variance
in national education expenditures, but in relation to particular constitutions o f the
welfare state and as an alternative to support o f social insurance programs. This
analysis also attempts to associate similar patterns o f state spending for social
insurance with specific types o f welfare regimes and as an alternative to funding
education, public and private. As in Castles’ studies, only public expenditure data are
analyzed. Data on private funding for social insurance and education are not
sufficiently available.8 More importantly, the inclusion of such data would change the
unit o f analysis and is at cross-purposes with this inquiry.

In fact, Esping-Andersen’s conservative welfare states correspond very
closely to Castles’ Catholic “family o f nations.” In 1960 the Catholic “family of
nations” included Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece; Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, theNcthcriimds, Portugal, and Spain. Germany was not included in the
1990 “fondly” because it failed to meet the “Christian party “cut-off criterion.”
Castles operationalized as “Catholic” nations those where 75 percent or more o f the
population was baptized as Catholic or where the Christian Democratic party had
been a major presence in government for the entire ten-year period prior to 1990.
Despite the feet that die Christian Democrats were the ruling party from 1982-1998,
Germany did not meet the second criterion.
8The OECD has advised that the inclusion o f private funding data would only
raise the GDP share going to education by about 10 percent for the United States,
Japan, and France (OECD 1995,71). That would not significantly alter the findings
o f this study.
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The addition o f private funding data would change this investigation from one
o f welfare regime types to an examination o f national patterns o f expenditure for
education and social insurance. Particularly fix’the liberal group o f nations, the
addition o f private to state expenditures would certainly revise upward the real
dollars spent nationally on education and social insurance. It would reflect the total
national effort, however, and not that o f the government. That is why private funding
cannot be included in the expenditure data for either education or social insurance.
Moreover, the exclusion o f private funding data is helpful in discerning the policy
preferences and objectives of welfare regimes; and society’s view o f the welfare
state’s role. What social and education programs a welfare regime supports, and how
it spends for them, teds much—about its view o f state and individual responsibilities;
its desire for social order, and its commitment to the well-being o f the individual,
family, and community.
Where private funding is a significant source o f funding, for either education
or social insurance, this may be reflected in lower levels of government expenditures
and a smaller portion of the budget allocated to that policy area. It may follow in
such welfare nations that individuals have a greater responsibility for their personal
well-being and socioeconomic advancement On the other hand, where private
sources o f funding are less or not significant, the burden on government may be
greater in real dollars and as a share o f total public spending. In such welfare nations
the state has a much larger role and responsibility to ensure the socioeconomic well
being and achievement of individuals, families, and the community.
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Data Sources
All five-year interval national records has been coded according to EspingAndersen’s (1990) typology o f welfare state regimes. Australia, Canada, Ireland,
Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States have
been classified as liberal. Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy have been
assigned to the conservative category. Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway,
and Sweden have been put in the social democratic group. Socialist electoral strength
and national GDP per capita data were taken from the OECD's PoliticalData

Handbook (Lane, McKay, and Newton 1997). Social security expenditures as a
percentage o f the GDP was obtained from the ILO’s 1996 edition o f The Cost of

Social Security. Social security expenditures, elsewhere referred to as social
insurance, includes benefits for old-age pensions, sickness and maternity, work injury,
and medical care (ILO 1996,3). Public spending for education as a percentage of the
GDP was taken from the OECD’s Political Data Handbook for the years 1960
through 1980, and the OECD’s 1997 edition ofEducational a Glance for 198S and
1990. Likewise were the figures for public spending on education as a percentage o f
total government expenditures. UNESCO’s Statistical Yearbook was the source for
data on full-time secondary level enrollments in vocational training and general
education curriculums. This information permits testing whether the kinds of welfare
states described by Esping-Andersen may also be associated with particular kinds of
education systems and patterns o f spending for education and social insurance
programs. Finally, information about the size o f national populations in the 5-29 age
group and those over 65 years o f age was taken from the United Nations’ Statistical
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Yearbook. A complete map o f the variables and data sources is provided in Table 1.
A further discussion o f variable calculations and data usage can be found in Appendix
A.
Findings o f Data Analysis
Descriptive Statistics and Variable Graphing
Summary and national data, graphs, and variable plotting provide support for
the three-fold typology o f social security states described by Titmuss (1974), Heclo
(1985), and Esping-Andersen (1990). They also represent evidence that those
different kinds o f welfare regime tend to exhibit certain traits in their education
policies, that there are characteristic combinations o f social insurance and education
policy. Indeed, countries with comparable education policies may be divided into
liberal, conservative, and social democratic clusters much like those depicted by
Esping-Andersen for social insurance policies alone.
Figures 1-4 have been generated from the summary data ofTable 2 to illustrate
the distinctive spending profiles o f liberal, conservative, and social democratic
welfare states. Figures I and 2 chart the trends in real social insurance and education
expenditures per capita, the spending “effort” o f each welfare state type, at every
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Table 1
Variable Map and Data Sources
Vviable
Nation1
Yev
Welfare state type
■twe^gth rtf « n n « l« t p u f i ^

Source

Esping-Andersen (1990)
Lane, McKay, and Newton (1997)

w» ■ u rin n ^ l > l^ - r i n n |

GDP per capita/I000
Social insonnce as % of GDP
Social insurance as % of total public spending

Social insurance as % of total social spending

Real social insurance dollars per capita

Public spending on education as % of GDP
Education as % of total public spending
Education as % of total social spending

Real education dollars per student

% population in 5-29 age group
% population over age 65
% General education secondary students
% Vocational education secondaiy students

OECD (1997)
ILO(1992,1996)2
Product of Social insurance as % of GDP
and Education as % of total public
spending divided by Public spending on
education as % of GDP
Social insurance as % of total public
spending divided by sum of Social
insurance and Education as % of total
public spending
Product of GDP per capita/1000 and
Social insurance as % of GDP divided by
100
OECD (1993,1995,1997)
OECD (1993,1995,1997)3
Education as % of total public spending
divided by sum of Social insurance and
Education as % of total public spending
Product of GDP per capita/1000 and
Public spending on education as % of
GDP divided by % population in 5-29 age
group
United Nations Statistical Yearbook
United Nations Statistical Yearbook
UNESCO Statistical Yearbook4
UNESCO Statistical Yearbook4

The number of records for which complete data was collected is 123. The 1960 records for
. Denmark, France, and Switzerland ate missing.
3 1989 values were used for 1990.
4 1965,1970 and 1985 values estimated for France; 1985 value was estimated for Japan.
1985 value estimated for Sweden; 1990 value was estimated for Belgium.
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Figure 1. Real Social Insurance Dollars Per Capita, 1960-90.
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Figure 2. Real Education Dollars Per Capita, 1960-90.
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Figure 4. Education’s Percent o f Public Spending, 1960-90.
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Table 2
Summary Data by Welfare Regime Type
Social Insurance S
Regime
Type

Year

Liberal
Liberal
Liberal
Liberal
Liberal
Liberal
Liberal
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Social Dan.
Social Dctn.
Social Dan.
Social Dan.
Social Dan.
Social Dan.
Social Don.

1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990

Socialist
Electoral
Strength

ODPpe

% Public Real
%
ODP Spending 000

Liberal
Conservative
Social Dan.

27.90
28.84
28.81
27.90
25.08
25.76
25.58
32.88
29.90
28.78
31.28
31.58
33.36
32.42
37.13
36.78
36.38
33.32
35.86
34.30
33.58
27.11
31.41
35.28

5.29
6.86
8.04
8.89
9.86
10.79
12.03
3.99
4.98
6.19
7.04
8.29
8.75
9.96
5.44
6.73
7.99
9.12
10.31
11.47
12.56
8.89
7.12
9.19

8.83
8.99
10.23
13.51
14.71
15.68
15.06
14.45
16.16
16.58
22.16
23.56
23.08
24.18
10.05
12.56
16.06
20.96
25.02
27.22
27.08
12.49
20.19
20.14

All Welfare States

30.56

8.48

16.73

31.95
33.53
34.63
37.77
39.71
37.60
37.68
45.07
45.67
44.03
49.89
50.16
41.29
46.91
3S.12
35.31
40.57
45.44
47.97
53.09
49.69
36.20
46.18
44.14
41.15

0.46
0.60
0.82
1.14
1.37
1.60
1.74
0.58
0.81
1.03
1.57
1.97
2.06
2.41
0.55
0.85
1.29
1.91
2.57
3.13
3.37
1.12
1.52
1.99
1.47

Educations

PopulalionM

% % Public Real
ODP Spending 000

5-29

over 65

fffffmitfiy PmnllnwnH

GcnEd Vocational

3.24
4.00
4.76
5.85
5.54
5.24
5.15
3.15
3.91
4.53
5.50
5.64
5.76
5.04
4.90
5.88
6.54
6.92
6.78
6.22
6.08
4.86
4.84
6.23

12.57
15.28
16.23
16.56
15.31
12.86
12.98
10.0S
11.12
12.02
12.38
11.98
10.11
9.72
17.33
16.66
16.74
15.24
13.32
12.10
11.46
14.58
11.08
14.62

0.43
0.67
0.91
1.23
1.34
1.44
1.67
0.34
0.54
0.76
1.01
1.23
1.37
1.43
0.68
1.01
1.32
1.59
1.85
1.98
2.24
1.11
0.97
1.55

40.91
41.52
42.66
42.72
41.40
39.48
37.49
36.27
36.47
37.06
38.36
37.86
36.67
34.94
38.85
39.38
40.02
39.55
37.93
36.16
34.35
40.88
36.82
38.01

8.82
9.27
9.70
10.26
11.09
11.71
12.58
10.91
11.99
12.93
13.98
14.57
13.68
14.70
9.78
10.76
11.71
12.83
13.78
14.62
15.20
10.52
13.32
12.75

89.81
87.73
84.56
95.57
92.44
91.47
90.66
55.34
59.24
63.60
66.81
63.77
63.18
62.33
68.16
69.01
72.79
76.65
72.06
66.09
64.07
90.33
62.23
69.88

10.13
11.90
15.07
4.06
7.37
8.35
9.17
42.21
38.26
34.56
32.20
35.22
35.96
36.68
30.85
30.67
27.00
23.11
27.77
33.81
35.87
9.42
36.27
29.84

5.23

13.62

1.19

38.97

11.91

76.91

22.49
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five-year interval beginning in I960.9 Figures 3 and 4 depict expenditures for social
insurance and education as shares of total public spending at every five-year interval
These two graphs illustrate the unique “preferences” o f liberal, conservative, and
social democratic regimes for the allocation o f public dollars to social insurance and
education programs.
A comparison o f Figure 1 with 3 and o f Figure 2 with 4 makes it clear that
there is no automatic or positive correlation between real expenditures and budgetary
shares within either policy area. In particular, changes in real spending for social
insurance or education do not tell how their budgetary shares will be affected—
whether they will go up, down, or stay the same. Government expenditures are
neither fixed in amount nor predetermined by a constant and preset schedule of
budgetary allocations. Expenditures vary with the economic capacity o f the state and
according to the hierarchy o f preferences and priorities determined by the political
process. Just as the budgetary “pie” may grow or shrink from one year to the next, so
can its policy slices—in real dollars, in relation to other programs and as a percentage
o f the total budget
As the summary data o f Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2 indicate, real spending for
social insurance and education grew—along with the GDP—for each welfare state

^teal spending is used in this study to represent “effort” as the financial
commitment o f a state to support a particular policy area. It is a useful measure for
cross-national comparison, by itself and when it is associated with the economic
resources o f the state as a percentage of the GDP. But measures o f real spending
really do not tell what “preference” a state or states may give to one or another
policy area relative to others. That preference finds expression in the percentage of
the total public spending that goes to a given program, and how that share changes
year-to-year relative to other program areas with which it must compete for state
monies.
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type at each five-year interval10 In other words, increasing national wealth was
positively associated with a greater financial commitment to social insurance and
education programs for aO types o f welfare state. This growth occurred more rapidly
in the earlier than later years of the 1960-1990 time period, and for social insurance
at a slightly higher rate than that for education, hi terms o f die different spending
commitments by welfare regime types over the 1960-1990 time period, social
democratic nations led overall in real spending for both social insurance and
education. Liberal regimes spent the least per capita for social insurance, but more
than conservative nations for education. Looked at another way, social democratic
states increased their spending effort for social insurance by greater than six-fold and
2,800 dollars per capita over the study interval conservative states by a factor o f four
and 1,800 dollars, and liberal regimes by 1,300 dollars and somewhat less than four
fold. At the same time, spending for education increased by a factor of four in liberal
nations, almost 3.8 in conservative states, and less than 3.3 in social democratic. As
measured in real dollars per capita, social democratic nations spent over 1,550 dollars
more in 1990 than 1960, liberal states 1,300, and conservative regimes 1,050.
Figures 3 and 4 add the element o f “preference” to those policy profiles. They
show that conservative nations tended to place a greater emphasis on social insurance
than education, relative to the other welfare regime types. Conversely, liberal nations
tended to place a greater relative emphasis on education than social insurance.
However, the data and graphs also indicate that some preference was given by liberal

An examination of national data records confirms that real spending for
social insurance and education also increased for each of the sample nations over the
entire 1960-1990 interval, but not necessarily at every five-year interval.
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states to increases in spending for social insurance programs over education. While
social insurance’s share o f total public spending increased over the 1960-1990
interval, education’s percentage grew during the early years only to decline, flatten
out, and finish with little gain at the end. For the social democratic nations that
preference is even clearer. Spending for social insurance as a share o f total public
spending increased significantly over the study period, while that for education
showed a steady decline.
Overall then, the summary data and figures support the existence o f the Idnds
o f welfare states identified by Esping-Andersen—liberal, conservative, and social
democradc-and unique education profiles for each. In terms o f spending effort
measured in real dollars, social democratic countries led the conservative and liberal
nations in both their education and social insurance commitments. They demonstrated
a preference to increase social insurance expenditures as a share o f public spending
over those for education. Conservative nations spent less than social democratic for
social insurance in real dollars but demonstrated a comparable policy preference, with
a high percentage o f total government spending directed to social insurance
programs. For all measures o f education spending though, conservative welfare states
were behind both social democratic and liberal regimes. Liberal welfare countries
tended to be laggards in all measures o f social insurance spending, exhibiting a
greater preference to spend for education. Although second to social democratic
nations in real expenditures per capita for education, liberal nations ranked first in
spending for education as a percentage o f total public spending. In addition, Table 2
shows that liberal nations led in general education enrollments at the secondary levd,
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it a rate much higher than that of conservative and social democratic states with their
considerable vocational training systems.
Wagner’s Law was not supported by the data, however. Increasing national
wealth—as measured by the GDP per capita—was not necessarily associated with
greater state expenditures fix’education or social insurance as a percentage o f the
GDP.11 Despite steady growth in the GDP per capita for the entire sample o f nations
over the interval o f the study, education spending as a share o f the GDP began to
shrink for a majority o f countries by 1980, and for all by 1990. Among the liberal
nations, Switzerland was the first to show this decline in 1970. Ireland was next in
1975, followed by Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United
States in 1980, and Australia in 1985. Italy was first among the conservative
countries in 1975, then came Belgium and France in 1980, Germany in 1985, and
Austria in 1990. Finland led the social democratic countries, its decline beginning in
1965, followed by the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden in 1970, and Denmark in
1980.
The national data for social insurance are different; there is not the same
unanimity across the sample as there is for education, but the number o f exceptions
to Wagner's hypothesis are sufficient cause for its rejection. Beginning with two
welfare regimes in 1980, nine of the eighteen nations had reduced levels o f spending
for social insurance as a percentage of the GDP by 1990. Australia was the first
among liberal nations to register such a decline in 1980, followed by Ireland in 1990.

Castles (1989) also rejected Wagner’s thesis for educational expenditures.
Lindert (1994) found only “weak support” for Wagner’s Law as an explanation for
rising social spending during the 1880*1930 time period.
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Italy led the conservative nations in 1980, followed by Germany in 198S and then
Austria, Belgium, and France in 1990. Finland and the Netherlands were die only
social democratic countries to show such a decline in social insurance expenditures,
in 1990.
Along with the data o f Table 2, Figures 3 and 4 suggest further cause to reject
Wagner’s thesis. Although GDPs and real social insurance expenditures per capita
grew steadily over the study interval, Figure 3 indicates those increases were not
matched by a consistent growth in social insurance’s share o f total public spending. It
actually declined in liberal and conservative nations between 1980 and 1990, and then
for social democratic states over the 1985-1990 interval Figure 4 reveals an even
earlier decline in education’s share o f total public spending, and Table 2 as a
percentage of the GDP, even as real expenditures for education continued to grow.
This was shown first by the social democratic nations in the 1970-1975 frame, and
then by liberal and conservative regimes beginning in the 1975-1980 interval
That expenditure levels for social insurance programs began to move
downward later than those for education may be evidence of its greater “lock-in”
effect (Pierson 1994), the fixed and nondiscretionary nature o f social insurance
expenditures relative to education and other public programs that are more vulnerable
to GDP fluctuations and partisan politics. This might be manifested by a preference
given to expenditures for social insurance over education and other budgetary
programs when public monies are tight. Following in this vein, it is interesting to
observe that changing levels of state expenditures for education as a share o f total
public spending more accurately reflects than social insurance the periods o f welfare
state growth, consolidation, and contraction cited in the literature: from the 1960s
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and the “Golden Age” o f welfare state expansion, the slowdown o f the 1970s, to the
stagnation and rollback o f welfare state expenditures during the 1980s (EspingAndersen 1999; Stephens, Huber, and Ray 1999). In particular, as it relates to the
slowdown and rollback o f welfare state expenditures that began in the 1970s, a
comparison o f Figures 3 and 4 makes it apparent that changes in spending levels for
education led those for social insurance. Although there are too many other public
programs and factors involved for this very general budgetary association to establish
a specific linkage between the education and social policies of Western societies—
and certainly not a trade-off—it does provide partial support for my hypothesis that
those welfare states may exhibit a preference to support and invest in educational
opportunities or social insurance.
Figures 5-12 are included as additional evidence supportive o f EspingAndersen’s welfare state typology, and o f my hypothesis that the kinds o f welfare
regimes he described can be linked with specific education profiles. Produced from
the social insurance and education data o f this study, these scatterplots reveal
distinctive country arrays that correspond closely to what Esping-Andersen
characterized as liberal, conservative, and social democratic clusters. The data and
charts also provide support for the hypothesis that an emphasis on educational
opportunities or expanded social insurance provisions represent alternative welfare
paths that states may follow.
Figures 5-8 utilize real expenditures data to illustrate how the countries
Esping-Andersen identified as belonging to liberal, conservative, or social democratic
clusters exhibit a tendency to gather in analogous groups when their social insurance
and education “efforts” are associated. A comparison o f Figures 5-8, four
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“snapshots” taken at ten-year intervals beginning with 1960 show the durability o f
those groups over time. Those welfare nations identified as social democratic—
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden—can be found from the
upper center to upper right, indicative o f their greater soda! insurance and education
effort Given lesser levels o f real spending for both social insurance and education,
the conservative nations—Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy—are located
more to the center and beneath the social democratic countries. With the smallest
state commitment to social insurance and widest variation in the commitment of
public monies to education, the liberal welfare states—Japan, Ireland, New Zealand,
Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, Switzerland, and the United States—are
spread from the lower left to the upper center.
Figures 9-12 provide additional evidence o f the linkage between the social
insurance and education policies o f Western welfare regimes. Clustering is also
apparent, but for different policies than those Esping-Andersen evaluated, and on
another dimension than that displayed in Figures 1-8. Using just education data,
liberal, conservative, and social democratic arrays are discernible in Figures 9-12,
very much like the clusters Esping-Andersen described for social insurance alone.
The scatterplots portray how the three kinds o f welfare state vary in their support of
educational opportunities, as indicated by their secondary level general education
enrollment rates and education “effort” in real dollars. Figures 9-12 also support my
hypothesis, and the argument advanced by Heidenheimer (1981) and H edo (1985),
that welfare regimes may emphasize either educational opportunities and achievement
or expanded social insurance systems; that the two represent alternative welfare
policies. The data and charts indicate that liberal nations have the highest rates o f
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secondary level general education enrollments, but also have the least generous social
insurance systems. Conversely, conservative nations have the lowest participation
rates in secondaiy level general education curriculums and very well developed social
insurance systems.
A comparison of the four ten-year interval snapshots shows that the liberal,
conservative, and social democratic arrays are fairly consistent over the 1960-1990
period. Liberal regimes stretch from the United States at the top right to Japan,
Ireland and New Zealand at the bottom and to the right o f center, the result o f their
high rate o f secondary general education enrollments and uneven spending for
education. These are also the nations that tend to support the smallest social safety
nets. This reflects the welfare strategy o f liberal regimes, to emphasize the
socioeconomic benefits that may be realized through educational opportunities and
achievement as an alternative to expanded social insurance provisions. The 1980 and
1990 scatterplots (Figures 11 and 12) show Switzerland located somewhat to the left
o f the other liberal nations. This may be attributed to the significant growth o f
vocational training enrollments that occurred during the 1980 time period. The social
democratic nations—Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Denmark—tend toward the
center, left and above the liberal states, given their higher real spending for education
and greater emphasis on vocational training programs. These states also tend to have
the most comprehensive social insurance systems. The Netherlands, a country that
Esping-Andersen recognized as having conservative features although it was
predominantly social democratic, is located nearer the conservative nations. The goal
o f social democratic welfare policy is to guarantee individuals and families “a socially
acceptable standard o f living independent of market participation,” but without
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discouraging individual aspirations or denying the opportunity for private
socioeconomic achievement (Esping-Andersen 1990,26-8,37). The conservative
welfare states are located toward the middle and left o f center. The vocational
training rate of conservative regimes is much like that o f social democratic nations,
but their financial effort to support education much less. The welfare policy of
conservative regimes represents the alternative to that supported by liberal nations.
The emphMi« is on collective responsibility and there is a for greater concern for
social order and stability. Educational opportunities at the postprimary level are fairly
restricted while the security provided by work-related social insurance benefits is
relatively broad.
These preliminary findings—based on national and summary data, variable
graphing and scatterplots—represent initial confirmation for my hypothesis o f an
association between the education and social policies o f Western welfare states. Just
as liberal, conservative, and social democratic welfare regimes may be distinguished
by the similarity of their social insurance programs, so can they by the education
policies they support In particular, liberal welfare regimes tend to be associated with
lesser social insurance commitments, higher levels of spending for education, and the
greatest proportion o f students enrolled in general education curriculums at the
postprimary level—a recognized vehicle of social mobility and opportunity, and an
alternative to expanded social insurance programs. This is supportive of
Heidenheimer and Heclo’s proposition that educational opportunity is the liberal
state’s substitute for the social insurance and income protection that is characteristic
o f conservative and social democratic welfare states. This is not to overlook the
greater financial “effort” o f social democratic states, but there is clearly a lesser
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«mph«fi« placed on general education than in liberal welfare nations. In terms of their
spending “effort,” as measured in real dollar expenditures per capita, social
democratic countries lead conservative and liberal nations in both their education and
social insurance commitments. As compared to the other regime types, conservative
nations tend to place a greater emphasis on social insurance than education. They
rank first in social insurance expenditures as a percentage o f total government
spending, but they are last for education.

Regression Modeling
Six welfare state expenditure models (Equations 1-6 in Tables 3-5) have been
specified for testing, utilizing four different measures o f public spending for social
insurance and education as dependent variables.12 Because the six models share
several independent variables, a detailed explanation for the use o f those variables is
provided only for the first two equations presented. Discussion o f the remaining four
models is limited to those things that are different
Regressions on Real Social Insurance Expenditures
The regression models in Table 3 (Equations 1 and 2) examine the “effort” of
welfare regimes to fund social insurance programs—the level o f their policy
commitment—using real social insurance expenditures per capita as the dependent
variable. The placement o f real education expenditures per capita in both models
permits an evaluation o f the association between a regime’s educational “effort” and

l2The results o f Equations 1 and 2 are recorded in Table 3, Equations 3 and 4
in Table 4, and Equations 5 and 6 in Table 5.
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Table 3
Regressions on Real Social Insurance Expenditures Per Capita

Dependent Variable

Equation 1
Real Social Insurance
$ per capita

Equation 2
Real Social Insurance
$ per capita

-3.6582*

-2.5096*

Conservative

0.3584*

0.3065*

Social Democratic

0.3089*

0.3412*

Socialist Electoral Strength

0.0060*

0.0060*

GDP per capita

0.0513

0.0185

Constant

-0.0751*

Education % o f Total Public
Spending
Real Education Dollars
per capita

0.7308*

1.0777*

% Population 5-29

0.0454*

0.0575*

% Population over 65

0.1412*

0.0805*

Adjusted R-Square

0.817

0.866

n-

123

123

i n dicates significance at the .05 level or greater.
that for social insurance. Equation 2 includes an additional variable—education
expenditures as a percentage o f total public spending—to test the hypothesis that
there is a policy trade-off between state spending for education and social insurance
programs—an exhibited "preference” to support education or social insurance
programs.13 The report o f a significant negative association for the variable

I3Real education expenditures per capita and education expenditures as a
percentage o f total public spending tap into very different dimensions of the political
(continued...)
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coefficient by the regression would be supportive o f such an inverse policy
association.
Variables for conservative and social democratic regime types, socialist
electoral strength, GDP per capita, the percentage o f the national population aged
5-29, and the percentage o f the national population over age 65 are independent
variables common to all six regression equations. The dummy variables for
conservative and social democratic regimes have been employed to analyze the power
o f Esping-Andersen’s welfare state model as an explanation for the variation in
education and social insurance spending by Western societies. All country data were
coded as liberal, social democratic or conservative, according to Esping-Andersen’s
own classification, in order to perform this test
Castles’ measure o f right-wing party influence has been replaced by “socialist
electoral strength” in each o f the six models. Intended to evaluate the effect o f
partisan politics on state spending for education and social insurance, this variable has
been operationalized as the percentage of the vote received by socialist parties in

l3(...continued)
and budgetary process. A condition o f muhicollinearity is not introduced by their
simultaneous use as independent variables in a regression on real social insurance
expenditures. There is not a fixed association between the actual dollars spent on
education and education’s piece o f the budgetary pie, rad then with the real dollars
directed to social insurance programs. The budgetary pie is not fixed in size, nor are
any o f its pieces in terms o f real dollars or in proportion to one another. In fact, as
indicated by an examination o f the national data and is dearly illustrated by the
graphs of spending for education in real dollars and as a percentage o f total public
spending (Figures 2 and 4), the two did not move in the same fashion over the 19601990 period. Although real spending for education and social insurance each grew
over the study interval (Figures 1 and 2), education’s share o f total public spending
tended to be fairly flat and even declined while social insurance increased (Figures 3
and 4). This difference occurred because social insurance increased more, both in
terms of real dollars (effort) and in relation to all other budget sectors (preference).
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national elections. The electoral strength and politics o f the left are normally
associated with working class interests, with the support o f social insurance programs
and other public policies which might benefit that constituency.
Like Castles, the GDP per capita has been used to represent national economic
wealth and indicate the resources, at least the potential capacity, available to support
public policies. Evidence o f a positive association between either real education or
real social

expenditures and the GDP would demonstrate the influence of

national wealth on spending levels. However, varying levels o f social or education
expenditures per capita that are unrelated to GDP size or growth might indicate there
is a choice or some intent involved in a welfare regime’s “effort” to support particular
policies.
Demographic variables were modified and made more inclusive than those in
Castles’ model. While Castles selected that proportion of the national population
under 25 to represent the size o f the school-age population, this study takes the
percentage of the national population in the 5-29 age group. That group more
accurately represents those who actually receive educational benefits from the state,
excludes the preschool population, and allows more weight to be given older students
and higher levels o f education where the enhancement o f socioeconomic
opportunities tends to be greatest Increases or decreases in the size o f this group
may directly affect the level o f public expenditures for education, both in total dollars
and real dollars per capita. In addition, the percentage o f the population over age 65
was included to determine if variation in the size of this group might be associated
with levels and changes in social insurance and education expenditures. Those over
65 not only tend to be the primary beneficiaries of the state’s social insurance system,
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but they are often among the most politically active—especially as voters. Of
particular interest is whether senior citizens, major recipients o f social insurance
benefits, might exhibit a negative association with education spending, a program for
which they may be liable for taxes but do not receive any direct benefits in return
(Undert 1994; South 1991).
Education's share o f total pubfic expenditures has been included in the second
equation to examine the association o f spending for that policy area with social
insurance programs. After controlling for the effect o f demographic factors on public
spending—in particular the size o f the specific population groups that are the primary
beneficiaries of the state’s commitment to social insurance and education—the share
of total public spending that social insurance or education programs enjoy may reflect
the preference of the welfare state to support and invest in that policy area relative to
other policy alternatives. A negative association reported by Equation 2 between
education’s share of total public spending and real social insurance expenditures per
capita would provide support for the hypothesis that preferential investment in
education or spending for social insurance are alternative policies that welfare
regimes may support, and that there is a trade-off between the two policy areas.
Castles’ variable for incremental program growth was omitted. Period-toperiod changes in expenditures are not being evaluated in this analysis. The measure
of Roman Catholic strength has also, and necessarily, been excluded. As noted
earlier, Castles’ Catholic “family o f nations” closely corresponds to EspingAndersen’s group o f conservative welfare states; and Catholic influence is captured
by the conservative welfare state variable.
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The calculations for Equations 1 and 2 largely substantiate earlier findings and
are further endorsement for the hypotheses o f this study. As hypothesized, welfare
state type and spending for education ire very good indicators o f expenditure levels
for social insurance programs. Both equations show that the kinds o f welfare states
Esping-Andersen identified—liberal, conservative, and social democratic—can be
matched with unique spending profiles for social insurance, in addition, the models
suggest that what and how a nation spends for education is a good predictor o f its
social insurance expenditures. Both equations reveal a statistically significant
association between state spending for education and that for social insurance.
A closer inspection and comparison o f the calculations returned for Equations
1 and 2 yields much o f what was expected, as well as some important discoveries. In
the first place, and contrary to what was indicated by the summary statistics and
variable graphing, the coefficient returned for the conservative variable in Equation 1
would seem to indicate a greater affinity between that regime type than social
democratic with increasing social insurance expenditures. That relative ranking
changes with Equation 2, when education’s share o f total public spending is added
and assessed for its effect on real social insurance expenditures. Including and
controlling for that variable makes the regime variables more accurate in their
reflection o f budgetary preferences. Equation 2 correctly estimates a greater
investment in social insurance programs by social democratic regimes, followed by
conservative and then liberal nations.14

14The value returned for the constant in the regression models is relative,
representing only the y-intercept o f the equation. However, it does mark the liberal
position as a reference point from which to assess the different influences of social
(continued...)
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But Equation 2 is not just a better explanation because it more accurately
reflects the real spending preferences of the three regime types; it is also a more
powerful explanation than Equation 1. Equation 2 exposes i statistically significant
inverse relationship between education as a percentage o f total public spending and
real spending for social insurance. It is evidence of a “choice” and “trade-off* that
exists between state investment in education and social insurance, that they are policy
alternatives. There is no budgetary formula that determines how real spending for
social insurance will be affected by education’s changing budgetary share—if it will
go up, down, or stay the same—yet Equation 2 indicates their movement is
connected in a meaningful way. Specifically, real spending for social insurance will
decrease as education’s share of total public spending increases, and vice versa. In
other words, as education is favored by an increasing share o f the total budget, real
spending for social insurance may be reduced. This is clearly the case for liberal
regimes, and the opposite for conservative. For these two regime types the trade-off
between investment in education or social insurance is very apparent They follow
very contrary social insurance and education policies. It is less clear for social
democratic nations but, as was pointed out earlier, those states continued to increase
real spending for social insurance even as education’s share o f the budget was being
reduced. The great improvement o f Equation 2 is that it reveals the trade-off between
investment in social insurance and education programs. This is confirmation o f the

14(...continued)
democratic and conservative regimes on education and social programs, based on the
value and strength o f the coefficients returned for their dummy variables.
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hypothesis that a preference to support and invest in education or social insurance are
alternative policies that welfare regimes may support
Both regression models report a statistically significant positive coefficient for
die variable measuring the influence o f socialist parties in national elections. This is
not a surprise. Real spending for social insurance would be expected to increase as
the political parties most closely associated with expanding those programs grew in
electoral strength. The coefficient may seem rather small, though, perhaps suggesting
the socialist partisan effect is minor or that it may have been captured more fully
elsewhere, specifically by the social democratic welfare regime variable. It might even
be questioned whether a condition o f muldcollinearity exists between those two
variables. I believe it does not Socialist parties also enjoyed high levels o f electoral
support in some conservative welfare nations, states that also demonstrated a
considerable welfare “effort” In Austria and Germany that electoral support ranged
between 40 and 50 percent over the study interval. Moreover, even certain liberal
welfare regimes—Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, in particular—
experienced high levels o f socialist electoral strength, ranging from nearly 40 percent
to over 50 percent (Lane 1997). Therefore, I do not believe the simultaneous use o f
the social democratic regime type and socialist electoral strength variables introduces
a condition o f muhicollinearity. Rather, I would argue this suggests the institutional
power o f the welfare state to affect ongoing policy decisions. “Politics matter,” to be
sure, as the electoral strength variable indicates, but the institutionalized welfare state
may have a greater continuous effect, regardless o f welfare regime type.
Furthermore, the votes political parties receive, whether o f the left or the right, does
not automatically translate into seats and power in government While there may be
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influence on the policymaking process, there is no necessary connection between the
strength o f political parties in national elections and the party or parties that actually
come to control the government and make policy—the ruling regime.
Neither equation evaluates the GDP per capita as having a significant influence
on real spending for social insurance.15 Although the national and summary data does
show that GDPs per capita increased across the sample over the study period, growth
in real spending for social insurance was far more a function o f regime type than
national economic capacity. In short, the explanation rests with the welfare policy
supported by each regime type. Conservative and social democratic regimes
“committed” a greater share o f their GDP, a higher percentage o f total government
spending, and more real dollars to social insurance than did liberal nations. It needs
also to be remembered that, just as real spending for social insurance may increase in
association with a growing GDP, real expenditures for social insurance may also rise
as the consequence o f a recessionary economy.
Both models reported a significant positive association between real spending
for education and social insurance. This comes as no surprise. The education and
social spending data examined in this study came from an extended period o f
economic growth and prosperity, one in which school enrollments and the size o f
elderly populations in most advanced industrial societies steadily grew. An increase in
the monies going to either education or social insurance is thus not difficult to
explain. It is important to recognize, however, that spending for the two policy areas

15This is not the same as the Wagner effect, discussed earlier, that the data
did not support, Le., that public spending increases as a percentage o f the GDP with a
larger or growing GDP.
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did not move in perfect synchronization over time. As discussed earlier, there were
differences between types o f welfare state, as well u between education and social
insurance programs, in size; rates, and timing o f expenditures growth.
It is perhaps tempting to read too much—or the wrong thing—into the results
of regression modeling for the relationships between the two age groups examined
and real spending for social insurance. First, as one would expect, increases in social
insurance spending are positively associated with the growth in the size o f the
population over the age of 65. Second, and what might appear as surprising, is the
positive association shown between the 5-29 cohort and higher levels o f social
insurance spending. However, what must be considered is that members o f the 5-29
age group are also covered by social insurance provisions in many nations,
particularly healthcare. Especially given the economic prosperity and general
expansion of welfare states during that period—increasing coverage and benefits for
more o f the population—it is not a mistake that the younger population may be
associated with increasing social insurance costs.

Rggraaona on Real Education Expenditures
The regression models o f Table 4 analyze educational “effort” o f welfare
regimes, using real per capita education expenditure data as the dependent measure.
Equations 3 and 4 reverse the Equation 1 and 2 relationship o f social insurance and
education expenditure data as dependent and independent variables. Like Equation 2,
the calculation o f a negative coefficient for social insurance as a percentage o f total
public spending in Equation 4 would be interpreted as evidence o f a policy trade-off
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Table 4
Regressions on Real Education Expenditures Per Capita
Equation 3
Real Education
Sper capita

Equation 4
Real Education
$ per capita

Constant

-0.8853

-0.6144

Conservative

-0.0609

-0.0161

Dependent Variable

Social Democratic
Socialist Electoral Strength
GDP per capita

0.2127*
-0.0025
0.1171*

Social Insurance % of
Total Public Spending

0.2163*
-0.0019
0.1073*
-0.0095*

Real Social Insurance Dollars
per capita

0.1701*

0.2520*

% Population 5-29

0.0102

0.0113

% Population over 65

0.0395*

0.0403*

Adjusted R-Square

0.910

0.916

n=

123

123

•Indicates significance at the .05 level or greater.
between spending for educational opportunities and social insurance systems, that the
two represent alternative welfare policies that states may support
Like the models of Table 3, Equations 3 and 4 o f Table 4 also support the
earlier findings o f this study and are further endorsement for its hypotheses. Welfare
state type and expenditures for social insurance are proven to be very useful in
predicting spending levels for education. Real spending for social insurance is
strongly associated with that for education. The models ofTable 4 also support my
arguments that liberal, conservative, and social democratic regimes exhibit
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characteristic education policies and that there is a trade-off between the support o f
social insurance and educational opportunities by those regime types.
Although Equation 3 does not have the same problem as Equation 1 in
estimating the significance and relative ranking o f the three regime types in their
support o f education, it is similarly less accurate in estimating the strength o f that
association because it does not indicate the trade-off that exists between state
expenditures for social insurance and education. That negative association is reported
by Equation 4 when social insurance as a percentage o f total public spending is
regressed on real education dollars per capita. According to the estimate o f Equation
4, real spending for education is adversely affected by the growing and higher levels
of public spending given to social insurance. This is dearly indicated by the national
and summary data for liberal and conservative regime types. It is also true for social
democratic regimes where, although real spending did increase for both social
insurance and education over the study interval, social insurance’s share o f public
spending increased over the 1960-1990 period while education showed a steady
decline. Therefore, the regressions—along with national and summary data by regime
type—support my dual contention that the kind o f welfare states Esping-Andersen
described may be linked with characteristic education profiles and there is a trade-off
exhibited between their support o f social insurance and educational opportunities.
There are also some interesting comparisons to be drawn between the models
of Tables 3 and 4. First, whereas socialist electoral strength was shown to be a
significant positive factor in the calculation o f social insurance expenditures, it is not
for education. Its effect is reported as negative, although not statistically significant I
would submit that this points out a real difference between education and social
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insurance policy in Western welfare states: while the amount of real spending for
education may not be a function o f particular partisan politics or regime type, as it
tends to be for social insurance, how that money will be spent—for general education
and vocational training curricuhuns—can be predicted according to partisan factors
and by regime type. Second, while it is not for social insurance, the GDP per capita is
a significant factor in estimating real education expenditures. Castles has reported a
similar finding: “Being rich and getting richer was dearly an important source o f
variation in education output, if not in educational effort” (1989,441-2). Education
spending is tied more immediately to the health and wealth of the national economy.
It does not enjoy the same “lock-in” effect as social insurance spending (Pierson
1994).
Neither equation computes a significant coefficient for the 5-29 age group.
This may be explained, in part, by an examination of the summary and national data.
After increasing during the early years o f the study, the 5-29 age group began to
diminish as a share o f most national populations and for each welfare state type
beginning in the mid-1970s. However, even as the size of that cohort dedined
relative to other age groups, real education expenditures continued to rise—
confounding the attempt to discover a meaningful mathematical relationship between
the 5-29 age group and education expenditures over the entire 1960-1990 period. It
would seem logical that the association might be positive, though, given the sign of
the coefficient and because real expenditures per capita grew steadily. The
connection between a growing elderly population and increased education spending is
perhaps a bit troublesome. Given the political clout o f the elderly and that they would
be inclined to favor social insurance over education expenditures, I thought an
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inverse association might be indicated—another dimension o f the tradeo ff between
social insurance and education. I think the report o f a statistically significant positive
coefficient for the over 65 age group may be spurious. Populations have been aging
in advanced industrial societies at the same time education spending per capita has
been rising. The two are clearly associated in time, but probably no more.
Regressions on Social Insurance and Education as Shares o f Total
Public Spending
Equation 5 of Table 5 is identical to Equation 2, but with social insurance
expenditures as a percentage o f total public spending made the dependent variable.
This model evaluates the "preference” welfare regimes may exhibit to invest in social
insurance programs versus other policy choices—education, in particular. Evidence
o f a significant association between education and social insurance programs in the
way public monies are allocated would be supportive o f the hypothesis that
preferential investment in social insurance or education programs are alternative
policy strategies that welfare regimes may support16 Equation 6 is a mirror image o f
Equation 4, but with education as a percentage of total public spending made the
dependent variable. As with Equation 5, the policy “preference" o f welfare regimes is
examined, but in this case with respect to educational expenditures.

N either education nor social insurance expenditures as a percentage o f the
GDP are examined as dependent variables by this study. Because o f the great
variation in GDP size between the sample nations, those spending measures may
indicate more about a welfare regime’s capacity to spend than its policy preferences.
For example, the United States may spend a smaller share o f its GDP on education
than the Netherlands but, because its GDP is so much larger, actually invests far more
real dollars per capita in education.
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Tables
Regressions on Social Insurance and Education as Shares o f Public Spending

Dependent Variable
Constant

Equation 5
Social Insurance % of
Total Public Spending
-15.7588

Conservative

7.7945*

Social Democratic

5.2122*

Socialist Electoral Strength

0.1017*

GDP per capita

0.4610

-7.9939
-0.3687
3.0806*
-0.0044
0.7294*
0.1176*

Social Insurance % of
Total Public Spending
Real Social Insurance Dollars
per capita

-3.4504*

Education % of
Total Public Spending

0.0195

Real Education Dollars
per capita

-1.0514

% Population 5-29

0.6532*

% Population over 65

1.8333*

Adjusted R-Square

0.429

n=

Equation 6
Education % of
Total Public Spending

123

0.3887*
-0.0085
0.465
123

’ Indicates significance at the .05 level or greater.
Although neither o f the "preference” models has the predictive power o f its
“commitment” counterparts (compare with the Adjusted R-Squares o f Equations 2
and 4), the results of the regressions are comparable and also endorse the hypotheses
o f this study. They are further confirmation that the kinds o f welfare states identified
by Esping-Andersen—liberal, conservative and social democratic—have
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characteristic policy profiles for education just as they do for social insurance. What
is more, the models offer additional evidence o f a relationship between public
spending for education and that for social insurance in Western societies, even of an
inverse association between the two policy areas which supports my argument that
educational opportunities and expanded social insurance systems represent alternative
welfare strategies that those states may support
There are some differences between the “preference” and “commitment”
models that require mention, however. Unlike Equation 2, the Equation S regression
on social insurance found neither measure o f education spending statistically
significant Equation S indicates regime type, socialist electoral strength, and
demographic factors are o f fin greater importance in estimating the share o f the
budget going to social insurance than any preference shown to education.
Education’s percentage o f public spending does not seem to affect the share given to
social insurance, although the coefficient for real education expenditures suggests an
inverse correlation may exist like that reported in Equation 4. The higher coefficient
reported for conservative than social democratic regimes also deserves mention.
What share social insurance receives o f total public spending is an expression of a
regime’s policy "preference," not o f its spending “effort” In terms o f total public
spending committed to social insurance, conservative and social democratic welfare
nations tend to allocate somewhat comparable shares. However, when it comes to the
real dollars committed, the financial "effort” expended, social democratic regimes
lead by a significant margin.
The Equation 6 regression on education also yields some interesting results.
Like the finding o f Equation 4, regime type, the GDP, and social insurance
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expenditures data ire reported to be important factors in the determination o f
education expenditures. As was the case with Equation 2, a negative association was
found between real social insurance expenditures and education’s share of the
budget At the same time, a positive association is indicated between the shares o f the
budget given to social insurance and education. Given their common patterns o f
growth and decline as budgetary shares over the 1960-1990 study period, is
illustrated by Figures 3 and 4, this would seem logical. It really says nothing about
the existence or not o f a trade-off; that effect is primarily accounted for by the
variables for regime type and real social insurance spending. What is somewhat
different than the results o f Equation 4, and more in line with expectations, are the
coefficients reported for the 5-29 and over 65 age groups. Education’s share o f the
budget varies in a significant and positive fashion with the changing size of the 5-29
age group as a proportion o f the total population. This makes sense. At the same
tune, the relative size of the age group over 65 is shown not to have a meaningful
effect on education’s share o f the total budget. Although this does not confirm the
negative effect I thought the growth o f this age group would have on education’s
share of the budget, it does not contradict it either, and the sign o f the coefficient is
negative.
Like the country and summary data, variable graphing and scatterplots, the
regression analyses support my hypothesis that the lands of welfare regimes EspingAndersen described may be further characterized by the common and characteristic
features of their education systems. However, all six equations do not support the
general finding that social democratic states tend to invest more in education and
social insurance, and at higher levels than both conservative and liberal welfare
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regimes. In particular, the regression on social insurance in Equation 1 represents a
challenge to this argument It suggests that conservative regimes may actually have a
greater affinity with increasing social insurance expenditures than do social
democratic nations. In the case o f Equation 1, that is because education expenditures
as a percentage o f total public spending is not evaluated, an indicator o f a regime’s
budgetary “preference.” The inclusion of that variable in Equation 2 remedies that
condition, Le., it makes the equation more closely model what is shown by the
national and summary data. Equation 2 correctly predicts that social democratic
regimes will have a stronger association with social insurance spending than either
conservative or liberal nations. Moreover, the regression also revealed a statistically
significant inverse relationship between education as a percentage o f total public
spending and real spending for social insurance. When the variable reflecting a
regime’s budgetary “choice” and the “trade-off’ between investment in education or
social insurance is captured and controlled by the appropriate variable—as it is in
Equation 2—a much better explanation is produced, and all regimes types more
accurately exhibit their affinity with real social insurance expenditures. A similar
modification was made to Equation 4 to improve on the explanation for real
education expenditures provided by Equation 3, and to expose the trade-off in the
relationship between education and social insurance.
Equations 2 and 4 are dearly the most powerful o f those evaluated. Equations
1 and 3 are underspedfied, and Equations 5 and 6 simply have less predictive power
as shown by their Adjusted R-Squares. At the same time, it must be recognized that
Equations 2 and 4 are analyzing different measures o f social insurance and education
spending than 5 and 6. Whereas Equations 2 and 4 are concerned with welfare state
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“effort,” as measured in real dollar expenditures, Equations 5 and 6 analyze policy
“preferences” as shares o f total public spending. This difference is important, though,
since all four equations produce very comparable explanations—about the different
spending by liberal, conservative, and social democratic regimes for education and
social insurance and the relationship between those two policy areas.
Like the tabular data and variable charts, the regression models of Equations 2
and 4 indicate the tendency o f social democratic regimes to invest in education and
social insurance at higher levels than liberal and conservative regimes. This is further
evidence of the greater social democratic “effort” and commitment to both education
and social insurance programs. Although social democratic regimes tend to allocate a
slightly smaller share o f public spending to social insurance than conservative nations,
they spend the most in real dollars on social insurance, followed by conservative and
then liberal states. While conservative regimes tend to spend more on social insurance
in real dollars and as a budgetary share, liberal states place a greater emphasis on
education than do conservative. When it comes to education expenditures as a share
o f total public spending, social democratic and liberal nations spend relatively the
same, but decidedly more than conservative states. Social democratic regimes rank
first in real education dollars per capita, followed by liberal and then conservative
nations.
As hypothesized, education and social insurance spending are strong predictors
o f one other. In particular, Equations 2 and 4 each report a statistically significant
positive relationship between the real dollars spent for education and those for social
insurance programs. This is hardly a surprise. The education and social spending data
examined in this study come from an extended period o f economic growth and
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prosperity, one in which school enrollments and the size o f elderly populations in
most advanced industrial societies steadily grew. An increase in the monies going to
either education or social insurance is thus not difficult to explain. It is important to
recognize, however, that they did not move in perfect synchronization over time.
There were differences between types of welfare state regime as well as between
education and social insurance programs, in both the rates and timing of expenditure
growth.
Particularly meaningful to this inquiry is the negative association shown by
Equation 2 between education as a share o f total public spending and real social
insurance dollars per capita, and the similar contrary relation in Equation 4 between
social insurance as a share o f total public spending and real education dollars per
student Expenditures for public programs are not the function o f a frozen budgetary
pie with fixed proportional slices committed to specific programs. The spending
changes for any policy area—education, social insurance, defense, agriculture, or
anything else—are not automatically matched with the spending levels for others. In
other words, there is no necessary correlation between government spending in one
policy area and another. Specifically, there is no a-priori reason to think that spending
for education and social insurance spending must move in perfect tandem, up and
down, or that the two might be inversely related. However, as the regressions o f
Equations 2 ,4 and 6 indicate, a statistically significant negative association does exist
between spending for education and that for social insurance. This finding o f an
inverse relationship between the two policy areas is evidence supportive of my
hypothesis that a preference to invest in education or social insurance programs are
alternative policy strategies that welfare regimes may support. Equation 5 reports a
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m m >r nygytivf Mandatifwi between re d education expenditures in d th e i h m o f

total public spending going to social insurance, but it is not statistically significant
There is another aspect of this inverse association that requires attention.
Regression models 2 and 4 report that die apparent "effect” of education’s
changing share o f public spending on real social insurance expenditures is eight
times greater than that for changes in social insurance’s share of total public
expenditures on real spending for education. Such a difference in magnitude is
truly significant, and probably attributable to more than one factor. Part o f the
explanation may be in the composition of the sample. Eight of the eighteen nations
in the study are liberal welfare regimes, nations that tend to spend relatively more
for education and die least for social insurance. Only five are conservative,
countries that tend to spend relatively more on social insurance and the least for
education. Given that die five social democratic regimes tend to exhibit the
greatest overall commitment to both education and social programs, it may be that
the majority data o f the "education* states—including the social democratic, but
especially the liberal welfare nations—tipped the scale and gave more weight to die
education variable. More important, though, may be the differences in
policymaking for education and social insurance. Once again, it may be indicative
o f the nondiscretionary nature of social insurance expenditures relative to
education and other public programs that are more vulnerable to partisan politics
and changes in die health o f the economy.
The summary data o f Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2 show that real spending
for social insurance and education grew for each welfare state type at each fiveyear interval. The national data confirm that real spending for social insurance and
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education increased for each of the sample nations over the entire 1960-1990
interval, although not necessarily at every five-year interval. As Table 2 and
Figures 3 and 4 indicate, however, increases in real spending for social insurance
and education were not matched by a consistent growth in their shares of total
public spending. In fact, education’s share o f total public spending began to
decline for social democratic nations in the 1970-1975 interval, and for liberal and
conservative regimes beginning in the 1975-1980 fiame. It happened later for
social insurance, declining for liberal and conservative nations between 1980 and
1990, and for social democratic over the 1985-1990 interval. As I observed
earlier, the changing levels of state expenditures for education as a share of total
public spending more accurately reflects than social insurance the periods of
welfare state growth, consolidation, and contraction dted in the literature. Earlier
and more than social insurance, education policy was affected by changes in the
economy and political arena.
Once more, as compared to education, social insurance programs seem to
exhibit a very strong “lock-in” effect (Pierson 1994). As well as being
nondiscretionaiy spending programs, they have a “lifeforce” o f their own. Most social
insurance programs enjoy widespread public support, especially those that benefit the
middle classes. Their popularity has helped to justify ever-increasing costs, and
expenditures have become less a function o f politics and the condition o f the national
economy than public expectations and the size o f the group eligible for benefits.
Former Speaker o f the U.S. House of Representatives Tip O’Neill called the U.S.
Social Security’s old-age pension system the “third-rail o f American politics.” “Touch
it and you die” he warned any politicians who dared consider reducing its retirement
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benefits or tightening eligibility requirements.17 Education, on the other hand,
appears more responsive to movement of the GDP and national politics, as Equations
4 and 6 indicate. The GDP is a good predictor of real spending for education and its
share o f the budget, but not for social insurance. Although education and social
insurance both saw steady increases in real dollar expenditures per capita over the
period o f the study, education's share o f public spending began a decline during the
mid-1970s that corresponds with the economic recession o f that time. Not until the
1980s does social insurance’s share o f public spending also show a downward
movement It may be, too, that education has a threshold beyond which additional
per unit (student) costs are relatively less than that for recipients o f social insurance
benefits. Schools may become crowded as the school-age population grows, but
expenditures do not necessarily increase in mark-step, nor are new schools
necessarily built or additional teaching staff hired.
Summary and Conclusions
Foremost among the objectives of this analysis has been to establish empirical
evidence of an association between the social and education policies o f Western
welfare states. I submit the data does confirm such a relationship, and that policy
linkage effectively extends the boundary of the welfare state’s definition to include
education with social insurance programs in its policy profile. The data also indicate
that Western nations tend to “cluster” into three groups like those Esping-Andersen
described for social policy—liberal, conservative and social democratic—according

17Paul Taylor, “Remember the Generation Gap?” Washington Post National

Weekly Edition, 20 January 1986,24.
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to the similarity of their education policies. Western welfare states exhibit distinctive
patterns o f support for education just as they do for social insurance. In particular,
there is a significant association between the different social insurance alternatives
supported by Western welfare states and their expenditures for education. The data
show that welfare state type and social insurance expenditure data are powerful
predictors of spending levels for education. Likewise, welfare state type and
education expenditures are powerful predictors o f spending for social insurance.
A detailed specification o f the particular education profiles for liberal,
conservative, and social democratic regimes is beyond the scope of the current
project, a subject for subsequent research. However, this much can be said. The three
kinds of welfare regimes Esping-Andersen distinguished by the similarity o f their
social insurance provisions can be comparably grouped because o f certain features
their education systems have been found to share. Each regime type—liberal,
conservative, and social democratic—can be identified with a different policy for
education, just as they are for social insurance. The data concerning secondary level
enrollments in vocational training and general education, in combination with
distinctive social welfare provisions and unique patterns o f spending for education
and social insurance, represent evidence o f these different policy profiles for the
social insurance and education systems o f liberal, conservative and social democratic
welfare states.
The particular meaning given to “educational opportunity,” and how it is
operationalized by each welfare regime type, highlights a most important difference
between the policy profiles o f liberal, conservative, and social democratic nations. I
have argued that a preference to invest in social insurance programs or educational
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opportunities are alternative policy strategies that Western welfare states may choose
to follow. Liberal welfare nations tend to prefer investment in educational
opportunities over the expansion o f social insurance programs. Educational
achievement is encouraged as a vehicle o f socioeconomic mobility and security, the
long-term functional equivalent o f social safety nets. Alternatively, conservative
nations tend to favor social safety nets. Educational achievement is less encouraged
as a gateway to social mobility and may even be made unnecessary for economic
security by a generous social insurance system. Social democratic regimes, even with
their expansive social safety nets, also provide a high level o f support for education
programs. Educational opportunity and the potential socioeconomic benefits o f
educational achievement are offered as an option to the individual; they do not
replace the protections of social insurance.
The findings of this study should not be considered as limited to an arbitrary
window defined by the 1960-1990 survey data; it is not so restricted in time and
space. This is more than a better explanation for the social insurance and education
policies o f Western societies during that time period. Indeed, rather than a snapshot
analysis o f nations and policies without meaning beyond its moment, I would submit
that this is a report on the ongoing work-in-process in Western political systems, of
the welfare state’s institutionalization and its policymaking for education and other
social programs. I would argue that the work-in-process on which this analysis has
focused reflects long-term and deeply-rooted policy and institutional arrangements,
and it is a very good predictor of future policy development.
How the welfare state and its policies for education and social welfare have
been institutionalized very much determine the structure and parameters for the
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enactment o f new public policies and the modification or reform o f existing ones.
Germany and the United States provide excellent examples. Germany’s occupationoriented guild structure for social insurance; a system with nineteenth century origins,
continues to define the German welfare state, even to providing the basic model for
the long-term care legislation adopted in 1994. In the United States, education is and
traditionally has been a state and local matter.18 Despite aU the campaign rhetoric
during the 2000 presidential campaign about school and education reform and,
particularly, o f a significant new role for the federal government in that policy field,
education will remain a state and local issue. For it to be otherwise would require—at
least—a constitutional amendment and a massive change o f tax and administrative
structures at all federal levels. Some change is likely, it always is, but the institutional
structure o f the American education system wQl remain largely the same for a long
time into the future.
Institutions are "sticky” (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992,15); and the
welfare state is one that is very durable and deeply entrenched in Western societies
(Esping-Andersen 1999; Pierson 1993, 1994,1996). Whatever the "crisis” o f the
welfare state, and barring some unforeseen political or socioeconomic event of
immense and revolutionary proportions, it is unlikely that either the substance of
education and social policies, or the national structures and rules for political
competition that affect the policymaking process of the welfare state, will undergo
any land o f significant change in the near term. Incremental changes will occur, to be
sure, but the institutionalized welfare state will continue to structure and resist any

18In 2000, only about 7% o f total education spending in the United States
came from the federal, i.e., national government
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great change; perpetuating its own survival and policy tendencies (Heclo 1974;
Hicks, Swank, and Ambuhl 1989).
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CHAPTER. IV
CASE STUDIES OF WELFARE STATE DEVELOPMENT:
GERMANY AND THE UNTIED STATES
Introduction
In The Development o f Welfare States in Europe and America (1981),
Hddenhdmer argues that a historical trade-off took place in welfare state
development between public investment in education and social security programs. In
particular, for the United States and the major European countries, “the emphasis on
education and social security programs are viewed as alternative strategies pursued
by emerging welfare states” (Flora and Heidenheimer 1981,269). Heclo, in The

Welfare State in Hard Times (1985), speaks o f a “trade-off* between public
investment in education and the expansion o f other social programs as a deliberate
choice in welfare state development. Castles similarly recommends, in “Explaining
Public Education Expenditures in OECD Nations” (1989), that the preference o f
some countries to spend for educational opportunities over expanded social programs
is demonstration of alternative welfare state strategies. Borrowing from EspingAndersen (1990), I argue that the types o f Western welfare regimes he describes—
liberal, conservative and social democratic-exhibit these alternative strategies in the
different kinds and combinations o f education and social policies they support. This
relationship between education and social policy is purposeful, not random, made
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manifest by the degree to which state policy provides educational opportunities and
encourages educational achievement as an alternative to social programs.1
This chapter and the next explore the alternative strategies and “trade-off”
theses for the United States and Germany, from the latter part o f the nineteenth
century to the 1990s. Both were rapidly industrializing states that today are advanced
industrial democracies, but they followed very different paths o f welfare state
development. While they share some common attributes—like democratic
government and federalism—their institutional structures and social policies are
decidedly different Indeed, Germany and the U.S. represent the “best cases” of the
conservative and liberal welfare regime types described by Esping-Andersen (Goodin
et al. 1999,14). Germany fits the conservative model where the primary provider o f
comprehensive social insurance programs is the state, while the market and private
insurance have only subsidiary roles. Germany was a pioneer in the legislation of
social insurance, and today has among the most comprehensive systems found in the
W est The United States may be the best example of the welfare regime type that
Esping-Andersen called liberal, where the market and private insurance are significant
alternatives to public protection, and coverage by the state is much more limited. The
American government’s entry into the field o f social insurance came much later than

Educational achievement, particularly at the secondary and higher levels, is a
recognized vehicle o f social mobility (Janowhz 1976; Kadble 1981). Educational
achievement can broaden socioeconomic opportunities and enhance an individual’s
ability to accumulate personal wealth, thereby reducing dependence on wage labor,
market forces and public assistance programs over the long run. It is in this context
that educational opportunity is operationally defined in this examination as the chance
to obtain an education at the post-primary level. Actual educational opportunity may
be measured by its inclusiveness, by “the proportion o f children o f different social or
occupational classes obtaining secondary or higher education” (Kaelble 1981,240).
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most other Western nations. Today it has only an incomplete patchwork quDt o f
separate welfare programs, not a system. By contrast, when higher education systems
are compared, that o f the United States is among the most accessible while that of
Germany is far more limited in the opportunities it offers (Heidenhehner 1981,1997).
Far and away, America led all other Western nations in the expansion o f upper
secondary and higher education opportunities, and still does today. The expansion o f
postprimary educational opportunities came much later in Germany, and it is still a
laggard today.
I argue that from the beginnings of the German and American welfare states
there is clear evidence o f alternative policy strategies and a trade-off between support
o f public education and social security. Germany chose to focus on the development
o f a comprehensive social insurance system and not on the expansion o f educational
opportunities. America chose instead to emphasize the provision o f educational
opportunities and did not develop a comprehensive social insurance system. This
trade-off remains dear even after many decades of policy evolution in the social
welfare and educational spheres. Three hypotheses of welfare state policy
development will be examined—structural, political conflict, and institutional—as
explanations for the different paths Germany and the United States followed in the
development o f social welfare programs and the expansion o f educational
opportunities since the late nineteenth century. First, that the socioeconomic
transformations and demographic shifts associated with the transition from pre- to
industrial to post-industrial society provided the structural framework for public
education and social security policymaking (Wilensky 1975). Second, that changes in
the distribution o f power among political actors affected the development o f social
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welfare and education policy. Democratization, mass enfranchisement, religious
organizations, interest groups, partisan politics and control o f the policy process
affected both the evolution o f the welfare state and its public programs (Castles 1982;
Hicks and Swank 1984,1992). Third, the initial institutionalization and subsequent
path dependence o f the maturing German and American welfare states have affected
the policymaking for public education and other social programs (Getting, Haug, and
Hinrichs 1994; March and Olsen 1984,1989; North 1990; Skocpol 1979,198S). The
level of bureaucratic development and control over public policy, whether the state
organization is federal or unitary, the different political arenas and actors for
education and social policymaking, and the degree o f local support and control over
education and social policies—all these affected the outcome and the trade-off
between public investment in education and other social programs (Weaver and
Rockman 1993).
The German Welfare State
The German Social Welfare System Today
Germany is generally acknowledged as the leader in welfare legislation, the
origins o f its social insurance system dating back to the 1880s and the government of
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck (Flora and Heidenheimer 1981). Although it has been
argued elsewhere that Imperial Germany was not the “pioneer” in redistributive social
insurance,2 it is still clear that Germany did break new ground when it moved social

2Lindert argues Bismarck’s social programs o f the 1880s “did not meet the
modem definitions of government redistribution or social insurance.. . . Instead, the
(continued...)
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welfare assistance to the national policy agenda and increased the responsibility o f the
government for i t By 1927, under the Weimar Constitution, the German government
had adopted a package o f social insurance that included provisions for work injury,
sickness and disability, old-age pensions, and unemployment assistance (Collier and
Messick 1975). Under this system the state was made the guarantor and broker for
social insurance. Benefits were determined by occupation and work record—
according to one’s socioeconomic status and what one had “earned”—and financed
through a combination o f employee and employer contributions. Traditional
patriarchal assumptions were implicit. Dependent family members were covered
under the terms of the working family member’s insurance. It was a system that
favored the protection and perpetuation o f the status quo—the existing
socioeconomic order—by encouraging the collective responsibility o f groups for their
members and associating kinds and levels ofbenefits to one’s work “guild” and the
insurance organization to which they belonged. This scheme for social insurance has
largely been retained over the years, and even served as the model for the long-term
care insurance adopted in 1994 (Getting, Haug, and Hinrichs 1994).
Germany today has a comprehensive social insurance system, including
provisions for work injury and disability, unemployment compensation, old-age
pensions, sickness and maternity benefits, family allowances, and long-term care.
Coverage and benefits are based on an individual’s profession or employment and
contributions record. Dependents are covered under the terms o f the working family
member’s social insurance provisions. Although the state is an important player, its

2(...continued)
starring role in welfare-state development goes to Denmark” (1994,9, 15).
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principal role is that o f broker in a social insurance system where employers and
employees are the primary contributors and administrators.3 Civil servants are
covered by a separate state-supported system, and a marginal private sector exists to
service specific professions and individuals with greater economic means.
The Development of Germany** Social Welfare System
Social Welfare Policy in Imperial Germany
Germany’s social programs introduced in the 1880s—illness insurance in
1883, work injury in 1884, old-age and disability in 1889—were built upon existing
structures and prior state actions. German governments had a long history of
involvement in social welfare matters by the late 1800s, and particularly in the area o f
public health. By the end o f the seventeenth century a number o f German
principalities had already established medical boards to oversee the practice of
medicine. In 168S, Brandenburg-Pnissia became the first to enact a comprehensive
law that brought the practice o f medicine and matters o f public health under state
regulation. By an edict o f the Elector Frederick William (1640-1688), the “Great
Elector,” the medical profession and all those associated with it—including doctors,
apothecaries, barbers, midwives and even bathkeepers—were placed under the
control and supervision o f a state Board of Medicine. This measure was justified as a
necessary state response to existing “abuses in the practice o f medicine, in the
preparation and distribution of medical remedies, and in the cure o f sickness”

3The government does subsidize the programs for old age, disability and
death, sickness and maternity, and unemployment; and it covers the whole cost of
family allowance benefits (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1994).
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(Dorwart 1971,240). As its first function, the Board o f Medicine was to certify and
license those wanting to practice medicine. Its second was to promote higher
standards in the medical profession by developing and enforcing a code o f conduct
fix’the practice o f medicine and delivery o f medical services by apothecaries, doctors,
surgeons, midwives, etc. (Dorwart 1971,241-5). In another area related to public
health, King Frederick I o f Prussia (1701-1713) established a Board of Sanitation in
1709 to fight the spread o f the plague and other contagious diseases. The charter o f
the board was expanded in 1720 to include any actions or agents that might be
harmful or a threat to an individual’s or the public health (Dorwart 1971,254). So it
was that when the new Reich government ventured into the field o f public health with
the Reichsimpfgesetz in 1874, legislation that made vaccination against the smallpox
virus mandatory for all Germans, the practice o f German governments to intervene in
matters affecting the public’s health and welfare was well established. In another
health-related area, the Imperial government enacted a law in 1876 to regulate the
activities o f independent insurance companies and to make it compulsory that all
industrial workers over the age o f sixteen join a medical plan if they were not already
covered (Mitchell 1991,45-6). This law was telling o f the social welfare reforms that
would follow over the next several years.
By the 1880s a mix o f public and private welfare assistance and insurance
programs existed throughout much o f Germany—mostly private—supported by local
governments and independent associations. About 6 percent o f German industrial
workers were already covered by private insurance systems in the decade prior to the
social insurance initiatives o f the Reich government (Hage, Hanneman, and Gargan
1989,65). These insurance programs were primarily guild-based, and participation
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was sometimes voluntary. These insurance funds, along with other independent and
local welfare agencies that were spread throughout Germany at the time—

Vereinswexn—largely provided the model and organizational structure for what
would be the Bismarck government’s new social programs. The welfare legislation o f
the 1880s affirmed that decentralization would continue as the preferred mode o f
administration for German social insurance. It was to be a system based on the
existing foundation o f guild-based insurance funds, modified to include a new role for
the central government (Katzenstein 1987,170-2; Moran 1999,34). Indicative o f its
conservative origin, that part was to be minimal, particularly with respect to any new
financial obligations or responsibility for the delivery o f public goods. In this scheme
the national government made itself the primary broker for the social insurance needs
of the German working class, but without taking over what had traditionally been a
local function. The role of employee-employer boards and local government was
stressed. This was the “Bismarck model” for social insurance. Private insurance
carriers were included in initial plans, but deliberately put at a competitive
disadvantage. The private insurance funds represented the primary competition for
the new government-sponsored social insurance but, at the outset, they were
necessary because the state had no social insurance program and supporting
bureaucracy of its own. Eventually, Bismarck intended that private and independent
insurance associations would be replaced by a state-controlled system that covered all
workers. Participation in that insurance system would be compulsory for all workers,
benefits would be funded through taxes placed on workers and their employers, and
the program administered by employee-employer boards with state oversight
(Mitchell 1991,49-51).
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Sickness insurance was adopted by the Reichstag in 1883. The services
included in this phut included income compensation for thirteen weeks (twenty-six in
1903), free medical care, medication, and hospitalization as necessary. This
legislation (fid not set out to immediately replace the vohintary and private insurance
associations, but instead to place them under state control while strengthening the
position o f new local and regional public insurance funds. Management o f local
insurance “funds” was entrusted to executive boards ( Varstand), staffed by labor and
employers in proportion to their contribution to the group's treasury. While worker
participation in some insurance program was made mandatory (Kassenzwang), a
certain degree of choice between public and private plans remained. From the
standpoint o f the federal structure of government, the national social welfare system
was decentralized. In keeping with the federal design, a central Reich office was
created (Reichsversicherungsamt) to oversee the insurance system, while daily
operations remained a regional and local responsibility. From the start, it was dear
that the implementation of this scheme would see the role o f small private and
voluntary associations greatly diminished.
. . . a tendency toward consolidation and centralization was evident from the
outset. Compulsory organizations campaigned actively to absorb voluntary
agendes. The advantages of amalgamation were soon manifest: more
members in a single insurance group meant more effident and less costly
administration, broader coverage, higher allocations, and special services----The small and scattered independent agendes were hard pressed to match
such benefits. Furthermore, they were more expensive for members.
Employers were required to contribute one-third o f the total income o f
obligatory agendes but nothing for voluntary plans; the latter were thus
entirely dependent on the regular payment o f premiums by workers. The law
thereby created an uneven struggle, which could only tilt finally in one
direction (Mitchell 1991,51-2).
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Work-related accident insurance was also proposed in 1883, but it was not
passed by the Reichstag until the following year. Essentially, it broadened the
coverage o f the sickness insurance plan, including a provision for no-foult workinjury insurance. Local operations and claims disputes were to be managed by an
executive body (Vorstcmd) comprised o f two-thirds workers and one-third
employers—in proportion to their financial support o f the insurance agency.
Although the Social Democratic party was not initially enthusiastic about
participation in such agency directorates, it very soon changed its position to
encourage worker participation. First, it was recognized that the social status of
workers had actually been improved by the social insurance system. Second, it was
determined that the majority status enjoyed by the working class on executive
directorates could eventually play to the advantage o f lower class interests (Mitchell
1991,52; Rosenberg 1986, 111, 115). In actuality,
. . . when the [accident insurance] bill was passed into law there was little in it
that gave administrative responsibility to the workers. They were represented
only in committees that dealt with preventive measures. For all practical
purposes the system was under the control o f the employers, who usually
combined into industrial or regional mutual associations. These associations
were under the supervision of state insurance offices that were ultimately
responsible to the Imperial Insurance Office. The system was thus highly
decentralized and was geared to employer self-administration. Although, in
the end, the employers possessed administrative control, they also had to bear
the full cost, with the exception o f those costs connected with the operations
o f the Imperial Insurance Office (Rimlinger 1971,119).
Legislation covering old-age pension and disability benefits passed the
Reichstag in 1889. With passage of this act, in combination with the existing sickness
and work injury laws, and although coverage at the outset included only 10 percent
o f the population, Germany is credited as having Europe’s first comprehensive
system o f social insurance programs (Mitchell 1991,50). In this area o f social policy
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the German government had broken new ground, but not without controversy. For
one, eligibility for retirement benefits began at age seventy and required worker
contributions for thirty years. Given life expectancy at that time, only a very small
percentage o f contributors could even expect to receive a pension some day. For
another, those workers who did five long enough to collect a pension typically found
the amount less than what was necessary to maintain their economic status in
retirement However, in a provision that was favorable to workers, individuals whose
accident or sickness benefits were near exhaustion were permitted to be reclassified
as disabled so that their assistance could be continued without interruption (Mitchell
1991,53-4).
No single factor or event adequately explains the early timing o f Germany’s
social welfare initiative relative to other Western nations. Instead, I would argue it
may be attributed to the interaction and combined effect o f Germany’s unification,
Bismarck’s state-building strategy, rising working class consciousness, and the
socialist challenge that confronted Bismarck’s conservative government Germany
became the pioneer in social insurance a little more than ten years after its unification.
At that time the legitimate policy spheres and agendas for the Lander and national
governments were still a work in process, their specific responsibilities and rightful
political authority not completely clear. Under these circumstances, while the
Bismarck government did not necessarily want to take over functions that had
traditionally been local, it may have been judged that some role for the Reich in an
area like social welfare would not only be appropriate but also help to establish the
legitimacy o f the German state and its political leadership (Hage, Hanneman, and
Gargan 1989, 131-2). To accomplish this task in a most effective and expedient
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fashion, Bismarck borrowed and buih upon the policy experience and structure o f the
guild-based social insurance system that already existed in the Lander. He inserted
the Reich government as broker for the social insurance system, but he did not
fundamentally alter its local and guild-based character.4 Decentralization and
occupation-based provisions remained hallmarks of the social insurance system.
While the national government was given oversight and regulatory powers, local
employee and business associations enjoyed considerable administrative autonomy.
The Imperial government's social insurance initiative may also be seen "as a
strategic response by a patriarchal state to the growing strength o f the socialist
workers’ movement” (Hicks 1994,102-4). Such an explanation is not in conflict with
the state-building thesis. In fact, it gives it greater depth. Likewise the view that
social reforms were undertaken by a paternal state that took as its duty the protection
o f the German working class (Rimlinger 1971,99-102). Both the tradition o f a
paternalistic state and Bismarck’s state-budding challenge were complicated by the
many new issues and social problems associated with industrialization. In particular,
the rising expectations of the German working class were accompanied by a growing
discontent with the existing socioeconomic and political arrangements. Although any
meaningful democratization was not in the cards, that was clearly not on the
Chancellor’s agenda, the time was ripe for social reforms. Industrialization and
demographic changes, coupled with the severe economic downturn o f the 1870s, had
made clear the inadequacy o f the existing social welfare system. The Reich
government was keenly aware that the welfare reforms advocated by the increasingly

Bism arck had favored a compulsory guild-based system as a member o f the
Prussian Diet in 1849 (Rimlinger 1971,100).
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popular Social Democratic party were very attractive to a politicized German
working class. All of these things—combined with the political acumen and
determined leadership o f Bismarck—provided a backdrop, purpose, and momentum
for the social welfare legislation that came in the 1880s. In this context, Germany’s
social welfare initiatives were part o f what has been referred to as “Bismarck’s
project. . . an effort at state-building, quite self-consciously designed to strengthen
the new German state apparatus and improve its ties with the industrial working
class. . ” (de Swaan 1988, 187).
A most important objective ofBismarck’s "project” was to meet head-on the
challenge to his conservative government represented by the Social Democratic
party, and particularly to weaken its appeal to the working class. This was to be
accomplished without undertaking any significant reforms that might upset the
hierarchical political order (Katzenstein 1987, 168). To do so, Bismarck coopted the
social policy agenda that resounded so well with the working class, demonized the
Social Democratic movement, and undertook legal actions to restrict the party’s
growth and political activities. For a twelve-year period, from 1878-1890, the state
waged a campaign against the Socialist movement under the anti-Socialist laws
(Sozialistengesetz). hi his speech at the opening o f the Reichstag in November 1881,
Bismarck spoke of the “moral foundation o f the Christian community” and o f a
requirement for a “repression o f Social Democratic excesses,” how both Christianity
and restricting the politics o f the left might benefit the “well-being o f the workers.”
For Bismarck and many other European politicians o f his era, there was a lesson in
the bloody violence and upheaval o f revolutionary France. Acts o f repression
undertaken by government to ensure domestic order and otherwise fend off efforts to
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subvert its authority to rule were a legitimate exercise o f stale power (Mitchell 1991,
48). As it turned out, though, the Social Democrats only gained in power during the
period o f their persecution by the state, and even faster with the enactment o f the
new social insurance legislation (Wehler 1993, 80-1).
Bismarck was keen at political manipulation, a master at deception and
invoking the dangers posed by “enemies o f the German people”—"the French, the
Socialists, the Catholics”—to his own advantage. On his part, it involved a constant
juggling and reevaluation of policies and objectives, o f political friends and enemies.
No situation or plan o f action could be permanent New circumstances and the
success or failure o f a policy could dictate changes in political strategy. Such was the

Kulturkampf(culture war) waged against the Catholic church and Catholic Center
party during the 1870s, a struggle Bismarck ended when he realized its futility,
likewise, he orchestrated a state-sponsored campaign against social democracy, to
blunt its political influence. The political machinations o f Bismarck help to explain,
along with his state-budding project, how such a conservative politician ended up
playing the role of social reformer, but that is not all German industrialization and a
changing socioeconomic and political context had produced a situation ripe for
welfare reform; and for a politician as astute as Bismarck, it was a call to action.
German politics were favorably disposed to new social legislation. From the
left, Bismarck’s conservative government was confronted by the increasing strength
o f social democratic forces, who supported state-supported social welfare provisions.
At the same time, those opposed to expanded public welfare programs—particularly
liberal elements who were indined to favor private and self-help solutions over state
assistance—were not in an effective political position to do so. German liberalism
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was generally weak and the influence o f the National liberal party was greatly
diminished (Mitchell 1991,45-6; Rimlinger 1971,89-91). German liberalism had
been at its peak from the late 1850s until the middle 1870s, a period that coincided
with the “take-off” o f German industrial development and ended with the depression
o f 1873. Successful economic development had boosted the appeal o f liberalism and
free market capitalism, and weakened arguments about the necessity for social
insurance and state-supported safety nets. “The leading spokesmen for economic
liberalism in the 1860s were optimistic and no longer viewed poverty as inevitable. . .
the road to abundance was open to anyone willing to put his mind to it” (Rimlinger
1971,103). To many Germans, particularly o f the new industrial working class, the
wrongness of such an argument was made very clear by the depression o f 1873 and
the severe unemployment that followed. Together with increasing pressure from
social democracy on the left, the waning o f liberal influence in German politics,
combined with a “patriarchal social ideal” and “the Christian social ethic,”
contributed significantly to the success ofBismarck’s social agenda (Rimlinger 1971,
91,8-9; cited by Weir, Orlof£ and Skocpol 1988,10-11).
If conditions had ripened by the early 1880s for the institution o f new social
rights, it was mainly because o f pressure from below. Bismarck’s ideological
justification o f these rights, however, came from above, from the patriarchal
conception o f the duties o f the state. His central political consideration was
not the creation o f new rights, consistent with a new interpretation o f the
rights of citizenship, but the preservation o f the traditional relationship of the
individual to the state. In a sense, social rights were granted to prevent having
to grant enlarged political rights. Of course, Bismarck fully intended to
alleviate poverty, and to that extent his social insurance was to reduce
economic inequality. But the whole thrust ofhis measures was to preserve the
traditional system o f political inequality (Rimlinger 1971,112).
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The Bismarck Model and Unemployment Insurance in Weimar Germany
Although Germany had been a front-runner in other social insurance
programs, it lagged its European counterparts in adopting unemployment insurance.
Untfl legislation was passed by the Weimar government in 1927, unemployment
assistance was left to the trade unions. That this social insurance provision came so
much later in Germany than in other European nations has been attributed by some
scholars to better conditions o f economic growth and a lesser problem with
unemployment in the period prior to World War I (Hage, Hanneman, and Gargan
1989,92). Clearly, though, that was not all. Over forty years had passed since the
groundbreaking social reforms o f Germany’s Imperial government, a world war had
been fought and lost, and a sea change had taken place in the partisan control o f
government and in the goals o f the political leadership. Egalitarianism and the
decommodification of labor,5 not the patriarchal tradition o f Bismarck, motivated the
democratic forces and shaped foe social policies of Weimar Germany. What did not
change, though, was the scheme for social insurance. The plan for unemployment
insurance closely followed the “Bismarck model” established for sickness insurance.
Unemployment benefits were to be funded by a combination worker and employer
contributions, with each group taking part in the program’s administration. However,
implementation was limited by the impending economic depression and rising
unemployment, and a majority o f the unemployed were still not participants and
covered by unemployment insurance provisions in 1932 (Lee and Rosenhaft 1997,

SDecommodification describes “the degree to which individuals, or families,
can uphold a socially acceptable standard o f living” without reliance on wage labor
and independent o f market participation (Esping-Andersen 1990,37).
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271). Nonetheless, with the addition o f unemployment insurance to work accident,
old-age and disability pensions and sickness provisions, the essence o f Germany’s
comprehensive social insurance system had been established.
Social Welfare Policy in the Third Reich
Social welfare policy and the social insurance system were made instruments
o f the Nazi party and o f state power in Hitler’s Germany. The old decentralized
social insurance system administered by workers and employers was abolished, its
control taken over and centralized in the Nazi party-state and its functionaries. In the
hands o f the Nazis, the social insurance system and its institutions became a tool to
manage the labor supply according to the economic and security requirements of the
state, as well as another means for the totalitarian state to track and control its
population. The Nazis also changed the rules for a worker’s insurance eligibility.
Contributions to an insurance fund no longer guaranteed a right to coverage and
benefits; instead it was an individual’s loyalty to the Nazi party and fulfilling one’s
duty to the state (Rimlinger 1971,132-4).
Social Welfare Policy in the Federal Republic
The centralized social insurance system instituted by the Nazis collapsed with
the defeat of the Third Reich. The postwar West German state saw a return of the
Weimar era portfolio o f social programs based on the Bismarck model o f social
insurance. The restoration o f these social insurance programs—work injury and
disability, unemployment compensation, old-age pensions, sickness and maternity
benefits—along with program modifications over the years and new provisions for

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

160
family allowances in 1954 and 1964, and long-term care in 1994, define the structure
o f the German welfare system as it exists today.
As with the history o f Germany more generally since the Second World War,
that of its welfare state has been eventful. Although the Bismarck model o f social
insurance was reinstituted by the Federal Republic, it has seen very significant
changes over the years. At front and center has been the mandatory public pension
system, the foundation for retirement planning and income security in old age. For
most retired Germans the public pension system is their primary source o f income. In
1995 over 80 percent o f the eligible West German population was covered by the
state pension system, and in East Germany it was even higher. Although it is
primarily financed by employer and employee contributions, the pension program also
receives substantial funding from the federal government (Arnold, Graetz, and
MunneO 1998,249-51).
In what was a landmark in social reform since passage o f the original old-age
and disability legislation in 1889, the dynamicpension was introduced in 1957. New
pension laws called for an association between an individual’s lifetime earnings
record and the pension amount received in retirement This amount would be subject
to a yearly recomputation in order to keep pace with developments in the economy
and changes in the national wage structure. While a certain level o f personal
resources would also be required, the objective of the dynamic pension was clear to
provide pensions at a level that would help support and protect a retiree’s
socioeconomic status at the same level as during his or her work career. Similar
provisions were adopted for workers on permanent disability (Rimlinger 1971, 178-
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81). There is little question that these reforms were intended to reinforce and protect
the existing social order, not level i t
TwtfH o f trying to wipe out income inequalities, the pension reform
consciously seeks to perpetuate them. In this sense the pension reform helps
to solidify rather than to alter the economic basis o f the social structure. It
helps to prevent foe sinking o f the pensioners to the bottom o f socioeconomic
scale, as well as to prevent a leveling o f the income structure (Rimlinger
1971,180).
hi 1954 national legislation was adopted introducing family allowances, a
monthly benefit that would be given to families beginning with their third child.
Originally funded by employers and employee associations, the law was changed in
1964 to transfer financial responsibility to the federal government. The law has been
amended over the years so that it now includes families with more than one child.
Children must be under the age o f 16 to qualify for the allowance, or age 27 if a
student (U.S. Department ofHealth and Human Services 1993,128).
In April 1994 federal legislation was passed adding long-term care to the
policy portfolio of the German welfare state. Beginning in 1995, this new social
insurance provided coverage for the medically approved long-term care needs of all
employees belonging to statutory sickness funds and their family members. Long
term care insurance is funded through employer contributions and automatic
employee deductions (Gdtting, Haug, and Hinrichs 1994,285-6).
Pension reform has returned to the political agenda on several occasions since
1957. The permissible retirement age, without a deduction in benefits, was lowered
to age 63 from 65 in 1972. In recent years, though, the primary object of pension
reform has been one part of a larger effort to address the ever-rising costs of the
welfare state. A reform act was passed in 1989, for implementation in 1992, that was
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to help manage the long-term financing of the pension system. In 1997, a CDUcontroQed government adopted legislation that lowered the pension replacement rate
and increased the value-added tax by one percent to help cover rising pension
expenditures (Arnold 1998). In what was heralded as “a milestone for pension reform
in Germany and Europe,”6 legislation was adopted in May 2001 that added the
option of privately funded savings accounts to the pension system. As it was
implemented in January 2002, workers were allowed to contribute 1 percent o f their
monthly earnings, tax-free, to private accounts in 2002, increasing to 4 percent by
2008. Through these private savings accounts individuals are able to make
investments for their own retirement in stocks, bonds, and other market instruments.
The inclusion o f private investment accounts in the German pension system
represents for more than just another retirement savings opportunity; it is indicative
of the financial stress that all Western welfare states are under today. In no small
way, the 2001 pension reforms were a response by the German government to the
larger and growing financial insecurity of the welfare state’s total budgetary
commitments, not just that o f its pension system. In order to sefl its pension reform
the SPD-Green government argued that private investment accounts offered a way to
greater income security in retirement That may be true enough but, in framing the
argument this way, they necessarily portrayed the existing pension system as insecure
(Cox 2001,49S). I would submit this was a very limited admission; that the
insecurity, the financial problem of the welfare state, was far greater than the pension
system.

6Christopher Rhoads, “Germany is Poised for a Pension Overhaul,” The Wall

Street Journal, 10 May 2001, A13.
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Private investment accounts will not solve Germany1! or any other welfare
state’s financial woes. It is not just old-age pensions, but the high and ever-growing
costs o f all its social programs that is a problem for Germany today and other
Western nations. It is made more complicated by the aging populations o f those
countries, that chief among the causes for rising social expenditures are popular
programs that most affect seniors—pensions, healthcare, and long-term care. But
there are other challenges for Germany as well, some shared and some not with other
Western nations. Among the most important, the German economy is in recession
and there is high unemployment, the costs o f reunification have been great, and then
there are the expenses and requirements o f the European Union.
However Germany may struggle with the crisis o f its welfare state, reform
will not come easily. Survey data from the early and late 1990s show that the German
people are not convinced o f the need for welfare reform (Cox 2001,493). When all is
said and done I am inclined to agree with Cox (2001) that, if there is to be real
welfare reform in Germany, the terms of the debate must change. Whether a welfare
system is comprehensive like the German, or minimal like the American, the social
programs o f the welfare state represent social “security” against the vagaries of
capitalism and the meanness o f industrialization. Whatever is the reality o f the
“security” provided by the welfare state’s social programs, it is highly valued by its
beneficiaries, and Germany is not an exception. Although the bottom line to the crisis
o f the welfare state may involve any and several combinations o f cost-containment
measures, budgetary reductions and tax hikes, that cannot be the crux of the reform
discussion. The discourse must focus on the maintenance o f social security—in
Germany and everywhere else.
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To associate social “insecurity” with reform has so far proven an effective
tactic o f those opposed to change. Left unexplained and to the devices o f the
opposition, proposals to raise the retirement age or increase taxes sound more like
social “insecurity” than security. If there is to be a meaningful debate and reforms, the
proponents o f welfare reform must link the changes they champion to the
maintenance o f social “security.” Ironically, this must be accomplished by making
dear the real insecurity o f the German welfare state as it now exists; that the need for
reform is critical It has not been so different in the United States where Republicans
and conservatives have accused Democrats o f using scare tactics on senior citizens,
warning that Social Security and Medicare benefits would be at risk if Republicans
are elected and their welfare reform proposals are implemented. For another example,
Republicans found out it was for more effective to talk about abolishing the “death
tax” than eliminating the estate tax. The terms that structure the debate are critical.
A Discussion o f German Social Policy
It is not unreasonable to argue that industrialization did contribute to the
devdopment o f social welfare programs in Germany (de Swaan 1988; Rimlinger
1971). The social insurance provisions adopted by the German government in the
later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were dearty a response to the
demographic changes and challenges that accompanied industrialization—
socioeconomic and political. However, even if it does enhance our understanding of
the context, the logic o f industrialism does not explain why a conservative German
regime would support those landmark social reforms. The alternative logic o f
capitalism offers some help in this regard, interpreting it as an action undertaken by a
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political elite to protect the capitalist order, but it cannot account for the tuning. The
democratic variant o f the political conflict thesis also falls short While the political
power o f the working class, organized labor and Social Democracy were dearly on
the rise—those who would be expected to champion social reforms—control o f the
government was not in their hands.
As industrialism advanced, democratic and other radical ideas filtered down
to the lower classes. The intensification o f social problems made imperative a
reinterpretation o f the rights and responsibilities o f the workingman. Liberal
and conservatives became engaged in a lengthy debate on how to resolve this
social question, but the policies that finally prevailed owed their initiative and
objectives to the state. The most significant of these policies was the
introduction o f social insurance.
The social insurance legislation of the 1880s made social and
economic relations among individuals an object o f statecraft It was a
conscious attempt at cementing the social fhbric of the industrial order, with
the interests o f the state instead o f the welfare o f the worker as the prime
objective (Rimlinger 1971,93).
Political entrepreneur and opportunist, the role of the “Great Manipulator”
Bismarck cannot be overlooked in any adequate explanation o f Germany’s
groundbreaking social reforms. It was the conservative government o f Bismarck that
presided over Germany’s landmark social reforms, not the left. As well as a response
to the societal challenges brought about by industrialization, that legislation came in
reaction to the growing influence o f the left—o f the working class, organized labor,
and Social Democracy. Heidenheimer (1973) has argued that Bismarck “pursued a
pre-emptive strategy” to blunt the increasing popularity o f political parties o f the left
by stealing their social agenda (317). Likewise, Rosenberg (1986) submits that
Bismarck promoted national social insurance as “a way that would tie workers to the
state and wean them away from the Social Democrats” (109). It was Bismarck’s
intention that the Reich government should remain under conservative influence and
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control, and he did what was necessary to make that happen. The German chancellor
recognized that social insurance programs—and education policy, too—might be
utilized as instruments o f state power, tools that could serve a conservative regime’s
determination to maintain control over and perpetuate the existing socioeconomic
and political order. In this regard, Roberts (1913) reports the following remarks by
Bismarck in an exchange with the historian W. H. Dawson some years after passage
of the 1880s landmark social insurance legislation: “My idea was to bribe the working
classes, or shall I say, to win them over, to regard the state as a social institution
existing for their sake and interested in their welfare.”7 Max Weber, a contemporary
political observer, had reservations with Bismarck’s conviction that “he could create
[in the working class] a positive attitude toward the state, and political gratitude, by
granting welfare benefits out o f public funds for compulsory private funds.” Although
Weber believed “benefits for the sick, the disabled, the veterans and the aged. . . was
certainly desirable,” he considered Bismarck’s strategy “a grave political error every
policy that ever banked on political gratitude has M ed.”8
Whether it was a “political error” or not, Bismarck’s welfare reforms may be
viewed as a deliberate action taken “to undercut the appeal o f German Social
Democracy,” as a way “to harness the labor force. . . to keep them slogging along”
(Mitchell 1991,47). To do so, in addition to his campaign o f repression waged
against Social Democracy, Bismarck introduced social welfare legislation before

7Elmer Roberts, MonarchicalSocialism in Germany (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1913), 119.
8Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline o fInterpretive Sociology,
vol. 3, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press, 1978),
1390-1.
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political parties representing organized labor and working class interests could
achieve an electoral majority and do so themselves. Data from the period support this
pre-emption thesis. In the decade prior to the 1880s only about 2 percent o f the
industrial workforce had so far been unionized, and parties of the left were only
receiving about 8 percent o f the vote (Hage, Hanneman, and Gargan 1989,65). So,
even given that organized labor and Social Democracy were on the ascendance, the
political left was dearly not in any position to win control of the government and its
policy agenda. Moreover, in terms of social insurance coverage, it was only a very
small portion o f the German population that received benefits from Bismarck’s social
reforms of the 1880s. Initially, not quite 10 percent were covered by the provisions
for sickness insurance adopted in 1883, the accident insurance in 1884, and the 1889
disability and old-age pensions system (Mitchell 1991, 50).
Far more than simply the timing o f the reform legislation, Bismarck and his
conservative government affected the very substance and structure o f the German
social insurance system as it developed and has come to be institutionalized. The
German welfare state that exists today speaks loudly to its origin in the 1880s. Then
and now, even with the many modifications and additional provisions that have come
over the years, the social insurance system would be characterized in much the same
way. It is a system based on one’s occupation, on the model of guild-based
associations, in which employers and employees are the primary contributors and
administrators, and the role o f government is principally that of broker. That scheme
even served as the foundation for the long-term care insurance adopted in 1994.
One can only speculate how different the German welfare state might have
turned out had Bismarck not preempted the left’s social agenda. What if it had been
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the Social Democrats, instead, who enacted Germany’s first social welfare programs
and determined the policy model? It seems likely the structure o f independent and
guild-based insurance associations would have similarly been utilized as the
institutional foundation for the new social insurance system. That would have made
sense for the head start it gave to implementation and administration. But would a
Social Democratic regime have established a social welfare system that was as
socially discriminating? Would it have been more egalitarian, less committed to the
protection o f the status quo than to ensuring a better quality o f life for everyone?
Would the role defined for government have been kept to that o f broker, or would it
have been given greater responsibilities to finance, administer and actively intervene
to ensure the fairness of the social welfare system? A most interesting question is
how such a social welfare policy might have affected the German education system.
Would education reformers have met more success in their efforts to eliminate the
class bias and expand the opportunities o f the education system? Rather than the
tripartite structure of differentiated schools that exists today, might German
secondary education have evolved to become a system o f comprehensive schools like
the American?
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The American Welfare State

The American Social Welfare System Today
Despite a long tradition o f private assistance to the needy, the United States
was late among the early industrializing nations to adopt social welfare programs.9
Even today the social welfare system sponsored by the state is not comprehensive,
leaving the market and private insurance plans as significant alternatives to public
programs. Although public expenditures for social programs are now approaching
one-half of the entire federal budget, the lion’s share goes to the old-age pension
system o f Social Security and the health coverage of Medicare—programs that
largely benefit the elderly middle class—not to actual public assistance or welfare for
the needy o f society. The welfare programs that the state does support are typically
limited in the population they cover, minimal in the level o f benefits they provide, and
with eligibility that is often work-related or means-tested. Moreover, with the
administration of many social welfare programs left to the states, even those that are
underwritten by federal legislation—like Medicaid, Temporary Assistance to Need
Families (TANF), or unemployment insurance—any real national standard is absent
Eligibility for state-administered work injury and unemployment insurance benefits
are normally related to an individual’s employment and earnings record. The old-age
pension o f the federal government’s Social Security program provides only a modest
level o f income, one that must be supplemented from other sources if seniors are not

9Orloff and Skocpol (1984) and Skocpol (1992) contend that the Civil War
pensions system was actually the U.S. government’s fiik social welfare program.
This old-age and disability pensions system that covered veterans and their
dependents ended with the passing away o f the Civil War generation.
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to live in a condition o f poverty. Some additional help for seniors may come from the
means-tested income assistance that is also available under the Social Security
system, as well as to children and those who are handicapped or destitute, but that is
limited. As to the area of public health, there are no provisions for universal
healthcare or for long-term care. What state-sponsored medical coverage does exist
is limited to seniors and those who meet the requirements of means-testing.
The Development o f America’* Social Welfare System
The Origins of the American Welfare State
By most scholarly accounts the United States was a laggard in the institution
o f a welfare state, its system of national social insurance not established until the
1930s (Marmor and Oberlander 199S). An alternative view puts the origins of the
modem American welfare state much earlier, with the pensions and disabilities system
for Civil War veterans and their dependents and with the social reforms o f the
Progressive Era (Noble 1997; Orloff and Skocpol 1984; Skocpol 1992). Orloff and
Skocpol depict the Civil War pensions system as functionally equivalent to the oldage pension and disability systems supported by other Western governments during
that period. In terms o f public spending, the generosity of benefits, and the
proportion of citizens covered, Skocpol claims the “Civil War system o f social
provision in many respects exceeded what early programs o f‘workingmen’s
insurance’ were giving needy old people or superannuated industrial wage earners in
fledgling Western welfare states around the turn o f the century” (1992,1-2).
According to Skocpol’s estimates for 1910, nearly 18 percent o f all Americans age
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65 and over were beneficiaries o f the Civil War pensions system—28.5 percent of aU
senior men and almost 8 percent o f aU senior women (1992,132).
As to the Progressive Era and the origins o f the American welfare state, the
early 1900s saw the passage o f many new laws intended to promote the welfare of
women and children. This included aO the legislative regulations and benefits adopted
at the state and national levels, including labor laws intended to protect women and
children from workplace abuses and new programs to assist mothers and expectant
mothers. Forty-one states passed provisions regulating the work hours o f women by
1921, and several even placed prohibitions on the kinds o f work occupations in which
women might be employed (Noble 1997,49). Mothers’ pension laws were enacted
by 39 states between 1911 and 1919, mainly intended to benefit working class
widows (Orloff and Skocpol 1984,726). hi 1921 Congress passed the SheppardTowner Infancy and Maternity Protection Act to provide federal grants-in-aid to the
states to establish clinics for infant and maternal health care. Forty-five states did so.
As Skocpol readily points out, the kind o f American welfare state she
describes was not like the European; it followed another path o f development. Rather
than a paternalist welfare state on the European model, buOt around social insurance
and a male breadwinner, “America came dose to forging a maternalist welfare state,
with female-dominated public agencies implementing regulations and benefits for the
good o f women and their children” (1992,2). It is in these late nineteenth and early
twentieth century regulatory activities and social programs that Orloff and Skocpol
argue the origins o f the modern American welfare state are really to be found. It is
not true “that the U.S. federal government did virtually nothing about public social
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provision until the Great Depression and the New Deal of the 1930s” (Skocpol 1992,
3-4). There is certainly merit to this claim, but criticism is also due.
Orloff and Skocpol are clearly right that American government was engaged
in the business of social welfare before the 193S Social Security A ct At least by the
time o f the Progressive Era, an American welfare state was starting to develop. A
problem is encountered, however, in linking the social policies o f this nascent welfare
state with the subsequent development o f the modem American welfare state that
emerged from the Great Depression and with the New Deal legislation o f the
Roosevelt administration. Marmor and Oberlander (1995) find the connection
between the Civil War pension system, old age insurance, and the 1935 Social
Security Act “troublesome.” Neither the public, policymakers, nor most recipients of
Civil War pensions understood those benefits as social welfare, but as a reward for
that generation’s sacrifice to the nation. What is most significant, “American social
reformers, neither in the late nineteenth century nor later, did not take their primary
inspiration for old age insurance from the Civil War program” (Marmor and
Oberlander 1995,218-9). There was not such “policy feedback” (Pierson 1993); the
Civil War pension program simply did not have “legs.” Its coverage was never
expanded to include other population segments or successive generations. A proposal
for a publicly-funded old-age pension system failed in the state ofMassachusetts in
1903, and a plan for a national pension system was rejected by the U.S. Congress in
1909 (Noble 1997,36). The Civil War pension program finally ended with the
passing away of the Civil veterans and their dependents. Not until the New Deal was
legislation finally adopted for a national system of old-age and disability benefits. As
for the Sheppard-Towner Act, it also did not have “legs,” did not establish an
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effective political following and permanent institutional foothold. Opposed by the
medical profession, this program to promote the better health care o f children and
expectant mothers was terminated in 1929 when Congress did not renew its funding
(Noble 1997,52). It would take until the 1960s before federal legislation was passed
to provide medical care for the elderly, eligible poor, dependent children, and the
disabled.
Even if the criticism is valid, that the “maternalist welfare state” was not the
foundation for the modem American welfare state, I would still submit it was an
important factor and building block in its development As Pierson says, “we know
that policy choices have political consequences” (1993,597), and the Progressive Era
was not a trivial period in American history. The politics and social policy decisions
of the early 1900s did influence subsequent political choices and the development of
the welfare state. It may not have been immediate, but the legacy o f Progressive Era
reforms to promote the health and general welfare o f children and mothers can be
seen in the Social Security, Head Start, Food Stamp, and Medicaid programs o f the
U.S. welfare system today. Moreover, what Skocpol identified as the “matemalist
welfare state” was just a part o f the American welfare state at an early stage in its
evolution, not the whole thing. In feet, a good deal of other policy activity and
feedback was taking place if one looks beyond the federal level and the building of a
matemalist welfare state. State governments across America were engaged in other
social welfare policymaking that went beyond “protecting soldiers and mothers.” A
paternalist welfare state, on the European model, was also at an early stage o f
development As well as old-age pensions, work-related social insurance programs
were also being proposed, considered and enacted during the Progressive Era, at the
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state level The role o f the American states in the making o f social welfare policy was
beginning to expand in a meaningful way. Indeed, lower level governments in the
United States federal system were the laboratories and proving grounds for the social
insurance and welfare programs that would later be adopted by the national
government
The winds o f change had already begun blowing in Washington. Theodore
Roosevelt, with an eye to the 1920 presidential election, announced in November
1918 a legislative plan that included provisions for old-age pensions, health care, and
unemployment insurance. Constructive social reforms were necessary, he believed, in
order to avoid civil violence and even revolution. Roosevelt had not taken the
significance o f the Bolshevik Revolution lightly; the United States was not immune
from the dangers o f radicalism.10 He had earlier warned, when he was president in
1907, “that constructive change offers the best method o f avoiding destructive
change; that reform is the antidote for revolution; and that social reform is not the
precursor but the preventive o f Socialism.”11 What might have been had Roosevelt
been returned to the presidency in 1920, or just waged a campaign on his reform
agenda, can only be speculated upon because o f his untimely death in January 1919.
Change was in the air, though, social welfare reform was on the policy agenda at the
highest levels o f the American political system. The national government would

10John Milton Cooper, The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and
Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge: The Belknap Press o f Harvard University Press,
1983), 258-9.
1^rom John Milton Cooper, The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson
and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge: The Belknap Press o f Harvard University
Press, 1983X 113.
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finally see the institution o f a welfare state. It was now just a m atter o f time and the
right circumstances.

The “Big Bang”
What public assistance existed in the United States before the twentieth
century was provided mostly by religious groups, private voluntary organizations,
and local governments (Noble 1997; Trattner 1989). With the Progressive Era of
American politics and the coming o f the twentieth century, this began to
change—first, at the state level By the 1920s several states had adopted provisions
for work injury insurance, widows’ and mothers’ pensions, and other means-tested
retirement programs. Maryland was the first to adopt legislation for workman’s
compensation, in 1902, and 43 states had done so by 1920. Employees o f the federal
government were given such coverage in 1908. Illinois passed the first pension law
for mothers with children in 1911, and 18 more states did so by 1913. Old age
pensions were adopted by Montana, Nevada and Pennsylvania in 1923, and four
additional states by 1927. Pensions for the blind were enacted by Ohio in 1898,
Illinois in 1903, and Wisconsin in 1907 (Popple and Leighninger 1996,244-5).
Provisions for health care and unemployment insurance were also debated at the state
level, but nothing o f great consequence was adopted. The social policies implemented
by the federal government, beginning with the New Deal in the 1930s, built upon this
foundation.
With the shock o f the Great Depression, initiatives for unemployment benefits
were renewed and legislation was finally adopted by many states. Wisconsin was the
first to do so, in 1932, with its program to be effective by 1934. Other states also
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undertook emergency relief efforts, but die scale of unemployment and economic
dislocation were too great and widespread for the states to deal independently with
the many problems o f the depression in any effective way. An adequate government
response to the crisis required the for greater resources available at the federal leveL
The elections o f 1932 that put Franklin Roosevelt in the White House and a
Democratic majority in both Houses o f the Congress signalled the electorate’s desire
and readiness for such a change and role by the federal government. Responsibility
for the public welfare and social safety nets—at least America’s notion o f them—
were recognized and placed on the policymaking agenda o f the national government
Therewith, American social welfare policy underwent a transformation, and the long
debate over a federal role in public welfare was decisively ended by the social welfare
initiatives of the Roosevelt administration.
Skocpol (1987,1992) and de Swaan (1988) are among those who call the
legislation of the New Deal and the Social Security Act (SSA) of 1935 the “big bang”
in United States welfare policy. The U.S. Congress passed laws establishing federalstate unemployment insurance, federally-supported public assistance, and a
contributory old-age pension system. Rather than bold new initiatives from the
center, however, the Roosevelt administration and Congress worked within the
framework o f welfare legislation that existed already at the state level. To a great
extent, the federal government’s new commitment made possible the strengthening
and expansion o f existing public assistance programs by adding its financial resources
to those of the states.
With the exception o f unemployment insurance, which by 1934 had been
enacted only in the state o f Wisconsin, the provisions o f the Social Security
Act were not novel. They were influenced by or based upon previous or
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existing federal and state statutes, such as the Sheppard-Towner and Federal
Emergency Relief Acts, and numerous state widows’ aid and old age
pension laws. The new statute merely strengthened, expanded, and in some
cases revived these practices. Furthermore, based primarily on the insurance
principle rather than on the public assistance model (which the fiscally
conservative FJ3JL favored), it provided “welfare” only to the needy blind,
aged, and young—the unemployable, or “deserving poor” (Trattner 1989,
264-5).
The 1935 Social Security Act inchided both general public assistance and
contributory social insurance provisions. A system o f federal-state unemployment
compensation was created for the jobless. A federal formula was implemented that
gave employers credits against their federal tax liability for contributions to approved
state unemployment programs. Federal monies were then provided for state-level
administration, where insurance plans had been formulated and approved by the
federal Social Security Board. The states were held responsible to administer the
unemployment program, to determine the taxes on the businesses covered, the size o f
employee contributions, the level of benefits and the length of the benefits period.
Every state met federal requirements within two years.
“Federal legislation was proposed to spur the states to pass old-age pensions”
(Amenta and Carruthers 1988,664). Twenty-eight states had already done so by the
end o f 1934. AH were means-tested, with different benefits and funding sources. By
1939, every state had adopted some kind o f old-age retirement system. From state to
state, however, those pension programs differed greatly in their funding provisions,
eligibility requirements and benefit levels (Amenta and Carruthers 1988,664). The

^ h e Federal Emergency Relief Act (FERA) o f 1933 provided over $3
billion as a grant-in-aid to the states to assist the unemployed. Responsibility for the
administration ofFERA funds, the forms of relief and groups covered, was left for
the states and local governments to determine (Noble 1997,70-1; Trattner 1989,
198-200, 261).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

178
Social Security Act created a national old-age retirement system for those over sixtyfive years o f ago—Old Age Insurance (OAI), popularly referred to as Social
Security—based on work force participation and funded by employer contributions
and a tax on employee wages. The national government would both collect the
revenues and distribute benefits to retired workers. Congress has gradually increased
its benefits and expanded those covered to include more and more lands o f
employment, as well as certain individuals who are unemployed, dependent, or
otherwise satisfy the criteria of means-testing. This program has become, over the
years, the cornerstone o f the United States welfare system.
In the area o f public assistance—welfare for the needy—the Congress also
built mainly upon programs that existed in the states. Most significant among these
were aid for dependent children and income assistance for the disabled and elderly
poor. A federal-state Old-Age Assistance (OAA) program was established for those
persons not eligible for OAI benefits or requiring assistance beyond OAI benefits. A
program to assist the dependent children of single-parent families was created—Aid
for Dependent Children (ADC)—that was essentially a continuation of the old Civil
War Widow’s pension program. However, unlike the Congressional mandate that all
states were to have and support unemployment-compeasation systems, no similar
requirement was placed on the states for public assistance It was left for the
individual states to decide if and what of these welfare programs they would support,
how they would be administered, the criteria for eligibility, and the level o f benefits.
Federal assistance would then be provided on a matching basis with the states.
The welfare legislation o f the New Deal was very far from the establishment
o f a comprehensive and universal social insurance system. "The part o f the
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population which had historically suffered from poverty remained largely untouched
by the New DeaT (Guy 1995,302). Although the basis for a nationwide social
welfare system may have been established, no national standard was set for public
assistance, nor an obligation by the states to support all federal welfare programs.
What is more, and a glaring omission when compared with the welfare systems o f
other Western societies, no provision was made for health care. This was a serious
shortcoming ofU.S. social policy at the time o f the New Deal, and it remains so
today.
Over the years the Social Security Act has been amended many times to
broaden its areas o f coverage and groups included. The contributory old-age pension
system—Social Security—has seen both a steady increase in benefits and the
inclusion o f many work groups—like the self-employed—not covered by the original
SSA legislation. Survivors’ Insurance (SI) was established in 1939 to cover the
surviving dependents o f those covered by social insurance. Unemployment benefits
were extended. Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled legislation was enacted
in 1950, and ADC coverage was expanded and renamed Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC). Disability Insurance (DI) was added in 1956 (Trattner
1989,284). Apart from the expansion o f existing social programs, however, three
decades passed between the “big bang” o f 1935 and the next major development in
United States social polity. This came with the presidency of Lyndon Johnson and
with a Democratic majority in both Houses on Congress.
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The “Great Society”
Along with political and civil rights legislation, welfare reform was an
important part ofPresident Johnson’s agenda to eradicate poverty and create a
“Great Society” Johnson’s “War on Poverty” included both a new strategy for
« iein g public assistance programs and the expansion o f federal policy into the area
of health care. An improved food distribution program for the needy, the Food Stamp
Act, was passed by Congress in 1964. Although states were not required to
participate, the Food Stamp program effectively increased the buying power o f many
low-income families’ food dollars in those states and local communities that opted in
(Trattner 1989,295-6). AFDC benefits were expanded, and the program was given
an additional emphaain and mission—to reduce the number o f those on its welfare
rolls. The administration’s solution for American poverty was to put the poor to
work. With the exception of mothers with young children, able-bodied adult AFDC
recipients who refused employment or job training could find their benefits penalized.
National health insurance bad been a long time in coming. Public interest and
debate can be traced back as far as the Progressive era and the administration o f
Theodore Roosevelt Since that time the health care discussion was renewed, and
then abated, every fifteen to twenty years (Kingdon 1995, 189). Health insurance had
been considered for inclusion in the 1935 Social Security Act, but it was withdrawn
when the Roosevelt administration concluded it was only possible to accomplish so
much social reform with a conservative Congress and “the anticipated opposition o f a
coalition o f medical providers, employers, hospitals, and insurers. . . ” (Noble 1997,
65). That judgment was borne out a decade later when President Hany Truman’s call
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for national health insurance met the determined opposition of Congressional
conservatives—both Democratic and Republican—as well as physicians, the
American Medical Association (AMA), the manufacturers o f health care products,
and foe health insurance industry. Truman's health care proposal finally died, never
coming to a vote, even after the Democrats took back control of both houses of
Congress in the 1948 elections (Noble 1997,69).
So, it was not until the 1960s and the presidency o f Lyndon Johnson that
health care finally came to be part o f the federal social security system, through
amendments to the SSAin 196S. Changing the terms o f foe health care debate to
something less than a national system probably helped, blunting the ability o f
traditional fires to mount an effective opposition. Rather than universal health care,
the Johnson administration sought to implement a program of limited medical
coverage for the elderly, the eligible poor, dependent children, the blind, and the
disabled. This new health care system had two parts. The first was Medicaid, which
provided basic health care services for the eligible needy and the elderly poor. A
compulsory federal program, it was to be administered by the states and supported by
the revenues from payroll deductions and federal subsidies. The other was Medicare,
a voluntary contributory insurance program for senior citizens covered by Social
Security that provided supplemental health care benefits, subsidized by the general
revenues of the federal government13

13A direct payroll tax on employees and employers was later added, and is in
effect today.
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Welfare Reform
Over the three decades following the adoption o f Medicare and Medicaid,
U.S. spending for health care grew at a much faster rate than that for the cost o f
living. From $42 billion and about 6 percent o f the GDP in 1965, total public and
private spending for health care rose to over $880 billion and almost 14 percent o f
the GDP in 1993. With the federal government accounting for 40 percent o f these
expenditures, health care as a category o f social spending had become second in size
only to Social Security—and still nearly forty million Americans were without any
health insurance (McKenna 1998,628-30; Kingdon 1995,217). Calls for reform o f
the health care system were widespread, by the public and from politicians at all
levels o f government. Most of the concern boiled down to two issues: containment of
ever-rising medical costs and access to quality care. However, aside from a general
consensus that this described the health care problem—and a “crisis” for a growing
number o f Americans without any healthcare coverage—there was not any
substantial agreement about what should be done. As a result, and despite sometimes
intense public debate at the national level about the need for reform, very little was
accomplished. Jimmy Carter’s presidency saw high-level discussions take place
between the administration, Congress, and organized labor about comprehensive
health insurance, but the parties could not agree on a single proposal (Kingdon 1995,
7-8).
Health care returned to the national agenda again with the presidency o f Bill
Clinton. It had been an important campaign issue, along with the economy. Some
forty million Americans were already without access to medical care and with the
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economy in recession, many who lost their jobs also lost their healthcare benefits. As
Kingdon (1995) has depicted the policymaking process, the political and problem
streams had come together—and something could happen. However, and despite
broad popular agreement that there was a serious and growing health care problem,
the advocates of reform—within and outside government—were unable to reach any
consensus on a specific health care proposal they could all support Lacking this
unity, the plan for universal healthcare coverage that was finally submitted in
September 1993 by the Clinton administration met the determined and effective
opposition o f Congressional conservatives and a broad community o f interest groups,
many o f the same that had earlier opposed Truman’s plan for health insurance—
doctors, the AMA, the manufacturers of medical products, and insurance companies.
Just tike Truman’s proposal, Clinton’s plan was rebuffed by the Congress; it never
even came up for a vote (Kingdon 199S, 217-21). I would argue that a recovering
economy also worked to the advantage of those resisting healthcare reform. The
problem certainly did not go away but, as people returned to work or found new
jobs, it lost its significance and place on the active political agenda. Health care
returned to the active agenda again in September 1996, prior to the national
elections, when the Health insurance Portability and Accountability Act became law.
This legislation required insurance companies to continue their coverage o f
employees who had lost or changed jobs. I hardly need argue that this should largely
be viewed in terms o f political expediency, a gesture to the electorate, than an
attempt at real reform.
By most accounts, Social Security and Medicare are considered successful
social welfare programs. Social Security pensions provide seniors with a minimum
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income level, saving many millions from a life o f poverty. The benefits o f Medicare
have been twofold: improving the health o f the nation’s elderly and, by covering
much of the expensive cost o f medical care, saving them from poverty. According to
a 1999 report by the U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Social Security and Medicare have
reduced the rate o f poverty among the nation’s elderly from almost 48 percent to less
than 12 percent14 Social Security and Medicare are widely popular as well as
successful, benefiting the middle class and even the rich. Rather than welfare, these
programs are considered an entitlement by many Americans. Although both programs
are subjects for reform, the primary concern with each is in ensuring its future
solvency, and this is a serious budgetary problem. But it is very unlikely either
program will see any major reduction in benefits, even though there will be efforts at
cost containment In fact, Medicare may even be amended to include some kind of
prescription drug coverage for seniors.
The ever-rising costs o f social programs is a problem that America shares
with other welfare states today. Another problem is not uniquely American, but it is
especially a target for welfare reform; it is about personal responsibility and it
concerns means-tested public assistance programs. Means-tested programs are what
many Americans consider to be the real welfare system o f the United States—Food
Stamps, Head Start, Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and the
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program that replaced AFDC in
1996. Although these programs account for a much smaller share o f the nation’s
budget than Social Security and Medicare, they are far more controversial and

14Edward S. Greenberg and Benjamin L Page, The Strugglefo r Democracy
(New York: Longman, 2001), 518.
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generally drifted by the general public. Temporary assistance to those down on their
luck is not objectionable, but not if those programs encourage welfare dependency
o f individual responsibility for one’s actions, and if it they are associated with
the disintegration of the traditional family unit—with single-parent households and
out-of-wedlock births.
President Bill Clinton promised to “end welfare as we know i t ” Only time
will tell, but the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act does appear
to have remade the welfare system has it had evolved since passage o f the 1935
Social Security A ct It not a great exaggeration to say that the old system of social
welfare was ended. Public welfare assistance as an open-ended entitlement
by the frdfHll gnvtynment c*m e to

Ml

Mid The old AFDC program was

terminated and a new block grant program (TANF) established to replace it Under
TANF the federal government would provide financial support to the states for their
welfare systems, with the responsibility to design and implement welfare programs
delegated (devolved) to the states under federal guidelines. According to federal
rules, family head-of-households receiving welfare assistance would be required to
find work after two years o f benefits, a lifetime limit on benefits not to exceed five
years, and with work and training requirements to be made a condition of continuing
eligibility. For unmarried teenage parents to receive benefits, they would be required
to stay in school and live with their parents or some other adult. Food stamp
eligibility was to be restricted, and targeted particularly to needy families with
children.
Proponents o f the 1996 legislation argued that the reforms would end welfare
dependency by encouraging workforce entry, strengthen the traditional family unit,
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and hdp to control soaring federal expenditures. Opponents believed the new system
would only lead to more poverty over the longer term, especially among children, as
recipients used up their lifetime limits. Only time will really telL Still, the results have
been striking.
It happened with unpredicted suddenness, hi just five years, the number of
people on the welfare rolls had plummeted by 48 percent nationwide.
Caseloads had peaked in 1994 but now were down in every state. What was
surprising was the size o f the drop. The number o f families on welfare had
declined by more than 80 percent in Wisconsin, Idaho, Wyoming, and by
more than half in twenty-three other states. There were only three
states—Hawaii, Rhode Island, and New Mexico—in which the drop was less
than 20 percent The trend defied what has been described as fee welfare
“reverse gravity” law; rolls that go up but do not come down.
I would suggest there are three factors that may account for most o f this
change. The first is that many of the states had individually been addressing welfare
reform and reducing welfare rolls since the late 1980s, and the product o f their efforts
was beginning to show. Second was the robust economy o f the 1990s, one in which
jobs were plentiful and unemployment was low. The third was the welfare reform act
that the Congress passed in 1996.
Federalism played a most important role in the 1996 reforms. Laying the
groundwork for the national welfare reform legislation, the states had been engaged
in their own experiments with welfare reform since at least the late 1980s. As
encouragement for those experiments, the Bush and Clinton White Houses had
granted hundreds o f waivers to federal welfare rules for the administration o f joint
federal-state social welfare programs, particularly regarding eligibility requirements.
Wisconsin, where current Health and Human Service Secretary Tommy Thompson

lsThomas E. Patterson, We the People (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2002), 481.
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became governor in 1987, was a leader in these efforts. A recurring theme o f statelevel experiments was twofold: reducing welfare rolls by getting welfare recipients
into the workforce; and encouraging parental responsibility. States helped with job
training, day care, and job placement Time limits were placed on benefits eBgibilhy.
Young and unmarried mothers were required to live with their parents or other
adults.
Any frank evaluation o f the success o f state and federal welfare reforms
cannot overlook the effect o f a good economy as a major contributing factor. The
verdict rests with time and harder economic times; that will teQ how successful the
state and national welfare reforms really were—whether welfare rolls went down
because the reforms worked or whether the number is less primarily because o f a
good economy and not as a result o f welfare reform, or whether welfare rolls went
down because of the time limits placed on eligibility, even though chronic
unemployment and poverty remain problems (and may even be growing worse).
The health care debate was renewed during the closing years o f the Clinton
presidency and was an important issue, along with social security and education
reform, in the 2000 general elections. However, none is in the cards for any
meaningful reform at this time. One reason is that these have now become standard
issues that all politicians must address in their campaigns, and the sound bite is
typically more important than the substance o f the rhetoric. Another is the absence o f
any effective political coalition to drive reform in these policy areas. In the first place,
there is no agreement about what the problems are and what should be done. In the
case o f education it depends largely upon who is asked. There is not a clear national
consensus about the education problem, with clearly defined causes and solutions
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upon which everyone agrees. Moreover, the implementation o f remedies is a statelevel task anyway. What the effective federal role can be has been grossly overstated
by opportunistic politicians in their pursuit of national offices. The most that can be
expected in the area o f health care is some land o f limited prescription drug program
for seniors as an adjunct to the Medicare program. What to do with the Social
Security retirement system and about its long-term solvency will remain unresolved
because it is not now an immediate problem, and the "war** on terrorism casts a very
long shadow over the current political agenda. Still, it can be expected that reform of
the social security, health care, and education systems will be key issues in upcoming
national elections, and especially in the 2004 presidential campaign. They must be,
given the increasing magnitude o f the health care crisis, the rising budgetary
expenditures for social programs at all levels of government, the anxiety of many
younger and working Americans about the viability o f a social welfare system they
are called upon to financially support but receive no benefits from, and for the
political clout of the elderly who are the primary beneficiaries o f the nation’s social
welfare programs.
A Discussion o f American Social Policy
There is a kernel o f truth to the logic of industrialism as an explanation for the
welfare state. It does describe the socioeconomic conditions most often associated
with groundbreaking social welfare legislation and higher levels o f state investment in
social programs. But it does not help to explain when, how, who, or even if a
government will actually respond. There is not a specific point that can be identified
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within the process o f industrialization or a particular level o f socioeconomic
development that can be said to automatically trigger state action.
The logic o f industrialism cannot explain the United States' relatively late
adoption of social welfare programs at the national level Industrialization and
urbanization were already well advanced—and the associated societal problems—
long before the New Deal legislation o f the 1930s. But even if the logic o f
industrialism cannot explain the timing, it can certainly be argued that the New Deal
does represent a logical response by the national government to the difficulties of an
industrial society, to problems that exceeded the capacities o f lower level
governments and o f private and voluntary associations to remedy. What had been
absent before was a catalyst that would rouse the federal government to action. That
came with the Great Depression and widespread socioeconomic dislocation, with the
Hoover administration’s lack o f success in dealing with the nation’s problems, and
the 1932 general elections that brought Franklin Roosevelt to the presidency and the
Democratic party to national prominence. President Hoover and a Republican
Congress had done and accomplished very little to address the national crisis. In feet,
Hoover would have preferred to let and leave the remedy to market forces (Popple
and Leighninger 1996,246). In this sense, the outcome o f the 1932 elections may be
viewed as a reaction to the Hoover administration’s failure to respond to the nation’s
problems in a manner considered acceptable by the electorate, and the New Deal
legislation as the response o f a new political leadership to the previous government’s
failure—empowered to undertake social reforms by the mandate o f the national
electorate. So, it was a new political leadership and a change in the partisan control
of the national government that finally mattered—and greatly—for the when, who,
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what and how o f the state’s response. It was the elections o f 1932 and the presidency
o f Franklin Roosevelt and a Democratic Congress that explains the tuning and
politics of welfare reform in the United States, a paradigm shift in social welfare
policy, far better than the logic o f industrialism.
If the reluctance o f the Hoover administration to act is put aside; an
interesting question still remains: given the level o f activity and all the social reforms
o f the Progressive Era, why did it take until the 1930s for major social welfare
legislation to be enacted at the national level? Noble (1997) considers the opposition
o f conservative groups, business interests, and a Congress “hostile” to social reform
as important factors, and so was the federal structure o f the American political
system. Federalism “magnified the strength of conservative opposition to change
while raising the costs o f coordinating the movement for reform” (44-5). First,
federalism made more numerous the “veto points” in the political system, the “areas
o f institutional vulnerability. . . in the policy process where the mobilization o f
opposition can thwart policy innovation” (Steinmo, Thden, and Longstreth 1992,
7).16 Second, because the states were the building blocks o f the American political
system, the factories and laboratories for social reforms that might later be adopted
by the national government,
federalism hurt reformers by raising the costs o f successful collective action.
With Congress hostile to nationalizing legislation, reformers had to mount
campaigns in dozens o f state legislatures or risk tlle backlash caused by
uneven regulation. At the same time, federalism fragmented the movements
for reform (Noble 1997,45-6).

16A detailed treatment of “veto points” is offered by Ellen Immergut
(Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992,57-89).
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Noble also remarks that Progressive reformers might have made a “wrong
turn,” a mistake, in attempting to construct a maternalist instead o f a paternalist
welfare state. Based on the European experience, modern welfare states first
protected male workers with social insurance. Without discounting what the
Progressive Era reformers accomplished in terms o f promoting the welfare o f women
and children, it was finally a European-style paternalist welfare state that emerged
from the legislation o f the New Deal (Noble 1997,50-3).
I would add a further observation, following the logic of Pierson (1993) and
political conflict theory, why it took so long for America to establish its welfare state.
Although Progressive era social reforms did generate policy feedback, “policy
choices [did] have political consequences” (Pierson 1993,597), those reforms seem
to have been more immediately effective in mobilizing the opponents of change than
those who stood to gain the most from welfare state development. No mass
mobilization of the working class or of organized labor took place, to make their
interests in social welfare reform known and represented; nor did a politically
effective programmatic political party appear—like the social democratic parties
found in Europe—to represent the interests o f labor and the working class.
Although social democratic and working class mobilization theories o f the
political conflict school are not very useful as explanations for America’s social
welfare system, they may still offer some valuable insights. First, they may be helpful
in explaining why the United States has a such a hodgepodge o f social programs and
not a comprehensive social welfare system. Second, even without a viable social
democratic movement, it cannot be assumed that the working class and labor had no
part in the policymaking for social welfare. As to the first point, America does not
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share with many European democracies a tradition o f labor and social democratic
participation in politics and government The U. S. has never had a programmatic,
labor-based, mass political party with a legislative agenda representing working class
interests that could compete for and control the nuq'or policymaking organs o f
government, and then drive the policymaking for social welfare. Since its beginnings,
the national party system has always been dominated by two major parties, both at or
near the middle o f the political spectrum. While the politics o f the left have not been
unimportant in America and to its social reforms, it was the more centrist Democratic
party that controlled both the White House and the Congress when the New Deal
legislation was adopted in the 1930s and the “Great Society” reforms during the
1960s. While the Democrats have been the champions o f labor and working class
issues during the twentieth century, at least far more than the Republican party, it has
never been with a comprehensive plan for social welfare. That is because the
Democratic party’s base of political support has been, and still is, too broad and
diverse to reach agreement on a comprehensive plan for such a controversial
program—and still maintain necessary party unity within the electoral process or as
the party-in-government Moreover, in order to build a winning electoral coalition the
Democrats have been forced to compete with the other “big tent” party, the
Republicans, for the votes o f American moderates, the political center. Neither party
can campaign on a platform too for to the left or the right and win. As a consequence,
I would argue the politics of social welfare have been very much the product of
compromise between right and left. Although important social legislation has been
adopted with the Democrats in control of both the White House and the Congress,
that policymaking has been limited by intra- and interparty politics to the art of the
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possible, with legislation produced piecemeal, sometimes in spurts, but not in any
integrated fashion according to the framework o f some final and comprehensive plan.
Second, concerning the role played by the working class in the policymaking
process for social welfare, it was largely indirect but with a powerful effect both on
and within the political system. At a very critical historical juncture, working class
interests were translated into votes for the Democratic party and the presidency o f
Franklin Roosevelt, and the New Deal legislation followed. It happened again in 1964
with the electoral “mandate” given to Lyndon Johnson and a Democratic Congress.
In the context o f political conflict theory, the interests o f the working class, its
struggle against the structure and commodifying effects o f capitalism, found
representation and a positive response within the American political process. But it
was more than just the Democratic party that had taken up the working class cause to
make something happen. It was a collection of public and private individuals, groups
and organizations that had been united in a temporary coalition because o f their
shared interest in a particular social policy outcome. That coalition would disappear
when the issue that gave it life left the political agenda.17 These transitory policy
coalitions, America’s two-party system, its electoral politics, changes in political
leadership and in the partisan control of government, all together they help to explain
much about the political mandates and policy initiatives ofRooseveh’s New Deal and
Johnson’s Great Society. To borrow from Kingdon's (1995) notion o f the
policymaking process, “windows” of policymaking opportunity were opened when

I would point out that this phenomenon o f ever-shifting and transitory
policy coalitions is not limited to social welfare. It is characteristic o f American
policymaking, o f its political pluralism.
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“compelling” social welfare problems were joined with policy solutions and political
opportunity at critical and decisive moments in time—and legislative history was
made before the window closed.
.. .each duster of policy innovations was put through by coalitions o f groups
in touch with sets o f elected legislators, coalitions that crystallized during
nationally perceived “crisesT widely understood to call.for positive
governmental solutions. But in each episode the coalitions favoring new
social policies were temporary, fragile, incapable o f any permanent
institutionalization—and very soon undone by conservative backlashes that
drew on localist phis business and other resistance to enhanced state power in
the United States (Skocpol 1987,365).
Although those temporary coalitions o f socioeconomic and political forces that had
formed to produce the “big bangs” o f America’s welfare reform may not have
survived, their landmark social reforms did, even to thwart off the conservative
backlashes that followed.
The role o f American labor in the politics of welfare reform presents a real
contrast with the experience of many European countries. American labor has never
been as politically conscious and organized at the mass level, nor its many trade
unions as united at the peak level As a consequence, American labor has simply not
been as influential as European in the political arena. When it comes to social policy,
however, that is something not all sectors o f the labor community have necessarily
wanted to change—and especially its leadership. The New Deal legislation found
both support and opposition in the leadership o f organized labor. Taken as a whole,
organized labor was clearly not a driving and supportive force behind the social
reforms o f the New Deal. It had been similar in Bismarck’s Germany (Rimlinger
1971,128-9). Important labor leadership, like Samuel Gompers of the American
Federation of Labor (AFL), were far more concerned with what they might gain for
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the working d*** in thdr negotiations with management than with any new social
provisions that might be implemented by the federal government With the
New Deal the federal government became union management’s competition in the
provision of retirement and other welfare benefits for labor. In this sense, as the New
Deal represented a threat to their job security, union management’s support o f the
New Deal could hardly be expected to be any more than lukewarm. This was
probably not the preference of the average American worker, though, who would
have been quite comfortable with the government’s intervention on their behalf and
the institution o f a state-sponsored social insurance system (Heidenheimer 1973,3189; Noble 1997,39-41). This depiction o f labor's role remains fairly accurate today.
Social policy in America is also a story about political institutions, national
development, a growing polity, and democratization. The evolution and growth o f
the American state and its brand o f federalism must figure prominently in any
explanation o f its social welfare programs. The U.S. Constitution did not establish a
strong central government to dominate the affairs o f the nation, but one authorized as
minimally necessary to represent the common interests o f the separate states. If
anything, there was an intention by the constitutional framers to minimize an
accumulation o f power by the national government that would come at the expense
o f the states and their sphere o f policymaking authority. However, what began as a
loose federation o f rather independent states became, over time, a dose union o f
lesser administrative political units joined under a powerful central government
Many issues that were naturally addressed at the local levd in early America—
security, order, and the general welfare—increasingly were passed on to the
jurisdiction o f larger political and administrative units as time passed, problems grew
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more complex and a greater nation coalesced. In this sense, the “big bang” o f the
New Deal that came out o f the Great Depression made dramatically clear the inability
of state and local governments, private organizations and voluntary agencies to
address the challenges o f an increasingly interdependent society and economy.
Moreover, and what is really a statement about how resourceful and effective a
federal system can be, the national government did not build social policy anew but
instead drew upon the experience and policies already implemented in the states.
Growing inclusiveness and democratization were also significant factors in the
development of the American welfare state. An electorate that has expanded to
include women and minorities has had an effect on party and campaign platforms, on
the composition and policy agendas o f the state and federal governments. The history
o f social welfare policy, at both the state and national levels, is associated with the
growing inclusiveness o f the body politic.
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CHAPTERV
CASE STUDIES OF EDUCATIONAL EXPANSION:
GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES
The German Education System
The German Education System Today
The history o f German education policy and administration since the 1870s
has largely been one o f decentralized organization, except for the period o f Nazi rule.
Today the formal authority for education resides with the German states, or Lander,
as established by the 1949 Federal Constitution.1 Within each Land, however, the
education system is subject to centralized control. Legislative and budgetary powers
belong to the Land parliament A lam /cabinet or ministry post, very often the
Ministry o f Culture ( Kultusmimsterhm), is charged with planning, administration,
teacher training and staffing. Instead of a state ministry, a larger Land may entrust
supervision o f the schools to regional administrative bodies that are part o f the state
executive and without a parliamentary counterpart Local communities are typically

Because the central government does not make and administer a single
education policy for all of Germany, but that function is delegated to the states by the
Federal Constitution, Germany does not have a national education system in a
strictly formal sense. At the same time, and although there are certain differences in
the way the education function has been implemented by the separate Lander
(discussed below), it is still reasonable to speak of a German education system owing
to and representing the very great similarity o f education policy and institutions
across the Lander. What I refer to hereafter as Germany’s “education system” are
those education policies and institutions that are commonly found throughout the
country.
197
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given responsibility for infrastructure maintenance and sometimes staffing (Lehmann
1994,2476; Nevennann and Richter 1983,88). All Land implementations are not
«Kl«t though, and «"ugh o f the variation that exists in the German education system
today can be attributed to differences between Lander—to different constitutional
provisions and laws covering education, to their separate educational organizations
and administration, and to state-level partisan politics.

LOnder control over educational affairs is not absolute, though- Over time,
through constitutional amendments and with new statutes and organizations, a
greater role in educational matters has been established for the federal government.
The Federal Vocational Training Act o f 1969 gave the federal government new
legislative and administrative authority in the area of enterprise-based vocational
training—the "dual system.” Under the authority of the Ministry o f Education and
Science, vocational training regulations for dual system students are determined
through the collaborative effort o f vocational schools, labor unions, and employers
with the Federal Institute for Vocational Training. The federal government decides
how federal monies will be directed to support private secondary and tertiary schools,
as well as the stipends for students attending those institutions, ft is the federal
government that works out the general regulations for public service employees that
are the basis for the Lander laws affecting state employees, inchidmg almost all
educators from the primary through the university level. Since 1969 it has been a
constitutional requirement that the Lander and federal government cooperate in the
planning and financing o f higher education’s expansion. In this vein, the Joint
Commission of the Federal and Linder Governments for Educational Planning and
Advancement of Research was established in 1970 to coordinate educational planning
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and research support among the Ldnder with federal government participation
(Nevennann and Richter 1983,88-91).
Today the German education system is primarily public, government-operated
and tuition-free, including higher education. The private sector is nominal, accounting
for only about 5 percent o f all primary and secondary-level enrollments (MarlowFerguson 2002,482,488). Although they are differently organized and controlled,
private and religious schools are also under the general supervision and even receive
funding from the state, as mandated by the Federal Constitution. The financial
support o f primary and secondary education is the primary responsibility o f the

Lander, including personnel, with infrastructure costs covered by the local
community. The major share of funding for higher education also comes from the

LOnderbatj and especially since an amendment to the federal constitution in 1969,
the national government has taken a greater role in policymaking and larger
responsibility fin* funding. The federal government covers almost three-quarters of
the fending for research programs, 65 percent o f financial aid to students, covers
much o f the cost o f education-related equipment, and shares with thcLdnderihe
construction costs for physical facilities (Mariow-Ferguson 2002,499). In addition,
federal monies are directed to private secondary and tertiary schools and the students
attending those institutions. For students this support has taken the form of
supplementary payments or loans, and for private institutions federal assistance has
often covered from 70 to 90 percent o f their operating budgets. This has made many
private schools essentially tuition-free, just like the public schools (Gellert and Ritter
1985,346-7; Lehmann 1994,2476).
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Public spending for education amounted to 4.1 percent o f the GDP in 1990,
and 8.6 percent o f all government expenditures. It is important to observe that both
of these spending measures are down from 1975 highs, when a period o f education
refoim and general post-Worid War Two system expansion came to a close. The data
show a continuous decline since 1975, when public spending for education was 5.4
percent of the GDP and 11.4 percent of total public expenditures (OECD 1993,
1995,1997). Private spending for education began a similar decline, starting around
1985 (Lehmann 1994,2477). Data from the 2000 time period indicate this trend has
continued since reunification, with education’s share of public expenditures now at
4.8 percent (Marlow-Ferguson 2002,482).
Primary school education is compulsory for all German children, beginning at
age six. All children, ages six through ten, attend common public primary schools

(Grundschulen). At about age eleven, with passage to the lower secondary level of
education, a selection process takes place that channels students into a differentiated
system o f academic and vocational programs. Students are separated into

Hauptschulen (general schools), Realschulen (intermediate schools), Gymnaaen
(grammar schools), or the relatively new Gesamtschulen (comprehensive schools).
They attend these schools until age fifteen or sixteen.

Hauptschulen and, to a large extent, Realschulen are intended for students on
a vocational track, those who will enter the workforce upon completion o f their
secondary education. Nearly two-thirds of German youth are directed along this path
and, by age fifteen or sixteen, many become participants in what is known as
Germany’s dual system. The dual system refers to enterprise-based vocational
training, a program that combines an apprenticeship or some other company training

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

201
with part-time attendance at a state vocational school Federal regulations govern the
conditions for the company-based portion of the dual system, but there is no national
standard for vocational instruction—and that is the responsibility o f the Lander. As
with other educational matters, there is tremendous variety in the implementation o f
vocational training programs from Land to Land, with many different institutional
options and curricula that combine academics with vocational instruction and in
company training. There are certain types of vocational schools that are common,
however. They include the part-time Berufsschule (vocational school) that is part o f
the dual system and the full-time Berufrfachschule that, after two years attendance
and certification, qualifies students for admission to advanced trade and technical
schools (Fachschuleri), vocational extension schools (Berufsausbauschulen) for
those already pursuing an occupation, and vocational grammar schools

(Fachgymnasien) that prepare students for further studies at vocational colleges
(Fachhochschulen) (OECD 1995,276).
Realschulen offer an intermediate secondary level curriculum that is more
demanding than that o f the Hauptschule The Realschule is meant for students
headed for the workforce, apprenticeships, specialized technical schools or, today,
even an upper level Gymnasium for pre-university studies. The primary educational
task o f the Gymnasium is university preparation and, historically, it has been students
who have attended a Gymnasium and possess its school-leaving certificate (the

Abitur) that have gone on to state universities in the greatest number. In the eyes o f
many education reformers, and many average Germans as well, the Gymnasium
remains today the accepted foundation of an academic career and the preferred path
to the university. Although the Gymnasium has traditionally favored the elite o f
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German society—and still does—the gateway has been widened somewhat in recent
years. Much as the result o f more flexible admission requirements and “a
strengthening of parental will,” the proportion o f secondary level students attending a

Gymnasium saw an increase from only about 7 percent in 1968 to almost 30 percent
by the early 1990s (Mmtrop and Wefler 1994,253). The Gesamtschule offers an
alternative path to the university, although its implementation has been much limited
and has varied greatly from Land to Land? At age seventeen, as well as moving on
to a variety of vocational programs, students on an academic track may continue their
pre-university studies in an upper secondary level Gesamtschule or Gymnasium.
German higher education is dominated by state-run or recognized institutions.
There are only a few private schools. In recent years, opportunities in higher
education have increased in association with those at the secondary level, with a
loosening of its traditionally rigid structure o f differentiated schools and the
introduction of new educational alternatives at the upper secondary and tertiary
levels. Although a Gymnasium education and itsAbitur remains the most travelled
and preferred path to a university, it is no longer the only way to the system of higher

^ fu c h o f the debate over school reform since the 1960s has focused on the
expansion o f educational opportunities at the secondary level, and in particular on the
introduction o f the Gesamtschule, or integrated comprehensive school Based on the
American high school model, the Gesamtschule was intended as an alternative to
students who would otherwise attend either a Realschuk or Gymnasium. Ahighly
politicized experiment in German education, the acceptance ami success o f the
Gesamtschukn has depended largely on the partisan majority in each land. bonder
controlled by the more conservative Christian Democrats have tended to look with
some disfavor upon the Gesamtschukn. On the other hand, in Lander where the
more liberal Social Democrats have controlled the government, the Gesamtschule has
become a fourth type o f secondary school In 1992, of the 500 Gesamtschukn in
operation, 80 percent were in Lander governed by the SPD, with an enrollment o f
almost 493,000 (Theen & Wilson 2001,181).
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education. As well as widening the gateway through Gesamtschukn implementation
and by making admission requirements for the Gymnasium more flexible, upward
mobility has been increased h x Realschulen graduates, with many new advanced
vocational training programs established at the upper secondary level. Today,
virtually any German student with an upper secondary level leaving certificate may
enroll at some institution o f higher education. Moreover, student mobility has been
enhanced laterally across academic and vocational categories within the differentiated
secondary system. Graduates of the dual system may return to complete their
education at a full-time vocational school, and then continue on to vocational training
in the higher education system. Likewise, students completing academic studies at the
secondary level may qualify to continue with their studies at Fachhochschulen,
vocational colleges for students seeking application-oriented education and training.

Fachhochschulen have especially gained in popularity and student numbers today in
Germany’s expanding system o f higher education (OECD 1995,278). Since the late
1960s, state governments have established many such non-university vocational and
professional programs for students who have completed secondary level academic
requirements or two-year vocational high schools (Tdchler 1985, 50-1).
The Development o f German Education Policy
The Origins o f the German School System: Pre-Imperial Germany
Most accounts of German history since the fifteenth century are dominated by
that of Prussia. As well as being central to the story o f German political development
prior to and following unification in 1871, Prussia also exemplifies the early
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development and history o f German education. Prussia's education system provided
the model upon which many other German states built their own systems (Hage,
Hanneman, and Gargan 1989, 168; Heidenheimer 1997, 13-28; Thut and Adams
1964,76).3 The Prussian experience also demonstrates the importance o f religion and
class in the development and organization of the German education system. Its
history illustrates the growing role o f government in education beginning in the late
eighteenth century, the efforts of successive political regimes to wrest control o f the
education system from church and local authorities to make it an instrument o f state
power for national development and societal management—to make Germans
productive workers, faithful citizens, and loyal soldiers.
Organized religion, particularly Roman Catholicism and Lutheranism, has
played a prominent and lasting role in the history and development o f German
education. Before the sixteenth century and the Protestant Reformation, the influence
of the Catholic Church over educational matters was preponderant and relatively
uncontested. It was a significant factor and provider o f education, with schools in
many major population centers. Its principal educational interest and objectives were
rather limited, however, to the preparation of young men, mostly o f noble or other
elite origins, fix’the clergy and public offices. It was not to educate the population atlarge, and especially not women (Dichanz and Zahorik 1998, IS).
It is the Protestant Reformation that is associated with the initial expansion of
mass education opportunities in Germany. Beginning roughly at the time o f the
Reformation in the sixteenth century, there came a new and unprecedented interest in

^Likewise, Prussia is recommended by Wilson (1977) as “best” to examine
the development o f education policy by the Social Democratic Party (45).
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the education o f the common man. Literacy, at least at a basic level, came to be
viewed as a public good for a growing mass o f German society—useful and
necessary for secular as well as religious causes. Particularly in Protestant German
states there began an effort to develop the reading skills necessary to make the
Christian Bible accessible to every individual As the Protestant movement expanded,
with the formation o f new Lutheran churches in many German states, so did the
establishment o f church-run vernacular schools organized at the parish level. These
new denominational schools (Bekermtnisschule), operated by the church and local
authorities, became the foundation for Germany’s future public education system
(Marlow-Ferguson 2002,483; Thut and Adams 1964,79-81; Wilson 1977,39).
Although the majority o f children would not attend school regularly until the
nineteenth century, a vernacular education was made compulsory by a number o f
German principalities and states much earlier. In the Duchy of Saxony, Weimar (fid
so in 1619 for all children between six and twelve years o f age. The pressure to
establish a basic education offering at the primary level was even felt in areas that
were predominantly Catholic. In Bavaria, new schools and curriculums were
developed that combined practical secular with religious training. Compulsory
education came to Lutheran Prussia in 1716 when King Frederick William I (17131740) decreed that all children between the ages o f five and twelve should attend
school so that they might be taught to read, write, perform arithmetic tasks, and
receive religious instruction. During his reign, 2,000 new schools were built
(Huebener 1962,3-4; Thut and Adams 1964,80).
In addition to religion, class was an important factor affecting the
development o f the vernacular schools and the structure o f the Prussian/German
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education system. The vernacular school served as the institutional vehicle to
separate the schooling o f the lower classes from the elite, b o rd er to satisfy
compulsory attendance requirements established by the state, the great majority o f
lower class children aged six to twelve were enrolled in local parish vernacular
schools. These schools, with upwards to 90 percent o f all school-age children
enrolled, came to be known as “schools for the people,” or VoUaschulen. They were
not tuition-free, however, and only the poorest parents were exempt from
contributing to the Volksschule education o f their children Boys were taught
separately from girls, except in those places where the students were so few it was
not practical to split them up. The educational program o f the Volksschule was not
intended as preparation for secondary and higher education instead it “offered just
those studies which the government thought would make the great mass o f
inhabitants efficient and devoted subjects.” As it involved vernacular schools, church
authorities considered that purpose to be preparation for confirmation Whatever the
case, most children left the Volksschule and ended their formal education by age
twelve or thirteen, the normal age of confirmation Very few Volksschule students
moved on to the secondary level, and especially those from rural areas, even in the
later 1800s when the opportunities began to expand with the growing establishment
o f trade and vocational schools (Thut and Adams 1964,89-90,97; Wilson 1977,38).
For upper class children the rules and educational opportunities were very
different When school attendance was made compulsory by King Frederick William I
o f Prussia in 1716, an exception was made for those who were privately schooled at
home or in small groups. Clearly, it was only the youth from wealthy and privileged
backgrounds that could be expected to have the benefit o f private instruction. As
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with the Vo&sschulen, boys and girls were typically separated; but there was a
further discrimination as well. Whereas privileged young men might continue on to an
elite secondary school (Gymnasium) and then a university following completion of
their etementary education, young women could n o t In the patriarchal German
society, the doors to secondary and higher education were effectively closed to
women until the late nineteenth century, when more and more secondary schools for
women began to appear as the result o f local and private efforts. These institutions
represented a variety of program offerings, from upper class finishing schools to
foreign language instruction and the sciences, but not until almost the twentieth
century did there begin to be the kind o f academic offerings for women—like those
for men—that were clearly preparatory for the university. By the beginning of the
1900s the doors to higher education were also beginning to open to women in some
German states (Thut and Adams 1964, 79-89,95-6). Since that time women have
effectively overcome the barriers that excluded them from secondary and higher
education, and continue to make advances against gender-bias in education and
society more generally.
Although there can be no question o f great change since the 1800s, the
influence o f class and religion remain deeply rooted in German education. Even
today, educational opportunities and achievement beyond the primary level tends to
reflect and perpetuate the el«« divisions o f German society. The upper classes are
still disproportionately represented in the Gymnasien and state universities (Fuller
and Rubinson 1992, 108-9; Gellert 1996,315-7; Ungens 1998,44; Marlow-Ferguson
2002,489-93). Likewise, the Lutheran and Catholic churches continue to be an
important force in German society, in its politics and education system. While
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religious influence has diminished u the state has taken over responsibility for the
education function, and public schools have come to dominate the landscape,
confessional schools remain—and even receive public funding. What is more,
religious instruction continues to be a curriculum staple at the elementary level in
many state-supported schools. Nonetheless, the change has been dramatic. The
German education system o f today is far different than that o f Prussia, Imperial
Germany, or the Weimar Republic. In association with Germany's ongoing political
and socioeconomic development, the mission o f its education system has undergone
many revisions, its institutional structure has been transformed, and its opportunities
greatly expanded.
By the time of the late eighteenth century—at the dawn o f the industrial age
and the modem administrative state—the Prussian government was showing by its
actions an interest in the education system as an instrument of state power, a new and
necessary object of government policy and control But the system o f church-run
schools was not something the Prussian government—and later a unified German
state—could simply decide to sweep aside and replace with its own organization,
personnel, and curriculum. The local parish school had become the predominant and
institutionalized form, the role o f the church and the clergy paramount, and religious
instruction was a curriculum standard. The Lutheran and Catholic churches had a
vested interest in the education system, and they would compete with the state over
its administration and curriculum well into the twentieth century. Out o f necessity, for
a long time, the Prussian and succeeding German governments were forced to
cooperate and work with organized religion on educational matters, even bringing its
personnel within the state’s own administrative apparatus.
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Beginning in the eighteenth century, Prussian and then German governments
would increasingly challenge the role and influence of organized religion in
educational aflairs. This was manifested in the early part o f the eighteenth century by
the state’s “coming out” in educational aflairs under Frederick William I, by a
working arrangement between the state and organized religion that recognized the
central role o f the church in German education (Huebener 1962,3-4). By the later
part of the century it was characterized by a struggle for control o f the education
system between organized religion (especially Catholicism) and those who controlled
the state.
During the reign o f Frederick the Great (1740-1786), the General-Landschul-

Reglement (General School Code) o f 1763 made Prussian schools institutions o f the
state. School attendance was made mandatory for children up to thirteen years o f
age. There was also an attempt by the regime o f Frederick the Great to involve the
state in the determination o f curriculum offerings and pedagogy, but little was
accomplished as official control over educational aflairs remained with the clergy and
church officials (Huebener 1962,4; Thut and Adams 1964; 80-1). In 1787 a new
government high commission for schools (Oberschulkolleghm) was created, a land
o f “national board o f education” to oversee Prussian education. An attempt to
establish secular control over the Prussian education system, this effort was opposed
and effectively thwarted by the new long, Frederick William H (1786-1797), who
appointed high-ranking church leadership to be seated on the commission. Similarly,
because organized religion continued to be so influential in educational affairs, even
the new school law o f the Preussische Allgemeine Landreckt (Prussian General Law)
o f 1794 was limited in its actual effect. Although this legislation made the
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Votksschuk a state institution and declared the legal superiority o f the Prussian state
over the church in matters o f education, any real change in control was minimal
(Huebcner 1962,4; Thut and Adams 1964,81).
The General Civil Code o f 1794 defined the Volksschule as an institution of
the state but did not consistently cany out this principle. While the civil code
proclaimed that the schools were under the supetyision o f the state
authorities, it also recognized the church’s historical ties to the schools and
entrusted school supervision to die superintendents o f the church dioceses
and the parish clergy. The local pastors or priests inspected the schools,
watched the work and personal conduct o f the schoolmasters, and reported
any deficiency or disorder to the civil and church authorities (Lamberti 1989,
13-4).
The government of Frederick William m (1797-1840) renewed the effort to
assert state control over Prussia's schools. In 1808 the OberschuUcoUeghan was
replaced by a new office of education within the Ministry o f the Interior. This new
agency was headed by the German scholar Wilhelm von Humboldt, who served as the
Prussian minister of education until 1810. During his brief tenure as education
minister, von Humboldt is credited for developing the organizational plan for
Prussian education, the Humboldt reforms o f 1810, that have affected the structure of
the German education system ever since (Dichanz and Zahorik 1998,19).
Humboldt’s plan focused on the mission o f the Gymnasium, on raising its academic
standards and malting it the secondary-level academic institution that prepared
students for university studies. Successful completion o f the Gymnasium’s leaving
examination, the Abitur, became a requirement for university admission. The
“elitization” of the Gymnasium that came with implementation of the Humboldt
reforms not only had the effect o f restricting the numbers o f students moving on to
the university, but it also reinforced the class-bias already given to the German
education system. The opportunities in upper secondary and higher education for
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children o f lower class backgrounds remained very limited. Young men from the
families o f civil servants and Protestant clergy were disproportionately represented in
the elite secondary- and higher-level institutions of German education (Heidenheimcr
1997,13,22,26). There would not be a meaningful change and expansion o f
educational opportunities until a period o f education reform and system growth that
began around the 1890s and continued into the twentieth century.
hi 1817 the education office was moved from the Interior Ministry to
department status within the Ministry o f Religion, Education and Public Health, with
separate divisions for primary, secondary and higher education. Prussian “universities
were made directly responsible to the Ministry of Education” while “secondary and
elementary education were administered through subordinate levels in the Ministry of
the Interior, namely, the provinces” (Thut and Adams 1964,85). Provincial
government was the responsibility of crown-appointed Oberprdsident and advisory
council, who were recommended for office by the Minister of Interior. Beneath this
group a subcommittee called the SchuOcollegium was established whose concern was
education within the province. Most o f their effort was directed to standardization at
the secondary level, with teacher training and certification, and with the
administration o f uniform school-leaving or maturity examinations (R eifeprtifim gf
that were the gateway to university admission. The SchuOcollegium was also
responsible for the training o f elementary school teachers, for which it received some
financial support from the central government (Thut and Adams 1964,85).

^oday, the school-leaving examination for secondary level academic schools
is known as the Abitur.
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While provincial and regional bodies were officially responsible for
elementary education, the real support and administration o f the primary schools took
place locally, in school districts {Gemeinden) representing a parish or village, and in

Kreise, administrative bodies that included a number o f Gemeinden within a given
area. The primary function o f Kreise was to inspect the elementary schools within
their jurisdiction. It was typical that the superintendent who presided over the Kreis
and its school inspectors (Kreisschulmspectoreri) were members o f the clergy. The
Prussian central government required all landowners and householders within a

Gememde to be part o f a school association (Schulvereiri) responsible to raise the
taxes necessary to fund the local elementary schools, and that a special committee be
assigned to oversee school operations.
Such a committee was called a Schulvorstand in rural areas, and a
Schulkommission or Schuldeputation in urban districts that maintained several
schools. In such school committees, the local clergy enjoyed privileged status.
Indeed, only the clergy were permitted to supervise the instructional
programs, including the deportment of the teachers. Lay members were
permitted to look after the buildings, equipment, and other “extemaT matters
(Thut and Adams 1964,87).
Although the Prussian government began to implement its own education
policy through a working arrangement with organized religion—one that recognized
its central role in German education and utilized its organization, facilities and
personnel—its final objective was dearly that the government should be in control of
the school system. It was a most pragmatic approach; it was how the government had
to begin if it wanted to enter the arena and become a real player in German
education. It was the clay and foundation with which the government had to work. It
also made much sense politically. For the state to enter the education arena by
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working with the existing education system would not arouse as much resistance
locally and by the Lutheran and Catholic churches.
At the beginning, the government limited its activities to increasing the
number rad quality o f the schools; but after gaining acceptance as the final
authority in educational matters* it gradurdty redirected the schools to serve
national rather than religious ends. The single, most effective device used to
achieve this transformation was the assumption o f complete authority over
the training, appointment, payment, and promotion o f the teachers. Secondary
school teachers, at least those appointed to the Gymnasien, were trained in
state-controlled universities; elementary teachers in the state-operated teacher
seminaries. As the government became more reactionary and autocratic,
particularly under Bismarck, the curricula and operation o f the teachers’
seminaries were so minutely controlled that the elementary school teachers
became not merely instruments for the regimentation o f children, but also
effective propaganda agents among their parents. As state institutions the
Gymnasien and universities came under equally stringent controls.
Municipalities lost their freedom to operate secondary schools, and many
such schools were no longer permitted to be known as Gymnasien (Thut and
Adams 1964,87-8).
The Prussian government sought to control curriculum content at the primary
level, in the Volksschulen, largely by overseeing the selection, training, and
supervision o f elementary school teachers. All schools—public and private, publiclyfunded or not—were subject to inspection by state officials (Kreisschulinspectoreri)
to determine their compliance with curriculum objectives (Hage, Hanneman, and
Gargan 1989, 164-5; Thut and Adams 1964,89). The realisation o f state objectives
was limited, however, because it was very often members o f the clergy that the state
entrusted to administer and inspect state-supported schools. Not until the Weimar
period was the government finally able to abolish superintendence o f local schools by
the clergy.5

5As late as 1918, two-thirds o f Prussia’s state school inspectors were
members o f the clergy (Wilson 1977,39).
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At the secondary level the Prussian government gsve its attention first to the

Gymnasium, the upper-class school o f choice. An institution whose high tuition made
it affordable only to the wealthy and privileged in Prussian society, a Gymnasium
education was the gateway to higher education, the dvfl service, military
commissions, to better jobs and greater socioeconomic opportunities in general. The
Ministry o f Education focused its efforts both on strengthening the Gymnasium and
bringing it under state control Among its objectives the Ministry targeted curriculum
standardization, teacher certification procedures, Gymnasium accreditation by the
state, and uniform school-leaving examinations with certificates (the Abitur) that
entitled university admission.6 Only a select number o f secondary institutions met the
standards set by the state-set accreditation criteria to be certified as Gymnasien.
These were mainly the exclusive Latin grammar schools, the high tuition institutions
of Germany’s elite that included the study o f classical languages and the humanities.
By raising the standards o f academic secondary schools, the Prussians
channeled the less able students into other institutions. Subsequently, the flow
o f students from the Gymnasium to the university was narrowed, with the
consequence that the proportion o f University students to their age group was
reduced to the point that the ratio prevalent in the 1820s was not reached
again until several generations later, in the 1890s (Heidenheimer 1997,13).
Greater in number were the municipal and church schools not receiving

Gymnasien accreditation. Many of these secondary schools came to be known as
Realschulen (Thut and Adams 1964,93). An increase in/teaZsc/w/en-type
institutions accompanied industrial and commercial development, and an emerging
and affluent middle class. Realschulen were a response to the demand for a

6These are known as the Humboldt reforms o f 1810, named after Baron Karl
Wilhelm von Humboldt, the Prussian minister o f education from 1808-1810.
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secondary curriculum that prepared young people for careers in business and
industry, not the university. A third form o f emerging secondary school type may also
be differentiated, an upper-level Volksschule, known today as the Hauptsckule.
Offering vocationally-oriented studies that were less demanding than the Realschule,
this third kind o f school was intended for students from the lower classes who would
enter the workforce upon completion of their secondary education. This clsss-bised
tripartite structure o f differentiated secondary level education would continue to
evolve over the nineteenth century, coming to characterize the education system of
both Imperial Germany and the Weimar Republic. With some variation from Land to

Land, the same differentiated system of secondary-level curriculum offerings and
school forms continue to exist today.
Education in Imperial Germany. 1870-1918
Germany's unification in 1871 did not see great changes in the field of
education. Dominated by the leadership and politics o f Prussia, Imperial Germany
tended to reflect Prussian interests and perpetuate its sociopolitical order. As it
affected education this was not a particular problem. Prussia accounted fix’almost
two-thirds o f Germany’s entire population and a similar proportion of school-age
Germans. Therefore, the education for two-thirds o f Germany's population was
already supervised by Prussia’s Education Ministry. Moreover, Prussia's education
system had provided a model much copied by the other German states. It followed
that the institutions and organization of education were much like Prussia's
throughout the Reich (Heidenheimer 1997,27; Thut and Adams 1964,76,99).
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The Reich Constitution o f 1871 did not make education policy a responsibility
o f the national government; it was to be a Land function. Therefore, no great central
bureaucracy was established to make and administer a uniform education policy
throughout the new German state. A body called the Reich School Commission was
created, but its function was to determine the level o f educational achievement
required to shorten a male’s period of military obligation to the state. In fact, little
changed and the prerogative for education policy remained with provincial, district,
and local authorities. In most areas of Germany, the role of organized religion and the
clergy remained paramount despite increasing state-level administration. The
institutional structures, administration, and the curricula of German schools reflected
continuing influence of organized religion. Church schools remained the most
common institutional form at the primary level, and religious training was a
curriculum standard throughout the land. The Prussian Education Law of 1906 even
recognized the confessional school as the institutional norm. At that time, only 900 o f
Prussia’s 37,761 elementary schools were not denominational. There was not much
space for secular schools (Weltliche Schulen) or curricula (Wilson 1977,37-9).
Socioeconomic and political privilege continued to be protected by an
education system that mirrored and perpetuated the class divisions o f society (Wehler
1993,120-1). Indeed, class differences were institutionalized at the secondary level
by restricting Gymnasium access—the gateway to higher education and social
mobility—to the wealthy and privileged. Although primary education was made
tuition-free in 1883 within Germany, and local governments (with limited central
government support) even covered most o f the student fees and expenses for private
and religious schools, secondary and higher education opportunities remained for
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more limited, with high student fees charged well into the twentieth century (Hage,
Hanneman, and Gargan 1989,159-60). It was an education system that taught
students to revere God, love the Fatherland, and appreciate the existing
socioeconomic and political order as the best for both the individual and the
community. The government was not wholly successful in establishing its authority
and control over educational affairs, however, far from i t For many years prior to
unification political opposition had been rising, particularly on the left, that would
greatly influence the politics and social policy o f Imperial Germany under Chancellor
Bismarck. There was also not a standard implementation for educational
organization, administration, facilities and curricuhims—under state control—within
Prussia, let alone the Reich. Education was, and remained—particularly at the
primary and secondary levels—very much a local affair subject to religious influences.
The degree o f autonomy left to the provinces, districts and localities meant
that there were far more education systems than there were states.
Differences existed not only between Prussia and Bavaria, but also between
urban and rural areas, wealthy districts and poor, not to mention the
complications and variations arising from this distribution o f religious groups
within an administrative division. There was no typical German elementary
schooL The VoOcsschuIe might be an interdenominational, eight-class school
with approaching one thousand pupils, or it might be a single schoolroom
where the local minister or priest taught chfldren o f all ages together,
provided that they were all Protestant or all Catholic. As for secondary
institutions, one estimate is that thirty-seven varieties were to be found,
ranging from the Gymnasium through the Realschule to the continuation and
middle schools.
The local variations, important though they were, should not
overshadow the fact that education in Wilhelmine Germany did reflect the
political and social structure o f the Reich, Le., it was above all elitist.
Education was not organized as a single, integrated system in which the pupil
proceeded naturally from the elementary to the secondary level. Instead,
elementary and secondary schools provided different types o f education
designed, one is tempted to say, for different “types” o f people.. . . the cost
o f secondary education effectively banished the lower classes to the
Volksschule. Only an essentially predetermined, privileged stratum could
expect to benefit from secondary education (Wilson 1977,38).
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The significance of organized religion in educational affairs, and German
politics more generally, was not lost on Bismarck. The Kulturkamptf(ailtunl
struggle) that began soon after German unification saw Bismarck and his liberal
allies target political Catholicism as a threat to the unity o f the new Reich. AntiCatholicism was a most convenient fofl for Bismarck’s political machinations, to rally
the Protestant majority to his cause. So was Social Democracy, but Catholicism and
Papal authority were particularly attacked as a rival to the secular authority o f the
new state. The Catholic Center party was declared an “enemy” of the Empire
(Wehler 1993,90-4). In addition, “the state once again made it clear that the schools
belong to it, and that the churches, specifically their local clergy, were merely
commissioned by the state to superintend the schools” (Nevermann and Richter 1983,
85).
The Kulturkampf, Otto von Bismarck’s attack on political Catholicism as a
threat to national unity, was sparked by a proposal to abolish all church
supervision of schools, both Catholic and Protestant; however, the
Kulturkampfreflected as well a general liberal unease about the role o f
Catholicism within the newly united Reich. In this new era o f nationalism,
secularism, and opposition to restraints on individual freedom, the Catholic
church seemed to many liberals a natural enemy, an expression o f reaction
and an agent of hostility to progressive change.. . .
For its part, the Catholic population o f Germany, especially in the
west and south, remained largely unreconciled to Protestant domination of
politics, the economy, and society.. . .
Although some nationalistic liberals hailed the Kulturkampfas a
continuation o f the ancient struggle between papacy and empire, by the mid1870s many other Germans worried that the anti-Catholic campaign had
become counterproductive. Certainty, the strength o f the Catholic church had
not been broken in Germany (it was, in fact, getting stronger), and the
emperor, crown prince, and Conservative party had all lined up against
Bismarck on this issue. Never one characterized by self-delusion, Bismarck
thus resolved to cut his losses. With the death o f the stubborn Pope Pius IX in
early 1878 and the election o f the conciliatory Leo X m as his successor,
Bismarck succeeded in disengaging himself and abandoning tin e Kulturkampf.
Unfortunately, this controversial political campaign had resulted only in a
deepening of confessional divisions in Germany” (Fritz 1985,415).
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The Kulturkampfaside, it may be argued that Bismarck had no choice but to
challenge church authority—Protestant as weU as Catholic—if he wanted to establish
the supremacy o f the secular Reich government over German affairs. In the long run
it presented something o f a paradox, however. On the one hand, religion’s continuing
influence in government and education represented a challenge to the secular
authority o f the state. This was especially a problem for those politicians who saw the
education system as an important instrument o f state power, o f societal management
On the other hand, organized religion was a conservative force in German politics. It
was unlikely to challenge—and probably support—state policies intended to maintain
the existing socioeconomic and political order. Acknowledgement by the Reich
political leadership that religion would continue to play a very significant role in
German educational affairs is shown in a May 1, 1889 decree by the Kaiser. At the
same time, it reflects his determination that the education system should serve state
interests. He emphasized the importance of the education system and religious
training in molding a loyal citizenry, particularly one that was resistant to the ideas o f
a rising political left (Hage, Hanneman, and Gargan 1989,164; Wilson 1977,39).
Although not new to its “enemies list,” Social Democracy was the next target o f the
Reich’s Kulturkampf(Wehler 1993,102).
[The Kaiser*s decree] was designed to remind the schools o f their important
role in combatting the spread of socialist and communist ideas. They were to
aim to create in their pupils reverence for God and love o f the Fatherland and
to convince them that “the teachings o f Social Democracy not only contradict
Divine commands and Christian morals, but are, moreover, impractical and in
their consequences destructive alike to the individual and community”
(Wilson 1977,40).
The Social Democratic Party (SPD) was chief among the political groups and
interests critical of the Reich government and its policies, particularly its social
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welfare programs and the class-based education system over which the church had so
much influence. These were consistent themes of the SPD from its formation in 1875
and throughout the Weimar period. As it developed, the SPD’s education program
had three primary objectives. First was a unified school system (Einheitsschule) that
was class-blind, cost-free, and standardized throughout Germany. School attendance
was to be compulsory at the primary level Second was the secularization o f the
unified school system (W eltlichkeil)—the end of denominational (confessional)
schools and religious instruction. Third was the development o f the

Arbeitsschule—postprimary level curricula that included practical manual and
technical skills and work experience—schools that elevated work-related training and
education to the same status as the traditional academic. Moreover, secondary and
higher education would be cost-free, with advancement to be determined by ability
(Wilson 1977,40-5).
As an opposition party in the Reichstag prior to the World War I, none of
these SPD education goals were realized. However, and probably in some measure
due to increasing SPD influence, the Imperial period was an important one in the
evolution o f German education policy and the expansion o f educational
opportunities. There were other very important factors, too. Among those was
Germany’s industrialization, which had started to accelerate in the 1860s. In addition
to generating its own demand for a more educated workforce, industrialization had
aroused working class consciousness, and therewith a growing source o f demand for
educational opportunities as well as impetus for the Social Democratic movement.
Another source of demand was the German Imperial state and its bureaucratization.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

221
The desirability of government employment heightened the demand for higher
education credentials (Heidenheimer 1993, 197).
Educational expenditures and opportunities began a phase o f unprecedented
expansion in the last two decades o f the nineteenth century, which continued until the
First World War. There was a great increase in male enrollments at the secondary
level, and particularly o f middle class youth. New opportunities for technical training
also became available. During this period and into the Weimar years what is known
today as the “dual system,” part-time vocational schooling combined with workplace
training, became firmly established as a core component the German education
system. Women also benefitted, as new academic opportunities at the secondary level
opened for them in Prussia and other German states, even including a few

Gymnasien. More liberal states even admitted women to universities (Hage,
Haimeman, and Gargan 1989,178; Thut and Adams 1964,100-1). A less auspicious
product o f the German education system’s expansion, though, was the
institutionalization of a class-biased tripartite system o f differentiated schools. At a
series o f German educational conferences held in the late nineteenth century, “the socalled school reforms o f 1892 and 1900 were derived [that] defined three parallel
types o f secondary schools” (Thut and Adams 1964,100). Though they have been
subject to various reforms over the years that have tended to reduce their class bias,
those school types remain to this day as the Gymnasien, Realschulen, and

Hauptschulen (Dichanz and Zahorik 1998,71).
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Education in Weimar Germany 1919-1933
With the end o f World War One and the collapse o f the Imperial German
government in November 1918, the SPD was finally given an opportunity to leave its
opposition benches and participate in government—to make and implement policy
according to its program objectives. Indeed, the declaration o f a new German
Republic and the National Assembly elections scheduled for January 1919 seemed to
prepare the way for a turning point in German social and education policy. But, after
winning only 18S o f 421 parliamentary seats, the SPD was forced to form a coalition
government with the German Democratic Party (DDP) and the Catholic Center
Party;7 and neither party was interested in major reform. In fact, for the Center party
a coalition government with the SPD actually represented an opportunity to defend
Catholic interests and prevent the SPD from undertaking its reform agenda.
Regarded a bulwark against a renewed Kulturkampfby many Catholics, the Center
party had also made very clear its opposition to the program o f the Social Democrats
during the campaign for the National Assembly. The Center party championed
religious instruction as a curriculum standard and ardently opposed the establishment
o f non-denominational common schools that would threaten the predominance of
confessional schools in the German education system. Thus, in the final analysis, it
was the politics of necessity and compromise required by coalition government that
brought the SPD to forego any immediate hopes of implementing its reform agenda,
and leave to trust that the democratic process would someday bring the desired

7The DDP left the government in June 1919 over a dispute about the terms of
the Versailles Treaty.
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policy changes (Fritz 1985; 416; Wilson 1977,46-7). There was some justification
for such patience, however, as the attitude o f many toward education reform was
undergoing change.
. . . the war and revolution had brought some benefits for the SPD’s position.
Most parties, at the foundation o f the democratic republic, were prepared to
accept the idea o f the “Soziale Einheitsschule, ” i.e., the ending o f
educational divisions based on class and wealth. Moreover, it became clear in
the very early stages o f the debates on the Constitution that an extension of
the Reich’s authority into the field o f education was no longer a desire unique
to the le f t. . .
The question was no longer whether the central government should
intervene in education, but to what end it should do so, and this was an issue
on which the government parties—the SPD, DDP and Center—could never
reach agreement in principle. The SPD still stood for secular, public schools;
the Center would never sacrifice confessional schools in which R.I. [religious
instruction] was an integral part of the curriculum; and between the two the
DDP hovered uneasily, often appearing divided with hsel£ but generally
favoring an interdenominational school in which some form o f ILL would be
taught The result o f this situation was a prolonged and complex battle.. . . It
ended in the dubious achievement o f the Weimar School Compromise, the
core of which was translated into Article 146 o f the Constitution (Wilson
1977,47-8).
The Weimar Constitution foresaw a greater role for the central government in
education policy, a sharing o f responsibility with the states and local authorities. It
also established the legal basis for a unified German school system. Article 146
specified that “the public education system is to form an integral whole. Intermediate
and higher education are to be based on a first school common to all.” Article 147
went further to speak o f a unified public education system in which private and
religious elementary schools would be the exception, not the rule. Secular schools
were to be recognized on a par with denominational and interdenominational schools,
with official preference given to common over confessional schools.
Implementation o f the Constitution’s education provisions met only limited
success, however, as did the SPD’s program for education reforms. Real
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administration and control o f German education remained with the individual states,
and denominational schools continued to play a predominant role. Moreover, Social
Democratic participation in government had little or no important impact on
education expenditures by the central government hi fact, instead o f increasing the
funds available to support expansion of the education system and to match the
growing enrollments o f the period, the SPD-led coalition was more concerned with
the issue o f equality (Hage, Hanneman, and Gargan 1989,178-9).
Nonetheless, the Weimar period did see the beginnings o f reform and
institutional restructuring o f the German education system. Although it fell short of
establishing the secular Einheitsschule, the Grundschule Law o f April 28, 1920
provided for a common four-year elementary school that would bring together the
children o f all classes. Implementation of the law would have the effect o f abolishing
private primary-level institutions and make the VoDcsschule o f the lower classes part
o f a unified school system. Debate was also undertaken on legislation that would
define the basis of the relationship between school and church—on the propriety of
religious instruction and the specific status of denominational, interdenominational
and secular institutions within the German school system. In January 1922 an SPDdrafted compromise bill was introduced in the Reichstag that would have made
interdenominational schools the norm. This measure went nowhere. Many rank-andfile SPD deputies objected to what they saw as a sell-out and effective victory of the
church school over the secular. Members o f the Center Party—along with other
conservative religious interests—opposed the bill, resorting to their fundamental
position that the confessional school should remain the predominant form. Unable to
find any compromise acceptable to the competing parties, the SPD proposal was
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abandoned in early 1924 and, with it, the period o f SPD-Ied reform effectively ended
(Wilson 1977,48-50). The political forces favoring an education system dominated
by confessional schools were not yet through, though.
hi January 1927 a new conservative Center-led coalition government was
formed that included the Catholic Bavarian People’s Party (BVP), the conservative
Nationalist Party (DNVP) and the moderately liberal German People's Party (DVP).
That July, with the Reichstag adjourned, draft legislation was made public that would
recognize the common Gnmdschule and denominational schools as equals, and
remove the preferential status given to common schools by the Constitution. Secretly
prepared, this school measure was mostly a Center party product As proposed, the
law would have favored confessional schools by permitting their expansion into areas
previously restricted to common schools, while raising legal obstacles to the
establishment o f other types o f schools. Passage o f this legislation was blocked in late
1927 and early 1928 by effective liberal opposition, from within and without the
government coalition, and for the unwillingness o f the competing parties to
compromise their positions on the status o f common and confessional schools within
the German education system (Fritz 1985,421-8).
Wilson (1977) concludes that the failure o f education reform is probably
reflective of the greater failure o f democratic government in the Weimar Germany.
While the SPD demonstrated a willingness to cooperate and compromise its
education objectives in the interest o f democracy and a greater collective good, the
other parties willing to join with the Social Democrats were too few. In particular,
the Center Party seems to have cooperated with the SPD only out of its
determination to protect denominational schools and religious instruction from
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secularization, and the Weimar Constitution allowed them to avoid a compromise o f
their basic position. "Since Article 174 guaranteed the perpetuation o f the status

quo—denominationally divided schools throughout the greater part o f the Reich—if
a Reich School Law was not passed, the Center Party was able to indulge in an allor-nothing policy” (Wilson 1977, SI).
Weimar Germany was all but finished by 1928; the writing was on the watt.
The great national experiment with democracy and parliamentary politics was nearly
over. With the demise o f Weimar, any further attempts at school reform were also at
an end. The economic hardships and socio-political turmoil brought on by the Great
Depression and the rise of National Socialism made this end certain, and the
movement for education reform would remain derailed until after the Second World
War.
Education in the Third Reich. 1933-1945
Although much control was left in the hands o f local authorities, the Nazis
centralized control over the German school system in 1938, making education a
function and instrument o f the national government A National Ministry of
Education and Youth Welfare was established to determine curriculums, texts, and
administrative procedures. German teachers were made state officials and were given
little choice but to become members o f National Socialist organizations (Huebener
1962, 18). Organizationally, theMittelschuIe (secondary school) with its commercial
and vocational training focus was kept part o f the school system. But the Gymnasium
did not fore as well. Almost three-quarters o f the students leaving Gnmdschulen
went on to attend a Deutsche Oberschule (German secondary school), schools where
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science and German literature, history and art were emphasized instead o f the classic
education offered by the traditional Gymnasium. The Nazis also established the A dolf

Hitler Schule and the Nationalpolitische Erziehungsanstalt (National Socialist
Training Institute) to prepare German youth fix' positions of leadership in the Third
Reich (Huebener 1962,16-20).
The centralized school system of the Third Reich collapsed with Germany’s
defeat in World War IL The nation’s schools were shut down by the occupation
forces of the Allies. The timing and conditions for the reopening o f Germany’s
schools was in their hands.
Reconstruction o f the German Education System After World W ar Two
The Soviet Union quickly replaced a vanquished and devastated Germany as
the focus of Western concerns and security interests in the closing days o f the Second
World War. With the outlines o f the new Cold War conflict already taking shape, the
victorious Western powers determined it was in their interest to rebuild and
rehabilitate their occupation zones as quickly as possible, to make that part o f
postwar Germany a respected and contributing member of the West European
community. A revitalized West German state—one with a functioning and deNazified government, a strong economy and a new military establishment—would be
a critical member o f the new Western political and military alliance that was pitted
against a Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe. This was the first order o f business for
the Allies in Germany’s postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation. The education
system was also to be addressed, but the objectives were less ambitious.
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With the Western powers more absorbed by the task o f German
reconstruction as it most affected the emerging East-West conflict—politically,
economically, and militarily—education reform was not high on the agenda.
Although there were limited attempts by the Allies in the early postwar years to
encourage the restructuring of German primary and secondary education on the
model o f America's integrated primary-secondary system with its comprehensive
school structure,8 that campaign was largely ineffective and mostly abandoned by the
early 1950s. In large measure this is because the Western allies had decided upon an
expedient course for West Germany’s reconstruction. They chose not to undertake a
complete remaking o f German society but instead to de-Nazify and rebuild, as it was
practical, upon previous foundations. With the Cold War already looming on the
horizon, it was realpolitik. While it was certainly desirable to instruct young Germans
in democratic values as part of the reconstruction process, creating a new education
system to do so was not; nor was it considered necessary. The German education
system prior to the period of Nazi rule had not been that much different than others in
Europe, so its restoration with de-Nazification and curriculum changes might be
acceptable. This is exactly what happened when the responsibility for education was
returned to the Lander by the Gnmdgesetz (Basic Law), the constitution that
established the German Federal Republic (FRG) in 1949. With few exceptions, the
tripartite system o f differentiated schools o f the Weimar period was reestablished

*In 1947, Directive No. 54 o f the Allied Control Council offered guidelines
for the Ltinder to follow in rebuilding their school systems. Among these
recommendations were an end to discrimination based on social class or financial
resources, the elimination of tuition fees, the introduction o f democratic principles as
a core curriculum element, and the establishment o f comprehensive, unified school
systems (Thut and Adams 1964,105-6).
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(Huebener 1962,23; Merritt 1995,270-90). As s consequence, education reform was
effectively put on the back burner until a later time.
The Gnmdgesetz made official the return to the education policies and system
o f the Weimar period and before. Control o f education was once again made the
responsibility o f theZdndfer. Thus, there would be no coordination o f education
policy in the West German state unless it was by the combined action and
cooperation o f the eleven LOnder.9 Already in 1948, though, a positive step in this
direction was taken with the establishment o f the Permanent Conference o f Ministers
o f Culture (Stdndige Konferem der Kultusminister). Today known by the acronym
KMK {Kultusminister Konferenz), this voluntary working association was organized
to help ensure a basic level of uniformity among the school systems o f the eleven

Lander and to represent their collective education interests with a single voice before
the federal government Despite operating on the principle of unanimity, and though
its resolutions are non-binding on the Lander, the Conference has proven fairly
effective in accomplishing that mission. It has adopted resolutions including such

A

The constitutional engineering o f the German federal state made a national
education policy or education reforms undertaken at a national level virtually
impossible. First, education was made a Land function. Second, the Basic Law
stipulates that approval by the upper house o f the German federal parliament, the
Bundesrat, is required for all legislation that would directly effect the Lander. This
applies to almost all education policy, over which the Lander already have nearly
autonomous constitutional authority.
The Bundesrat represents and is directly responsible to the Land
governments, its members appointed—not elected—by the separate Lander
governments. Bundesrat appointees are typically high-level Land politicians, very
often Land ministers, and all are normally from the same party. Each Land delegation
must vote as a block, not as individuals, according to the instructions o f their Land
government. This gives the Lander, through the Bundesrat, considerable influence in
the national policymaking process and, effectively, an absolute veto over any federal
legislation affecting the LOnder.
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hems as the length of compulsory school attendance, the basic structure o f the
education system, core curriculum requirements, the school transfer process, and
standards for promotions and upper secondary school leaving-examinations like the

Abitur that entitle university admission (Nevermann and Richter 1983,91). It has
been less successful, however, in finding common ground among the LOnder for
education reforms.
A most important LOnder accord, one that reflected resistance to education
reform and the expansion o f educational opportunities in the first decade after the
Second World War, was the 19SS DQsseldorf Agreement This pact affirmed the
continuing commitment of the LOnder to the traditional differentiated structure of
primary and secondary schools, one wherein the Gymnasium would be the
educational institution recognized at the secondary level that qualified students for
university admission. While it did not put a halt to or prohibit LOnder from
undertaking any school reforms or experimentation, the DQsseldorf Agreement had
the effect o f limiting the scope o f such activities to those which conformed to the
differentiated structure of institutions it described as the standard (Baumert 1983a,
196; Baumert and Raschert 1983, 107-8). This restriction would remain untfl it was
reversed by the Lander’s Hamburg Agreement o f 1964, at the onset o f a period o f
education reform.
Although it took until the mid-sixties before sufficient momentum would
gather to drive wide-scale education reform, the nearly two decades following the
Second World War were not without some very important accomplishments in
German education. The restoration o f the pre-Nazi tripartite education system, which
had been part o f the overall postwar reconstruction effort, had been completed. The
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shortage o f qualified faculty and staff that the war had produced was no longer a
problem. There were many new schools to replace those destroyed by the war, with
greater capacity at the secondary level than ever before—albeit through those kinds
o f institutions that conformed to the structure o f differentiated schools stipulated by
the DOsseldorf Agreement. Education was fully back in business throughout West
Germany. It was an education system with a solid foundation, one that could both
support further expansion and withstand experimentation with its basic structure
(Baumert and Raschert 1983,107-8). That time finally came in the mid-1960s, when
a policymaking window opened for education.

Education Reform in the Federal Republic
With the major tasks of Germany’s reconstruction at a finish and the tripartite
system of schools restored, the way was readied for new education reforms and
expansion. Education issues were given a much higher priority on the public agenda,
and received the benefit of the growing government revenues that came with
Germany’s new prosperity. Support was widespread, from the left to the right on the
political spectrum—from liberal SPD reformers who considered the broadening of
educational opportunities a basic issue o f citizen equality and dvfl rights, a growing
middle class that wanted greater options in secondary and higher education, to
conservative Christian Democrats who regarded educational investment and
excellence critical to Germany’s continued economic growth and development
(Katzenstein 1987,304).
Arguments for overall expansion o f education, but especially o f higher
education, at first stressed the significance of maintaining and improving the
Federal Republic’s scientific and technological potential vis-a-vis Western and
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socialist industrial competitors (late fifties/early sixties). These arguments
were soon generalized and supplemented by
on the school’s role in
the socially expanded definition o f citizenship. The improvement o f equality
o f opportunity for groups hitherto deprived o f their M citizenship in this
extended sense (children o f workers, Catholics, segments o f the rural
population, girls), was sought through the introduction o f pre-school
programs, though extending compulsory education and lobbying few the
comprehensive school, and, lastly, through the opening up o f the formerly
cxdvxveRealschuIe, Gymnasium, and university (Neumann and Pfeffer
1983,76).
The 1964 Hamburg Agreement signalled the start o f an intense period of
education reform and expansion that would last less than ten years. This LOnder pact
effectively reversed the DQsseldorf Agreement’s prohibition against school
experimentation that was contrary to the traditional tripartite structure o f primary and
secondary education. With the door opened, new education programs and reforms
were launched that saw increased Realschulen and Gymnasien enrollments,
experimentation with the comprehensive school model, and greater opportunities at
the university level.
In order to promote and coordinate a national discussion and make
recommendations for the reform and future expansion of the German education
system, the LOnder and federal governments created the German Education Council

(Deutscher Bildungsraf) in 1965. Comprised o f important state and national figures,
education administrators and academics, the Council was to address the future
development and reform of the differentiated primary and secondary system. The
findings and proposals of the Education Council were published in its 1970
“Structural Plan for the Educational System” (Strukturplanfu r das Bildurtgswesen,

Strukturplan), a long-term plan calling for the fundamental restructuring o f the
education system from preschool through the secondary level. “According to the
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plan, the vertically divided secondary education system with its three types of school,
and the separation o f the upper level o f the Gymnasium with its general education
from the vocational schools, were to be replaced by unitary secondary levels I and IT
(Baumert and Raschert 1983,112-3). What the Strukturplan proposed went far
beyond reform o f the existing system; it was revolutionary. The old education
structure would essentially be tom down, the institutions o f the traditional classbiased tripartite system eliminated, and a new German education system rebuilt upon
the foundation o f a classless comprehensive school. To realize such an objective
would have been difficult enough without opposition, but it was also met by the stem
resistance o f conservative CDU politicians and others opposed to such dramatic
change.
The key to the success o f the restructuring plan was the implementation of
new comprehensive schools, or Gesamtschulen. But the Strukturplan made no long
term commitment to these comprehensive schools—for or against—beyond
experimentation. In 1969 the German Education Council had recommended there be
no less than 40 experiments with comprehensive schools throughout Germany, and
during that same year the Permanent Conference of LOnder Ministers o f Culture had
agreed to an experimental program that would involve two types o f comprehensive
school, integrated and cooperative. The integrated form o f comprehensive school

(integrierte Gesamtschule) would eliminate the tripartite structure o f differentiated
secondary schools with its implementation. All students would attend a single school
that merged the separate curricula of the Gymnasium, Realschule, and Hauptschule
into a single curriculum combining both required and elective courses. The
cooperative Gesamtschule would preserve the traditional tripartite curricular
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structure, but within a single building, and make easier the process o f student transfer
from one school type to another (Baumert 1983b, 218).
The agreement by the LOnder to experiment with integrated and cooperative
forms o f the comprehensive schools was a political compromise. For real education
reform, meaningful expansion o f the opportunities in secondary and higher education,
the widespread introduction and acceptance of the integrierte Gesamtschule was key.
Its implementation would widen the gateway and opportunities in secondary level
academic studies, and then in higher education. The greatest support for the
integrated comprehensive school came from the SPD and liberal education reformers.
The cooperative comprehensive school was offered as an alternative, the fallback
position of those who opposed restructuring the traditional three-track structure of
German secondary education with implementation o f the integrierte Gesamtschule. It
was advocated by the CDU and conservative education reformers, those who wanted
only very little or no real education reform.
Education reform was a major subject of partisan debate at the national level
during the 1960s. It was a pivotal issue in the campaign o f the Social Democrats to
win control of the Bundestag “They adopted educational reform issues as one of the
keys to mobilizing additional groups o f supporters and advocated a constitutional
change to enhance the Federation’s say on education policy” (Heidenheimer 1997,
75). At the center o f the debate over education reform was the introduction o f the

Gesamtschule to replace the existing tripartite system o f secondary schools. When
the 1969 national elections brought the Social Democrats to power in coalition with
the Free Democratic Party (FDP), replacing the Grand Coalition o f the CDU and
SPD, it gave the forces o f reform added momentum. It was the first time in West
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German history that the CDU found itself on the benches o f the opposition.
Heidenheimer (1993) has written that this “change in party control of the national
government was significantly related to change in education policy. When the Social
Democrats came to power under Willy Brandt in 1969, education reform was near
the top of their agenda” (202). High on the list for reform was the differentiated
school system, to overcome its dass-bias and the restrictions it placed on lower- and
middle class opportunities in secondary and then higher education. Central to the
SPD’s reform plan was the introduction o f the integrated comprehensive school.
In 1970 the Ldnder and federal governments established the Federal-States
Commission for Educational Planning and Advancement ofResearch (Bund-Ldnder

{Commissionfiar Bildungsplanung undForschungsfbrderung, BLK). The mission o f
the BLK was intended to be like that of the Permanent Conference o iLdnder
Ministers of Culture, to coordinate education policy among the Ldnder, but to also
include the federal government as a participant in that process. As well as short- to
long-term planning, the BLK was given responsibility to investigate the funding
requirements o f education programs. It was also expected to rationalize education
policymaking within the federal structure, to enhance communication and foster
consensus between Linder and with the federal government. In 1973 the BLK
produced the Bildungsgesamtplan (General Education Plan), a comprehensive plan
for German education that covered both its structural development and financial
requirements. As well as encouraging the establishment o f Gesamtschulen, the BLK
recommended that Ldnder institute a two-year “observation phase”

(Orientienmgsstufe) during the fifth and sixth grades, delaying the decision as to
which type of differentiated school a student would attend at the secondary level.
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During this period, parents would participate with teachers in evaluating student
progress and determining the type of secondary school they would attend. Showing
its general support o f the Bildungsgesamtplan^ in 1974 the Permanent Conference o f
Linder Ministers o f Culture called for the nationwide implementation o f the
observation phase.10
Despite its endorsement by the Permanent Conference, there was actually
stem resistance to the final design o f the Bildungsgesamtplan, and especially to the
introduction o f integrated comprehensive schools at the secondary level. It was most
vigorously opposed by Christian Democrats—at the national level and mLdnder
controlled by the CDU—by Gymnasium teachers and administrators, and by many
average Germans who simply preferred the traditional system o f differentiated
schools. Whether and where education reforms would be undertaken or not, what
turned out to be o f greatest consequence was the federal arrangement for education

^ h e German Education Council had earlier made a similar recommendation.
Also known as the “orientation level” or “orientation stage," all but two Lander
implemented this program in one or the other o f two forms. A school-type-specific
variant tended to be implemented in CDU-controDed Ldnder. In this model the
orientation stage was linked to the different kinds o f secondary schools—Gymnasien,
Realschulen and Hauptschulen—and students could be reassigned during the
observation period. The nonspecific form tended to be found in Ldnder governed by
the SPD. In this version, the observation stage took place in autonomous schools that
were comprehensive and not o f a particular type. They were nonspecific and,
therefore, reassignment to another school type within these “independent school
centers" was not possible during the observation stage. “. . . opponents from the
CDU and the teachers associations suspected that the [SPD] plans fin* establishing
independent school centers were biased to channel more students into
Gesamtschulen, rather than those o f the established tripartite model” (Heidenhrimer
1997,99). In feet, the Gesamtschulen have been more successful and enrollments
greater in Ldnder where the SPD has been dominant More generally, social class has
continued to be a very significant factor in the assignment o f students to vocational or
academic tracks. Children channeled into the vocational track tend to be from
working-class backgrounds, and those from the middle- and upper classes to the
academic track (Baumert and Raschert 1983,120-1; Heidenheimer 1997,98-9).
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laid out by the Grundgesetz that made the Land dominant in educational affairs.
Because o f that provision, partisan control ofLQnder governments was made far
mote important in determining education policy and whether reforms would be
instituted or obstructed than which party was in control o f die national government
As a result, Gesamtsdmk implementation met more success in Ldnder where the
SPD governed and little where the CDU was in charge.
Since the Federal Constitution o f 1949 had established state (rather than
federal) jurisdiction over educational matters, variations in the distribution o f
power between the major political parties within and across the LQnder soon
came to dominate debates about the goals o f educational reform. Whereas
Social Democrat (and liberal) state governments tended to stress education
as a civil right, with an emphasis on individual self-fulfillment, equality, and
compensatory action (and a comprehensive school system as a corollary), the
more conservative Christian Democrat state governments insisted more on
collective aims and actions for the public good such as the supply o f highly
qualified graduates. Several attempts were made to establish a new structure
for the educational system as a whole to which both sides could subscribe
(e.g., the Strukturplan o f 1970 and the Bildungsgexmtplan of 1973). In most
respects, however, these attempts failed (Lehmann 1994,2471).
In retrospect, it is dear that those who opposed implementation of the

Strukturplan and BildungsgesamtpLm—the program o f education reform—had the
advantage over those who favored change. The opposition was well positioned at the

Land levd to thwart the SPD agenda for education reform, and that proved to be the
Achilles’ bed o f this campaign to reform the German education system, its “veto
point”11 Moreover, widescale, deep and sustained political support to push forward
and cany out nationwide education reforms never realty coalesced. Although initial
support for education reform was widespread, it was relatively thin—a collection o f

“Veto points are areas o f institutional vulnerability, that is, points in the
polity process where the mobilization o f opposition can thwart polity innovation”
(Steinmo, Thden, and Longstreth 1992,7). A detailed treatment of “veto points” is
offered by Ellen Immergut (Steinmo, Thden, and Longstreth 1992,57-89).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

238
groups who, for their many different reasons and causes, wanted some kind o f reform
program or another. But there was never an organization or definitive program to
unify their ranks, to deepen and sustain their commitment, to drive education
policymaking and support the implementation of new reforms. With the education
reformists neither well-organized nor positioned politically to make things happen,
the attention of the public and government was eventually diverted to other things. In
particular, the worsening economic conditions o f the 1970s and worries about a
swelling budget deficit blunted effective implementation o f the General Education
Plan and the SPD’s agenda for education reform. The SPD government o f Helmut
Schmidt, who replaced Willy Brandt as chancellor in 1974 and remained in office
until 1982 when the CDU was returned to power, folded the tent on education
reform.
By the time Willy Brandt left office in 1974,183 comprehensive schools had
been established. But when the big push o f the 1969-1972 period foiled to win
a breakthrough, educational goals lost their priority on the party agenda, and
die SPD was unable to make a potentially strong issue pay off in Land-level
elections (Heidenheimer 1997,76).
Officially, education reform ended in 197S with the demise o f the German
Education Council. After meeting for two five-year terms between 1965 and 1975,
the Council’s commission was not renewed by the LQnder and federal governments
beyond 1975. The experimental phase with the integrated comprehensive school was
over by the beginning of the 1980s, but it was not a victory for those opposed to
education reform. The increase that had been realized in postprimary educational
opportunities had been truly significant
The years from 1965 to 1975 were a period o f important reforms; changes
had come to the German education system that would last In Lander where the SPD
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was dominant, the integrated comprehensive school had become a fourth type o f
secondary school by the beginning o f the 1980s. The Gesamtschule was still an
institutional “midget” though, accounting for less than 25 percent o f secondary level
enrollments mLQnder that actively supported its establishment, and less than 10
percent across the Federal Republic (Baumert 1983b, 217-20). But that was not the
end to the Gesamtschule's effect as a driving force behind education reform and the
expansion of postprimary opportunities. Indeed, the campaign to implement the

Gesamtschule in LQnder governed by the SPD had a profound effect on the
education policy o f those LQnder controlled by the Christian Democrats—a
reactionary one. If not the Gesamtschule then something else would have to be done,
because even in LQnder governed by the CDU there was mounting popular pressure
to expand educational opportunities—and it required a response. But, instead o f
implementing the Gesamtschule that they opposed, LQnder governments dominated
by the CDU expanded enrollments at Gymnasien and Realschulen. As a
consequence, there was a large decrease in enrollments at Hauptschulen and
participation in the dual system (Heidenheimer 1993,205-6; Leschinsky 1983a, 17781).
The CDU-led Linder did not stop the Gesamtschule reformers by defending
the status quo, but instead they met the demand for greater educational
opportunity by opening the Gymnasium door wider, so that a larger
proportion o f students was encouraged to enter these now somewhat less
selective schools. The proportion o f fourteen-year-olds attending West
German Gymnasien increased from 14 percent in 1960 to 24 percent in 1980,
and then more slowly to 29 percent in 1991
Even where their diffusion
was most limited, the comprehensive schools exerted pressures that made the
remainder o f the tripartite system less hierarchical. Linder like Bavaria and
Baden-WQrttemberg introduced only a few Gesamtschulen, but by 1991 they
were enrolling dose to a third o f fourteen-year-olds in Gymnasien
(Heidenheimer 1997,100-2).
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German higher education also saw important changes. The introduction of

Gesamtschulen and greater Reabchtlen and Gymnasien enrollments was matched by
an increase o f opportunities and participation in tertiary education. As well as to
secondary level reforms that increased the number o f university-bound students,
much o f higher education’s expansion can be attributed to the proliferation o f
institutional alternatives to the traditional university. Especially popular was the
development o f vocational colleges like the Fachhochschulen^ intended to meet the
training and personnel requirements of science and industry (Gellert 1985,284;
GeQert 1996,311-2). Between 1960 and 1980 the number o f universities rose from
19 to 61. There were also another 27 institutions o f a university type, 26 art
academies and 155 polytechnic colleges devoted to the applied sciences and
technology (Fachhochschulen) (Naumann 1983,263). Over the period from 1960 to
1982 the number o f students in German higher education grew more than four-fold,
from 290,000 to 1.2 million. Nearly three-quarters were enrolled at traditional
universities and the rest at vocational colleges like the Fachhochschule. By the mid1990s that number had increased six-fold, to nearly 2,000,000.12 In 1992 almost half
o f all those “at the most common age for starting tertiary education” were moving on
to some kind o f full-time program, roughly three-quarters to university studies and
the remainder to alternative institutions like the Fachhochschule—just as it was a
decade earlier (OECD 1995,149-50).

,2Most o f the growth in higher education enrollments occurred within the
eleven Lfinder o f the old West German state, the five Ldnder o f the former German
Democratic Republic (GDR) accounted for less than 190,000 o f those students.
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German governments, at the both the Land and national levels, were a very
large factor in the growth o f tertiary level opportunities. In the first place, HocLQnder
and national governments have functioned both as the gatekeepers and controllers o f
supply in a higher education system that was, for all practical purposes, without a
private sector. If there was to be a meaningful expansion of educational opportunities
in higher education, it depended on government action. According to the original
provisions of the Gnmdgesetz that authority rested with the LOnder, education was a
policy area in which the Ldnder were to be dominant. This was revised in May 1969,
however, when the federal constitution was amended to give the national government
a greater role in policymaking for higher education. Initially restricted to bilateral
agreements with ike LOnder and providing financial assistance to students, for
university facilities and research, the federal government was henceforth empowered
to participate with the LQnder in planning the “framework regulations” for higher
education and financing its facilities expansion. This new working arrangement was
institutionalized with the 1969 expansion o f the Federal Ministry o f Scientific
Research to become the Ministry o f Education and Science, and the establishment in
1970 o f the Federal-States Commission for Educational Planning and Advancement
o f Research (BLK). The LOnder still retained their power of veto over educational
matters, though, both in bodies like the Joint Commission and through the Bvndesrat
in the federal parliament (Naumaim 1983,275-6; Nevermann and Richter 1983,91;
Peisert and Framhein 1995, 7-8).
The window for higher education reform was rather smaller than that for the
primary and secondary levels, lasting from about 1969 until the mid-1970s. It was a
period where some important actions were taken by the government to expand the
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opportunities in higher education, but they were not the catalyst for the tremendous
growth in enrollments at the tertiary level that had started some time before and
continued long after. Still, it is probably fair to say that reforms undertaken by the
German government did have the efiect o f expanding higher education opportunities
and encouraging greater enrollments. Already low university tuition fees were
eliminated during the early 1970s. The existing student stipend program was also
revised and expanded, in particular to increase the assistance given to students from
lower class backgrounds. The 1971 Bundesausbildungsfbrdenmgsgesetz (Federal
Education and Training Assistance Act, BAfiG ) instituted a comprehensive system of
means-tested educational grants for upper secondary and university students, tripling
financial assistance between 1971 and 1977. It also offered the financial support o f
the federal government to assist the LOnder in the expansion o f their higher education
facilities. Legislation was also proposed that year calling for the establishment o f
comprehensive universities (<Gesamthochschulen) as a long-term organizational goal
o f German higher education. The Gesamthochschulen would combine the traditional
university with Fachhochschulen-typt schools, bringing together students from all
social classes in a single institution (Katzenstein 1987,305-6). This proposal would
be at the center o f the debate over higher education reform and expansion that
ensued in the federal parliament and within the Ldnder over the coming years, part of
the larger education controversy that continued up to and beyond the passage of
national legislation in 1976 regarding the future mission and organization of German
higher education.
Five years o f intense partisan debate and struggle within the federal
parliament culminated in passage o f the Hochschulrahmengesetz (Federal Framework
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Law on Higher Education, HRG) in 1976, legislation intended to coordinate and set
forth a common higher education policy binding on all Ldnder and throughout the
FRG. The product o f many compromises, the process of reaching a final agreement
was made more arduous not just for partisan conflict within the Bundestag, but also
because it required the consent o f the Ldnder-coatroHed Bundesrat. Upper chamber
approval o f the HRG was constitutionally required, for two reasons: it was legislation
that affected the LOnder, and for the authority over the education function given to
the Lander by the Basic Law. This act described the guiding principles for German
higher education, defined the responsibilities o f the system o f higher education, set
the requirements for university admission, and determined the future organization of
the nation’s institutions of higher education. The/CRG called for curricula reform that
would better define programs o f study and limit their duration. It described a
flattening o f the personnel structure for professorial staff and a common
administrative organization based on a presidential office. It placed the

Fachhochschulen on an equal footing with traditional universities with regard to their
institutional autonomy. Perhaps most important in terms o f new educational
opportunities, the HRG named the Gesamthochschule as the institutional foundation
upon which the future expansion o f German system o f higher education would be
based. This proposal met with determined partisan resistance in the Lander, like that
to the Gesamtschule, and its implementation was similarly very limited nationwide
(GeUert 1984,219-20; GeDert 1996,312; Katzenstein 1987,308-9,316-7).
Germany’s judicial system also played an important role in higher education
reform, principally by its legal recognition and protection o f a widened gateway to
tertiary education. With university enrollments having doubled in the decade between
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19SS and 1965, student demand for many programs was at or had exceeded the
capacity o f the higher education system. During the late 1960s restrictions had
already been imposed on admissions to medical schools and related fields—in number
or quota (manerus clausus) and through the selection process. The wait fix
admission to medical and veterinary schools was more than five years, and seven for
dentistry (Teichler 1982,163). The Federal Constitutional Court finally became
involved with the issue of enrollments as it concerned the restrictive university
admission policies o f Bavaria and the city-state of Hamburg. It ruled in July 1972 that
state laws which restricted university admissions—except as a temporary measure
under conditions o f overcrowding and only until the legislature had devised a
nondiscriminalory system for admissions—violated the constitutional right of
students to pursue a university education (Katzenstein 1987,313-4,333-6). This was
so, said the Court, “because the modem state makes the social security and cultural
development o f the citizen one o f its central concerns” (from Heidenheimer 1981,
290). As time would show, however, the practical effect o f this decision—not so
much in protecting but in contributing to the further expansion o f higher education
opportunities—was much dampened by a recessionary economy and subsequent
pressures to reduce the level o f government expenditures.
Although tertiary level enrollments continued to grow throughout the 1970s,
1980s and into the 1990s, the period o f proactive government support and
meaningful higher education reform was clearly over by the early 1980s—probably
even before passage o f the HRG in 1976. There was no concerted political attempt to
match public expenditures, staff increases and facilities expansion with the pace o f
increasing enrollments. While the ranks o f university students grew by 30 percent
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during the 1977-1982 time period, staff and facilities only grew by 5 percent
(Katzenstein 1987,307). Indeed, and it was even under Schmidt’s SPD government
that the federal contribution to LOnder facilities buddings projects began to shrink.
The “fail from grace” o f education reform has been attributed to many things.
As well as the ongoing partisan conflict over education policy both at the national
and Lend levels, among the causes most often cited are the recession o f 1974-75, a
second oil crisis, the long recession at the end of the 1970s, and the burden of
increasing public expenditures (Gdlert 1984,220; Naumann and Pfeffer 1983,78;
Peisert and Framhein 1995,10). Germany was not alone in facing these problems,
and the consequences for its higher education system were not so different from that
in other Western nations.
The German institutions o f higher education, like those in other countries,
went through a difficult period during the 1980s, as a result o f economic
problems, which occurred in the wake of the oil-crisis starting in the second
half of the 1970s. The government was forced to cut public expenditure, and
education has always been a first victim in such situations. Consequently, the
expansion o f the higher education system slowed down and began to stagnate
in some areas. Although student numbers continued to rise, expenditure for
personnel and equipment did not keep up with those increases (Gdlert and
Rau 1992,91).
But it was not just education policy that was influenced by these events. So
were many other public programs, and the balance o f power in Germany’s national
politics was also profoundly affected. Although the SPD continued in power with the
FDP after the dections o f 1976 and 1980, it was divided with its coalition partner—
as well as within its own party ranks—on howto best address the nation’s economic
problems. In 1982 the FDP finally broke its coalition with the SPD, joining the CDU
in the FRG’s first ever successful constructive vote o f no confidence, to bring down
and replace the government o f Helmut Schmidt The new CDU-Ied government,
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under the chancellorship ofHefanut Kohl and in coalition with the FDP, then went on
to win the general elections o f March 1983. The victory o f the Kohl-led government
«nrfir»f«4 the German electorate’s readiness for cost-cutting measures and a return to
a more conservative policy agenda, and education was clearly a target for budget
reduction. It was also an opportunity for the CDU/FDP coalition to end and perhaps
even reverse those education reforms and social policies intended to restructure not
just the education system, but German society as w dl (GeDert 1984,221). Especially
targeted for attention were those programs and expansion plans that would create
greater opportunities and access to higher education. Financial support for
secondary-level students was ended and that for university students all but eliminated,
the means-tested system of grants introduced in 1971 by the SPD converted to a loan
program.
Criticism o f these measures was heavy and reached from the parliamentary
opposition to many societal and political groups outside parliament. It was
argued that the cancellation o f the support for pupils was going to bring an
end to the social opening o f the educational system, while the new loan
system for university students could leave some students with debts o f about
40,000 Marks after graduation, which might keep many prospective students
from a low social background from entering higher education (GeDert 198S,
286).
Another analyst of this era has written that these government measures simply
made dear, once again, the “hidden social class bias o f the system against a
pronounced redistribution o f educational opportunities” (Naumann 1983,284). Even
allowing that the means-tested stipend program o f the 1971 Federal Education and
Training Assistance Act had encouraged greater enrollments by students from lower
class backgrounds, he observes that students from the middle- and upper classes,
already overrepresented at the tertiary level, did even better because of the new
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“invisible subsidy”—free tuition. The cash subsidies for lower class students may
have been rfimmatod but free tuition was n o t Moreover, it was women from middleand upper

backgrounds that had probably benefited most from the recent

expansion. It was their increased participation that largely accounted for the growth
in student numbers (Naumann 1983,283-4).
The Kohl government also halted implementation o f the HRG’s long-term
goal to make the comprehensive university the institutional foundation of German
higher education. The Gesamthochschule, an organization intended to draw students
from all social classes, would not be allowed to challenge the traditional university
and end its elite status in the higher education system. Instead, the institutional
differentiation and “hidden social class bias” o f the tertiary system would continue to
persist. Notwithstanding university and Fachhochschulen enrollments that would
continue to grow, this action of the conservative Kohl government ensured that the
gateway to a university education—and the opportunity o f upward social mobility
that it represented—would be kept narrow. In particular, the flow o f those from the
lower social classes would be restricted because o f the traditional Abitur requirement
for university admission that did not exist for comprehensive universities. In
combination with the conversion o f the student stipend system to a loan program,
killing the implementation of the Gesamthochschule was a real defeat for education
reform and the further expansion of educational opportunities. According to an
observer at that time, “by its decision to stick to conventional forms o f higher
education the conservative government is supporting a socially selective education
system” (Gdlert 1987,287).
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Over the years, efforts to implement Gesamtschulen and Gesamthochschulen,
never great, tapered off to be insignificant There was not a complete reversal of
education policy, though, the reforms o f the 1960s and 1970s introduced some
changes that would “stick” and be consolidated. This is especially true with respect to
the growth o f new opportunities and the institutional changes that came to secondary
and higher education. Although implementation o f the integrated comprehensive
school has been very limited, and the differentiated structure o f schools not
eliminated, the secondary school system is today less preferential to those o f higher
socioeconomic status. Hauptschule enrollments decreased dramatically between 1960
and 1990, and those at Realschulen, the Gymnasien and Gesamtschulen went
markedly up.13 In terms of university-bound students, while only around 5 percent
obtained tbcAbitur certificate in 1960, the qualification for university admission, that
number was well over 20 percent by the 1990s. This is “the enduring contribution” o f
the reform era German Education Council (1965-1975), “to increase greatly the
proportion of students leaving secondary school entitled to enroll in universities”

Almost 64 percent ofW est German students attended a Hauptschule in
1960. For grades 7 through 9, this number had declined to 34 percent in 1990.
Realschulen enrollments accounted for roughly another 29 percent, the Gymnasien
for nearly 31 percent, and the Gesamtschulen for approximately 6 percent (Lehmann
1994,2472-3). Data from the 2000 time period indicate that about 25 percent of
German students now enter a Hauptschule after completing the Grundschule, nearly
40 percent eater Realschulen, roughly 25 percent enroll in Gymnasien, and 13
percent attend Gesamtschulen (Marlow-Ferguson 2002,490-3). As the enrollments
o f ethnic German students in Hauptschulen has continued to declined over the years,
that institution has come more and more to be identified as the school o f western
Germany’s inner cities and urban areas for minority students. Twelve percent of
Germany’s workforce is non-German. About half of these laborers, referred to as
“guest workers,” are o f Turkish origin and they reside mostly in western Germany.
The children o f these minority workers primarily attend Hauptschulen, and they now
account for as much as 70 percent o f the student population in some urban schools
(Marlow-Ferguson 2002,483,491).
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(Katzenstrin 1987,311). While some o f these students had attended a Gesamtschule,
the majority still came from Gymnasien—where the doors had been opened much
wider to those from lower social strata (Heidenheimer 1997,100-2,119-20; OECD
1995,276). The system o f higher education has grown significantly over the same
period, seeing more than a six-fold increase in student enrollments. Much o f this has
been in association with changes at the secondary level and in response to consumer
and industry demand for new programs and opportunities at the tertiary level. The
higher education system has not been transformed, however, it continues to retain a
very certain class-bias in the distribution o f opportunities that are upward socialmobilizing. The upper classes continue to be disproportionately overrepresented in
the state universities. At the same time, German higher education today includes very
many from the lower and working classes who never before had access (Gellert 1996,
315-17).
The German Education System and Reunification
With Germany’s reunification in October 1990, the five Ltinder o f the former
German Democratic Republic were incorporated into the FRG. For those Lander, as
weQ as undertaking very dramatic political, economic and social reforms, the task o f
reunification has meant adapting to the education system ofW est Germany. The
story o f that effort is beyond the scope o f this work. However, it does deserve
mention that East Germany’s education system had been based on a structure o f
unified comprehensive schools from grades one through ten, after which the majority
o f students were directed into some kind o f vocational training. Only some 10
percent moved on to an upper secondary school for two more years, acquiring the
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Abitur which entitled them to university admission. Many East Germans have been
less than enthusiastic about adjusting to the West German structure. That displeasure
has been such that it has even supplied fuel for the fire o f those calling for further
reforms of the FRG school system. In 1994 the LOnder Education Ministers even
decided to hah the further coordination o f the school systems until after 2000
(Almond, Dalton, and Powell 1999,222; Mintrop and Wefler 1994,254-7).
A Discussion o f German Education Policy
The early expansion of mass education in Germany finds much useful
explanation in the educational mission o f the church associated with the Protestant
Reformation, and with the project o f modem state-building argued by Boli, Ramirez,
and Meyer (1985). The task o f state-building likewise helps to explain the expansion
o f educational opportunities at the secondary and university level, but not always the
timing or form. The logic o f industrialism and its human capital variant have
something to impart, particularly with regard to the context, but they also do nothing
to explain the timing or manner o f secondary-level and university expansion, the
class-bias of the German education system, or the particular institutional structure
that distinguishes Germany’s education system today. For answers to questions such
as those, political conflict and institutional theories have much to contribute. There is
much to be learned from the struggle that has been waged by so many social and
political groups for control o f the German education system and its mission since the
eighteenth century, and also from the linkage between Germany’s political
democratization and expanding opportunities in its education system. The institutions
and institutionalization of the German education system also have a story to tell. By
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setting the rales for and structuring the political competition—and a* autonomous
political actors in their own right that naturally inhibit change—Germany’s political,
social and educational institutions have had a great effect on the policymaking for
education. Particularly important has been the decentralization that has historically
characterized the control of German education, and the great institutional tenacity of
the traditional tripartite system o f differentiated schools that has been so resistant to
reform.
The history of postprimary educational expansion in Germany since the early
nineteenth century has been one o f slow and fitful expansion. It has been associated
with Germany’s unique course of political, social and economic development—most
closely with its political democratization. It is a story about a straggle for control of
the education system—between church and state, between national and state
governments, and between political parties at the state and national levels. It bears
the legacy o f the important role played by the church in its early development, the
preferential treatment given to society's elite, and o f educational opportunities that
were deliberately restricted and serviced the perpetuation o f existing class divisions.
Government support of public education by the Prassian state and then Imperial
Germany was to further state objectives—economic development, industrialization
and the personnel requirements o f the administrative state—not to provide a vehicle
of social mobility for the masses. It was an instrument of state power manipulated to
perpetuate the socioeconomic status quo even as it served to enhance the power of
the German state (Kaelble 1981,262; Thut and Adams 1964,81-8). The state
controlled the education supply, it held the key to its expansion and was its
gatekeeper.
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However, it has been the LOnder o f the Gennan state, and not the central
government, that has historically exercised the greater control over education policy.
Except for efforts by SPD-led governments during the Weimar era to establish a
uniform national education system, and the period o f authoritarian rule under
National Socialism, it has been the LOnder—and their predecessors before German
unification in 1871—that have always had the greatest governmental authority over
educational matters. This division o f power was dear in Imperial Germany and is still
today in the FRG. Indeed, the function o f the Federal Ministry o f Education today is
more to participate in and coordinate education planning with the LOnder than to
make policy (Nevermann and Richter 1983,83,90).
The politics of policymaking in German education speaks to the ability of
local and regional governments under a federal arrangement—and in a partisan
context—to frustrate and obstruct the policy objectives and initiatives o f a central
government The SPD, a long-time proponent o f Gennan education reform, provides
a good example. LOnder governed by the SPD generally have a better record in
implementing education reforms than those controlled by the CDU. At the national
level, however, as the party of government, the SPD has been much frustrated in
realizing its agenda for education reform because o f the resistance o f CDU-govemed

Ldnder. Over the course o f time, within and across tht Ldnder, the Christian
Democrats have enjoyed both a longer tenure and greater influence over German
education policy than the Social Democrats. The only partial success o f school
reform in the 1960s and 1970s—as made evident by the very limited implementation
of the Gesamtschule and Gesamthochschule—is testimony to the dominance o f both
conservative CDU politics and the LOnder over German education policy (Mintrop
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and Writer 1994,252-3). In addition to partisan politics and federalism, education
reform has also been hindered—and the forces in opposition helped—by the very
o f the education system. Germany’s education system exhibits
very normal institutional behavior, it is self-perpetuating, sticky, and resistant to

Despite the magnitude o f Germany's recent reforms and the expansion o f
opportunities in secondary and higher education, educational achievement remains a
restricted vehicle of social mobility. The gateway remains narrow because the class
bias that has historically characterized the distribution o f educational opportunities
has not been eliminated. It is still institutionalized in the tripartite system of
differentiated secondary schools that, even after reforms, retains its traditional class
bias. That structure has been made more flexible, to be sure, but it continues to favor
Germany’s upper classes and to perpetuate the existing social order.
If one remembers the histoiy of the Gennan school system. . . then it is not
difficult to understand that the three traditional types o f schools even today
represent the social structure of Germany. There always have been attempts
to put together children o f different backgrounds into one comprehensive
school system. Such well-known pedagogues as Comenius, Pestalozzi, and
Humboldt have strongly advocated the idea o f a comprehensive school, but
without success. When the German parliament o f the Weimar Republic met in
1918, the Socialists and other parties tried to found a comprehensive school
system. The parliament accepted only a compromise that brought together
children o f all families into a comprehensive elementary school (grades 1 to
4). All the other types o f schools remained the same.
The structure has not yet changed. The experiment of the
Gesamtschule as the one unifying, comprehensive type o f secondary school
has not been politically successful. Instead of replacing three different,
socially discriminating types of schools by just one, it has been added as a
fourth type (Dichanz and Zahorik 1998,71).
Despite its substantial growth over recent years, the system o f higher
education also tends to reflect and replicate the existing class structure. Peisert and
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Framhein (1995) write o f the “two-type structure” of Gennan higher education that
had emerged by the end of the 1980a, comprised o f the traditional universities and the
less prestigious Fachhochschulen (131). Indeed, although die introduction o f
alternative tertiary level institutions like ih t Fachhochschulen have made
postsecondary opportunities available to many groups that have been historically
denied, “it has raised new questions about the reproduction of structural distinctions
in society through the higher education system” (Gellert 1996,313).
This is not to sty that little good has come of the higher education reforms,
because so many thousands of Germans have and do enjoy the opportunity and
benefit o f better jobs and lives as a result, but a good deal o f the recent program
expansion in higher education has not necessarily been o f a kind that has enhanced
social mobility on a large scale. In fact, many o f the new vocational and functionallyoriented offerings would actually appear to reinforce existing class lines. This is
illustrated by viewing social groups as users o f education services, consumers that
display distinct patterns in their consumption o f traditional university and alternative
higher education programs. Students with working class roots are disproportionately
overrepresented in Fachhochschulen-type institutions and badly underrepresented in
the traditional state universities, accounting for something under 15 percent Pupils
from upper-middle class backgrounds are just the opposite, most likely to be enrolled
at a university and not at one o f the new alternative institutions—something around
10 percent Such patterns o f education consumption tends to be reinforcing o f the
status quo. On the other hand, although not much has happened for the working class
in terms o f increasing social mobility, the middle class does seem to be reaping some
benefit from the expanded educational opportunities (Gellert 1996,315-7). So, if
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there has been any sort of class restructuring with educational opportunities serving
as the vehicle o f change—at least so far—it has been mostly limited to the middle
class.
I am hesitant about concluding too much about the expansion that has taken
place in Germany's secondary and higher education systems since the 1960s. There
can be no question that meaningful change has taken place, but it is simply too soon
to say in any definitive way how things will end up. Certain differences do seem
evident, however. In terms o f increased social mobility, secondary and higher
education have become more opportunity-bearing for a greater number o f students
from all social groups than ever before. The secondary system has not only become
more inclusive, it has also widened as a gateway to higher education. A growing
proportion o f German students are preparing for advanced studies at the tertiary
level. At the same time, it must be observed that the restrictive system o f
differentiated secondary schools is still around, and the kind o f program expansion
that has taken place in higher education seems—at least so far—to perpetuate
existing class structures. Change has been certain, though, and it seems most likely to
continue with the passage o f time.
Although it is a story often told in association with landmark events,
educational expansion is much more a gradual process and not a one-time event. It is
subject to a number o f social, economic and political forces, both internal and
external to the education system. One such factor is economic growth and
development, which is often associated with the expansion o f the education systems
over the long term. Another is population growth, although that is not likely to drive
expansion of Germany’s education system today. On the other hand, there is a
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generational effect that may have some impact. Children often tend to follow in the
footsteps of their parents, in career paths and at least matching their educational
achievement This tends to stimulate some educational expansion, with or without
population growth, as societies modernize and become more literate. When this
phenomenon is combined with the positive actions taken by a state to educate its
citizenry in response to the requirements o f economic growth and development—and
democratization, too—educational expansion is given a real push. A troubled
economy may have a contrary effect, which can be magnified by a slide to an
authoritarian form of government Looking back over the past two centuries, this has
very much been the tale for Gennan secondary and higher education.
Other important forces that have and will continue to variously encourage,
obstruct or slow further education reform and expansion include Germany’s partisan
politics, the class structure o f its society, and the very institutionalization of its
education system. Whether a Land is governed by the CDU or SPD will continue to
make a difference in its education policy, on how opportunity-bearing that education
system wQl be. Likewise wfil class. German society has a most durable class
structure, one that inhibits education reform and expansion that would upset its
divisions; and it is supported by public policy. The class structure is reflected in the
organization o f the education system, in its institutionalization, and it biases the
distribution o f educational opportunities that may enhance individual social mobility.
What is more, the class divisions o f German society are deliberately perpetuated by
the status-quo maintaining social insurance programs o f its welfare state. In this most
important respect, the education and social policies of the German welfare state are
complementary, they go together hand-in-hand, even though the responsibility for
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policymaking and administration falls upon different individuals and organizations at
different levels o f the federal governme n t Finally, it important to recognize that
institutions will change only slowly unless the circumstances are exceptional Under
normal conditions they are very durable, self-perpetuating, and resistant to change.
Germany’s class structure, its social welfare and school systems all share these
institutional properties. Further education reform and expansion can only be expected
to be slow and fitful, and not just for its institutional dimension, but also for its close
association with the class structure o f German society and the other social programs
o f its welfare state.
The American Education System
The American Education System Today
Education in the United States is primarily the responsibility o f state and local
governments. There is not a national system o f education. There is not one formal
and integrated structure of schools—from the primary through the university
level—that is administered from the center by the national government or any other
authoritative body. Rather, the American school “system” is comprised o f a variety of
educational institutions operated by the federal, state and local governments, by
independent private and religious organizations.14 In its entirety, the American school

Although the education policies and institutions found within and between
the fifty states are not identical, there is fin more the same than is different about the
way the education function is implemented across the United States. So, as was the
case with Germany, when I hereafter speak o f the “school” or “education system” of
the United States, I am referring to those education policies and institutions that are
most commonly found throughout the country.
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system is mostly public; that is where the majority o f educational institutions,
enrollments and opportunities are found. Religious and private schools are also
important, but they play a much smaller role. At the primary and secondary levels,
public schools account for over 90 percent o f all spending for education and nearly
90 percent o f all enrollments. At the tertiary level private institutions take on a
greater significance, accounting for nearly 35 percent o f the spending and 22 percent
o f all enrollments (OECD 1995,82-3; Marlow-Ferguson 2002,1501, 1511).
The responsibility o f state and local governments for public education has a
long tradition in AmericaJSducation is not even addressed by the Constitution o f
1787 which established and defined the powers and obligations o f the new federal
government No official, agency, or branch of the national government was given the
constitutional authority to make education policy and run the nation’s schools, not
even the president The same is true for the national legislature. While the Congress is
authorized to undertake actions and make laws for the “general welfare” under the
Constitution’s “necessary and proper clause” o f Article I, it does not have any
specific powers in the area o f education. The Constitution’s silence about educational
matters and a specific role for the federal government in those affairs leaves that
power, according to the Tenth Amendment, “to the States respectively, or to the
people.”
Although it has no formal authority over public education in America, there is
a U.S. Department o f Education. The president appoints, and the Senate confirms, a
cabinet secretary to head that department. While it has existed as a cabinet
department only since 1979, many different “departments,” “offices” and “bureaus”
o f education have been around for a long time. A Department o f Education was first
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created in 1867 for the purpose o f coDecting statistics and other information related
to the nation’s education system. It was abolished in 1868 and moved to the
Department o f the Interior where it was known as the Office o f Education. In 1869
its name was changed to the Bureau o f Education. In 1939 it was made an office o f
the Federal Security Agency and in 1953 it was moved to the Department o f Health,
Education, and Welfare with the establishment o f that cabinet department In 1979 a
separate Department o f Education was created and its secretary was made a member
o f the Presidential cabinet under the administration o f Jimmy Carter. Ronald Reagan
attempted to eliminate the Department o f Education, along with Energy, as part o f
his campaign against “big government,” but he was unsuccessful. Today the
Department o f Education is responsible to oversee the education programs o f the
federal government and to collect data concerning public education. Other
organizations that are involved in education at the federal level—but also without
formal authority over educational matters—include the U.S. Departments o f Health
and Human Services, Agriculture, Defense, Energy, Labor, and the National Science
Foundation. Together, they accounted for almost half o f federal funding for
education in 1987 (Valverde 1994,6543).
Constitutionally, each o f the fifty states is responsible to support a system o f
public education. In practice, much o f that authority has been delegated by the states
to local school districts and their “school boards,” bodies that are typically
independent o f other local governmental organizations—in their policymaking,
administration and funding—and whose members are elected by the citizens o f the
local school district. In the early 1990s there were 15,358 such school districts in the
United States, each with a school board having jurisdiction over one or more
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associated schools in a specific geographic area (Valverde 1994,6539). The specific
details o f the school district arrangement are prescribed by the constitution and
statutory laws o f each state. Normally, school districts are empowered to make and
administer school policy that complies with state standards, appoint or remove a local
superintendent o f schools, choose school principals, hire and fire teachers and other
school personnel, raise tax revenues to support the schools, the construction and
maintenance of school facilities—all the kinds o f things necessary for the day-to-day
operation of a local and largely autonomous school system. They may also be
concerned with teacher certification, curriculum development and the selection of
textbooks. At the local level there is frequently active citizen participation, at the
regularly scheduled public meetings of the school board.
State governments retain overall supervisory authority for public education,
the right to locally intercede, and provide much o f the funding upon which the
budgets of local school districts depend. At the state level there are very often
departments of education, and elected or appointed state boards o f education that are
headed by a state superintendent o f schools. Along with the state legislature and
executive branch o f government, state school boards are typically concerned with the
distribution of state and federal monies to local school districts, in determining
statewide teacher certification requirements, and may be involved with curriculum
decisions and the selection o f textbooks.
According to the regulations of each state, private schools and colleges may
be established by churches, individual sponsors, and private groups. The governing
bodies o f religious and private schools enjoy considerable autonomy in their
operation, but not the economic benefits o f state association. The support from state
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funding is far less, perhaps even negligible, and they are unable to levy local taxes as
a means of revenue generation. However, in many communities children enrolled in
private and parochial schools are often permitted to participate in specific courses
offered by their community’s public schools on a part-time basis. The 1965
Elementary and Secondary Education Act provided funding for such shared-time
programs.15 Moreover, it is permissible for the government to contribute to private
and parochial schools as it supports essentially secular ends—like school busing and
student lunches, training materials, special education programs, etc.—but does not
advance the cause o f a specific religion.
In addition to differences between states and the great variety o f alternatives
offered by private and religious schools, much o f the variation in American education
can be attributed to the thousands o f local school districts. A fundamental building
block o f the nation’s education system today, local school districts represent the
institutionalization of local control and diversity, hallmarks of American education
since early colonial times. In a very real sense, for the great differences in education
policy and implementation between school districts, there are nearly as many "school
systems” in the United States as there are school districts. The local school district is
a highly valued and durable American institution, and its widespread support enables
it to remain very much at the center o f America’s public education system. In point of
feet, though, the autonomy once enjoyed by local school districts has diminished.
This has happened as the provision o f educational opportunities has become less a

15As well as funding for shared time programs, the $2.3 billion act provided
monies to help in the education o f children from low-income families, as well as
monies for textbooks, audio-visual presentation materials, educational research and
training facilities.
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local issue and more a state and national one, as education costs have risen beyond
what local school districts can provide, as American society and its education system
have become more democratic and inclusive, and as government at the state and
federal levels has responded to those changes.
The notion of a national school system or o f state and local systems
dominated by federal agencies is regarded by most Americans and by their
representatives in Congress as abhorrent Yet, the fact o f federal influence is
evident in Supreme Court decisions concerning integration, in the massive
application of federal funds accompanied by evaluations o f their use, and in
the creation of instructional materials through grants by the National Science
Foundation. The reluctance o f local authorities to accept federal direction had
diminished substantially by the late 1960s, when they found it increasingly
necessary to turn to the federal government for the solution o f local problems
(Deighton 1971,463-4).
In fact, the federal government has a very considerable role in American
education, one that has grown especially since the Second World War. By the
exercise o f its power to legislate for the general welfare and national defense, the
Congress has become a very powerful and influential actor in the nation’s educational
affairs. The federal government contributes to the financial support o f the different
sectors of the American education system—public, private, and religious. It oversees
the national military academies and other schools affiliated with state operations at
home and abroad. With the Supreme Court often at the forefront, it was the federal
government that led efforts to expand educational access and opportunities for
minorities, the poor and disabled. It drove the campaign to racially desegregate the
nation’s schools. Indeed, it is arguable that the most important ongoing educational
task o f the federal government has been to oversee and guarantee the expansion and
more equitable distribution of educational opportunities throughout the nation.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

263
Each cme o f the fifty states provides tuition-free public education at the
primary and secondary level. Almost 90 percent o f all children attend these statesupported schools, the remainder are enrolled at private and religious institutions.
Whether at a public or private school, attendance is compulsory for children in every
state, typically beginning at five or six years o f age until age sixteen. The period for
primary and secondary education normally lasts twelve years, thirteen where
kindergarten is included. Primary level education lasts anywhere from five to seven
years, depending on the local school district—and there is considerable variation both
within and between states—followed by two or three years in a middle o r junior high
school, and then three or four more in a high school A similar institutional division
can be found in the private sector. Curriculums are also comparable, apart from the
religious instruction that takes place in parochial schools. Primary and secondary
schools in both the public and private sectors provide a broad and unified curriculum
designed to meet the general academic and training needs of all students. All
programs of education and training, for all children, typically takes place under the
same roof and administration. For this reason, and to distinguish America’s
secondary schools from those elsewhere around the world that provide either
academic instruction or vocational training—but not both in a single facility—U.S.
high schools are often called comprehensive secondary schools. The principal
function o f the American high school is to provide a general academic education,
though, not vocational training programs (Marlow-Ferguson 2002,1504). Separate
vocational and trade schools also exist, but they are very limited in number and
enrollments.
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The comprehensive school with a general education curriculum has been the
predominant institutional form in the American education system since the early
nineteenth century when public education opportunities began to greatly expand at
the primary level It came later at the secondary level, with the take-off o f
enrollments in comprehensive high schools that started around the turn o f the
twentieth century. Vocational and technical training programs were never established
on a scale and with a separate institutional structure like the German dual system.
When and what vocational education does exist in the public school system is
typically found at the secondary level in the comprehensive schools. Specific federal
and state legislation to support or expand vocational training programs has been
meager. The Smhh-Hughes Act o f 1917 provided federal aid, on a matching basis
with the states, for vocational training programs below the university level. The act
provided grants to help pay for the education o f teachers who would instruct
industrial, trade, business, agricultural and home economics subjects. It also
contributed to the salaries of teachers o f vocational courses. In 1963 the Congress
adopted the ($731 million) Vocational Education Act that required each state to
establish a policymaking Board o f Vocational Education. Federal funding was made
available to the programs those state bodies might establish. It also included a
provision for a work-study program to prevent student dropouts. However, during
the Reagan administration, federal support for such programs was greatly reduced
with passage o f the 1983 Job Training Partnership Act legislation which required
demonstration of program effectiveness as a condition o f receiving federal funding. In
1984 only American 225 high schools were considered “vocational” (Valverde 1994,
6542).
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Following high school graduation or by otherwise satisfying secondary level
requirements, students may continue their education by attending public or private
two-year and four-year institutes, colleges and universities.16 The U.S. Department
o f Labor reported in 2000 that over 60 percent o f all high school graduates, some 1.8
million, moved directly into higher education (Marlow-Ferguson 2002,1511). Nearly
40 percent o f entire 18-21 age group were found to be attending some type o f
tertiary institution in the 1990s (OECD 1995, 153). Students wishing to pursue
occupations in advanced technical or semi-professional fields—in computer science
and electronics, as dental hygienists, paralegals, etc.—may attend two-year junior
colleges or technical institutes for specialized training. Students seeking advanced
academic and professional careers—in academia, business, the law, medicine, etc.—
may enroll at four-year universities and professional schools. More prestigious public
universities and private colleges may require entrance examinations, but a high school
diploma is very often all that is required for a student to enroll at many state and
community colleges. Nor is age normally a factor limiting an individual's access to
higher education; nearty half o f all American university students are over 25 years of
age (OECD 1995, 316).
Although they are heavily subsidized by the states and federal government,
America’s public colleges and universities are not tuition-free. The additional costs of
higher education are left for the individual student and his or her parents to manage.

As a rule, American students are not required to pass a comprehensive final
examination at the end o f their high school studies in order to graduate. No such
system exists in the United States. The requirements for a high school degree are
normally determined by local school districts, and are usually based on completing a
specified program of coursework.
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This task is made somewhat easier by the low-cost community college system, and
the many public and private opportunities for financial assistance available to
prospective students. For the typical college student, education costs are financed
through some combination o f state allocations, private and public student
scholarships and awards, loan programs and the student’s own resources. In some
measure because o f the individual financing requirement, as well as the quality of
their educational offerings, private colleges and universities are an important
component and alternative to public institutions in the American system of higher
education.
According to recent OECD data, United States’ spending for education
amounts to about 7 percent o f its GDP, S.7 percent going to public institutions and
the remainder to private. In terms o f the government's budgetary pie, education
accounts for just over 14 percent o f total public expenditures. Indicative of the much
greater size of the public sector in American education, spending by public schools
for outweighs that o f private and religious institutions, especially at the primary and
secondary levels. Approximately 82 percent o f all education spending is by public
sector institutions. Almost 93 percent o f education expenditures at the primary and
secondary levels is by public schools, and 65 percent at the tertiary (OECD 1995,
71-6,78-84,122). Today, and historically, it has been the states and local
governments that have provided the lion’s share o f financial support to the schools.
Local school districts now cover almost 45 percent of primary and secondary
education costs, the states 48 percent, and the federal government less than 8
percent For higher education the distribution o f financial support by level of
government is very different Local governments account for less than 6 percent of
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education spending, the states for 58 percent, and the federal government for 36
percent For all levels o f education the national government provides over IS percent
of the funding, the states SO percent, and local governments over 34 percent (OECD
1995,117-9).
As wed as for differences in state laws, the decisions o f local school boards
and the availability o f private and religious alternatives to public schools, much o f the
variation in education across the United States—in policy, quality and
opportunities—may be attributed to the use o f the local property tax as the principal
means of revenue generation by school districts. The property tax favors wealthier
communities and their financial capacity. As the potential revenues that may be
generated from property taxes are determined by the sum total o f property valuations
within a school district, an indicator of its wealth, richer school districts are in a
better position than poorer—subject to local decisionmaking—to pay for education.
This dearly causes differences in education policy, in the kind and quality o f the
education product, and in the types of educational opportunities available.17 In some
states, greater financial parity among school districts has been achieved through state
subsidies to the poorer school districts. Although such state equalization programs
have not eliminated the financial gap between the richest and poorest school districts,
it has hdped to narrow the differences within states.

Even acknowledging that differences in per-pupil spending between school
districts could affect the quality o f a student’s education, the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled in
Antonio Independent SchoolD istrict?. Rodriguez (1973) that funding
the schools was a state issue, not a problem that warranted federal action under the
14th Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.
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The Development of American Education Policy
Phaoaophicel Underpinnings
The United States stands out among nations for the magnitude of its
commitment to educational opportunity. Educational achievement is encouraged by a
school system that is widely accessible. The United States is also outstanding for the
level o f uniformity that exists in the education system o f a country so large. From one
end o f the nation to the other, education is very comparable in its administration,
institutions, and curricula. What is truly remarkable is that such organizational
consistency is the attribute o f a country that does not have a unified national
education system, one where the responsibility for education is highly decentralized.
Indeed, education in the United States is largely a function o f the states and local
governments, with independent private and religious organizations playing a smaller
but very significant role. This contradiction—-the uniformity o f an education system
without centralized administration—is the product o f a society that emphasizes
individual over collective responsibility for one’s well-being, that views educational
achievement as an agency o f self-actualization, a vehicle o f social mobility, and a
means to personal economic security (Janowitz 1976,34-5). In this sense, America’s
investment in educational opportunities represents an alternative to the safety nets of
state-supported social insurance programs (Heclo 1985,16). While its social welfare
provisions are niggardly by comparison to many other Western countries, America’s
educational opportunities and services are among the most generous in the world.
This has not always been the case, however. Throughout America’s history there has
been a record of discrimination against women and minorities in the distribution of
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educational and other socioeconomic opportunities (Marlow-Ferguson 2002,1495,
1499-1500).
From America’s beginnings until well into the twentieth century, educational
opportunities were far less for women than men. This gap has closed today, and
women even account fix a slightly greater proportion o f higher education enrollments
than men. The greater problem historically, and still today, has been with racial
discrimination in the distribution of public goods. A landmark decision affecting
minority educational opportunities in America came in the 1954 ruling by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Brawn v. Board o fEducation that separate school facilities for
different races violated the law of the land—the Constitution—and where such
school systems existed they would have to be desegregated. The decision in this case
came in response to the many racially segregated schools systems that existed across
the United States at that time. Not only did these school systems maintain separate
facilities for the different races, they offered different education products that
represented unequal educational opportunities. Segregated school systems were
instruments o f socioeconomic control that favored the social mobility o f chosen
groups through the provision of educational opportunities, and denied the
opportunity for educational achievement to those social groups that were looked
down upon. Although the Brown ruling offered the possibility that educational
opportunities might be made equal for all races, it has been a most controversial
decision and never folly implemented. Meaningful desegregation o f the nation’s
schools was not realized until the 1960s, and complete desegregation has never been
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completely accomplished.18 Nonetheless, there has been very significant progress in
expanding the educational opportunities for those social groups that have historically
fmwi ifarriniiiMtari ip m it

A tendency to prefer community solutions and local governance has typified
American society and politics since colonial times. At the beginning it was largely the
natural outcome o f geography and politics, o f the continent’s expanse and the
distance between colonial settlements, limited transportation and communications
facilities, and the absence of an effective central government Even for problems and
issues that were shared by communities within and across the colonies, there was no
real alternative to deal with those matters except at a local level.
Although the undeveloped environment o f colonial America posed a real
hardship for many, to others the unsettled lands and isolation represented a great
opportunity. Indeed, the American frontier was a place to be exploited because o f its
geopolitical reality. Many individuals and groups o f European heritage emigrated to
America precisely for the chance to “go it alone,” to establish new lives and
communities where life could be led in the manner they chose. This was especially
true for those seeking to escape the religious persecution they suffered in Europe.
When they came to America, in addition to their faith, many brought with them a

18Nor is it likely that all school segregation will ever be completely
eliminated. Although the effort to do so has not ended, it has slowed o r been
discontinued in many places. Moreover, not all school segregation is de jure
(deliberate) and subject to court-ordered remedies, like busing. School segregation
also exists defacto. Segregated school systems exist as they match the residential
pattern o f their associated community. For example, what is termed “urban white
flight” has been attributed as one cause o f defacto segregation in the nation’s innercity schools. (For a further discussion see Rob Gurwitt, “Getting off the Bus,” in
Governing, May 1992.)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

271
determination to live in communities o f their own making and governance. It was not
just faith-based communities, though, other colonial settlements and immigrant
groups also preferred significant autonomy in the management of their local affairs.
This was particularly true as it affected matters o f community education.
Education in America has always had a strong local component Although the
overall authority for education in pre-revolutionary America rested with the colonial
governments, as a practical matter it was mostly a local affair. What organized
educational opportunities did exist were usually community-level private or religious
schools, with limited enrollments and curricula offerings. There were not public
schools systems, open to all children in the community, that linked primary with
secondary and higher education. Indeed, in early America educational opportunities
were very restricted, and mass education was virtually nonexistent. Most children did
not attend school at all, and those who did went only for a short time—usually three
years at most. In isolated and sparsely populated areas, what education did take place
was often carried out in the home. In more populated areas there were sometimes
private or clergy-run primary schools, sometimes even secondary schools, but
enrollments were small and tended to favor the upper crust of colonial society.
What, when and where there was a concern for greater literacy, at least at
some basic level, the motivation was frequently religious. Beyond an ability to read
the Bible and religious instruction, however, educational objectives were typically
limited to the development o f only basic skills in writing and mathematics. This was
not unlike the experience in many parts o f Europe where the purposes and influence
o f religion—and especially that o f Protestantism—were central during the initial
stage o f educational expansion at the mass level. In America, though, there was not a
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church or religion that had organized and and developed an institutional presence in
the social and political infrastructure comparable to the Catholic and Protestant
churches in many European countries. There were not politically powerful American
churches like the Lutheran and Catholic in Germany, institutions with the
organizational capacity and wherewithal to establish and administer a centralized
vernacular school system at greater than a community level.
The Origins of Public Education in America
Americans looked to government as early as the seventeenth century for help
in satisfying the educational needs o f their communities. In a meaningful way this can
be traced to New England, and specifically to the example o f the Massachusetts
colony. In 1642, a Massachusetts law became the first in America to make the
schooling o f children mandatory. It charged that all children be taught to read,
although it was parents, guardians, or masters who were made responsible for that
task. Additional legislation was adopted in 1647 directing all towns with fifty or more
households to establish a primary school, and those with 100 or more to support a
secondary-level grammar school as well. Education continued to be a local
responsibility, though, as the colonial government did not organize to administer,
provide, or otherwise support mass education. Until well after the Revolution,
education would still be chiefly a function of local communities, with private and
religious schools playing a key role, in Massachusetts and elsewhere across America.
Formal education opportunities remained limited for most children. Mass education
would not come until the earty 1800s, with the movement to establish common
primary schools open to all children.
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The coming o f the common school maria a critical stage in the development
o f American education. Far more than an alternative to faith-based and private
education, the widespread implementation o f the common school represented the
expansion o f educational opportunities on a grand scale. Indeed, for the many it was
not a matter of choosing between alternatives at all; the common school presented
the opportunity for a formal education they had never had before.
Common primary schools were opened as the result of state and local
initiatives, not in response to a mandate by the federal government19 Excepting for
the exclusion of those individuals and groups that did not enjoy equal rights o f
citizenship, common schools were formally classless and open to all children, boys
and girls alike.20 They were operated by local school authorities and financed

The national government was involved at the margin, however; and I would
suggest that its actions are evidence and symbolic o f the value placed on educational
opportunities and achievement that dates to early America. Under the Articles of
Confederation, land was set aside for public education in the territories west ofNew
York and north of the Ohio River—areas that would eventually become states—by
the Land Ordinance o f 1785 and the Northwest Ordinance o f 1787. This territorial
policy was continued under the U.S. Constitution o f 1789.
would like to emphasize that the common schools wereform ally classless.
There were not legal rules and regulations that organized children according to their
class or gender into different types o f educational institutions. Nor are there today.
America has not institutionalized a class-based education system. However, I would
not propose that class, gender, or sundry other socioeconomic and demographic
variables were not factors affecting the kind o f schooling children received—or did
n o t Race certainly did, and still does today. Moreover, all common schools were not
the same. What common schools were able to offer as an educational product and
opportunity depended very much on local politics and community wealth, on parental
determination to educate their children, on the educational resources and personnel
available. These same factors, including class, race and gender, continue to affect the
kind and quality of education that individual American children receive today. At the
same time, and despite very significant demographic, educational product and facility
differences across the country, as well as between urban, suburban and rural schools,
(continued...)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

274
through a combination of local government funding and parent contributions. Over
time, as the common school increased in popularity and number across the nation,
state-level funding gradually increased and family contributions declined to zero.
The common public school was implemented in substantial numbers and
somewhat sooner in New England than elsewhere. For a longer time on the middle
and southern seaboard, private and religious organizations continued to play a larger
role in the establishment and support o f schools. Once again, Massachusetts was at
the forefront o f change. It was among the first to establish tuition-free public
education, beginning with common elementary schools in the 1820s. By the end o f

20(...condnued)
the United States public education system is stillform ally classless today. The
institutions and structure o f education for all students attending America’s public
schools is consistent, regardless of their background. Any student, anywhere in the
country, can theoretically move within the same institutional structure from the
primary to the secondary level and then on to higher education. This is so even with
the “tracking” that occurs in secondary schools, the placement o f students in similar
curriculums but o f different academic rigor, and even for students whose secondary
emphasis may be more vocational than academic. Those who successfully complete
their secondary studies, from any track or curriculum, can move o n to the tertiary
level. However, history and data show that educational opportunities and
achievement tends to vary according to student background. As one example, nearly
80 percent o f America’s white population over age 25 had completed at least four
years o f high school in 1989, while only two-thirds o f the black population had done
the same (Valverde 1994,6539). For another, the United States Supreme Court
ordered in its 1954 Brawn v. Board o fEducation decision that the nation’s public
schools should be desegregated based on its finding o f fact that separate school
facilities based on race were “inherently unequal” because o f the different and
unequal educational opportunities they represented. An equalization o f educational
opportunities has never been achieved. One scholar has observed that the “selection
o f low SES (socioeconomic status) students to vocational programs, low ability
groups, ‘throw-away’ curricular tracks is a daily routine o f American schools. It is
simply performed more smoothly, and is less explicitly articulated than in Germany”
(Elena Lisovskaya, dissertation defense o f author, notes and detailed comments, 10
July 2002, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo).
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the nineteenth century, with state after state following the lead o f Massachusetts,21
the basic structure o f America's public education system was largely established on
the institutional foundation o f the common school—tuition-free schools administered
and financed by the states and local school districts with little federal support
As wed as increasing educational opportunities, the common school
movement may also be associated with the growing role o f state government in
educational matters. The later 1830s saw the beginning o f state-wide organization,
administration and financial support coming to public school systems. State
governments began to levy taxes to finance public education, participate with local
authorities in the determination o f curriculum requirements and courses of
instruction, set attendance requirements, and certify teachers. Massachusetts was the
first to create a state board o f education in 1837, with lawyer and politician Horace
Mann appointed its first head. During the 1840s Pennsylvania and New York
followed with public school systems o f their own. Local school systems were not
taken over by state governments, however, not then or since that time. Over the
years, despite rising levels of state and federal assistance and the influence that might
be presumed to follow, various attempts by school reformers to centralize the
authority for public education, and the trend to consolidate many governmental
functions in larger political and administrative units, public education has remained
very much a local governmental responsibility in the United States (Bengtson and
Achenbaum 1993,47).

21

In 1852, Massachusetts was also the first state to make school attendance
mandatory for primary-level students. By 1890, twenty-seven states had also enacted
compulsory attendance laws. Mississippi was the last state to do so, in 1918.
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That primary and secondary education is still largely a local effort does not
mean the role played by the state is inconsequential. State funding is frequently
critical to the operation o f local school districts across the United States, and it is
state governments that set the educational standards for all school districts within
their jurisdiction. However, the part played by the national government is far less.
General federal aid for primary and secondary education did not even come until
1965, when Congress passed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA)
to provide federal funding to school districts with substantial numbers o f children
from low-income families. Total federal spending may now reach the vicinity of $15
billion as a result o f legislation passed during the administration o f G.W. Bush, but
that is still less than 10 percent o f the total public expenditures for primary and
secondary education; and the federal government has no constitutional authority to
set national education standards. Furthermore, state and local governments may
decide not to accept federal funds for education, depending on the “strings” (the
conditions) that Congress attaches for their use.
The Expansion o f Postprimarv Educational Opportunities
Over the course of the nineteenth century, beginning with the proliferation of
the common school, public education facilities and enrollments grew rapidly to
surpass those o f private and religious organizations, first at the primary level and then
in secondary and higher education. Along with this growth, sooner and more widely
than in Europe, new subject matter and courses o f instruction were introduced to the
curriculum offerings o f public, private and religious schools alike. In primary schools,
courses in history, geography, the physical sciences, the arts, basic bookkeeping,
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homemalring and physical education were added to the “3 R 's”—reading, writing and
arithmetic. New offerings at the secondary level included advanced courses in
mathematics and the sciences, language instruction, the social sciences, vocational,
and technical training. For the variety o f subjects taught, the different kinds o f
education and training available under a single roo£ America’s secondary schools
have come to be called comprehensive schools.
The increase in public educational facilities and nmlr«ng o f the comprehensive
school was very much a response to the changing educational requirements o f
America’s industrialization and economic development In the early 1800s though,
and with industrialization just beginning, educational achievement for the many was
defined as having a primary-level education, not more. It follows that educational
opportunity meant access to a common elementary school. Not until the later
nineteenth and early twentieth century would educational opportunity and
achievement be considered to mean secondary and then higher education. For several
generations, the expansion o f secondary and university level opportunities lagged
those at the primary stage. In particular, what is today known as the United States'

ladder system o f education took much mote time to fully develop.
America’s ladder system is a nation-wide structure o f educational opportunity
and entitlement It is a mostly public three-level hierarchy comprised o f primary,
secondary and higher education layers. At the first level, open to all children, is
elementary or primary education. Students who complete primary school may
advance to the secondary level and high school. Those who satisfy requirements at
that level can move on to higher education, the top o f the education ladder. No
formal restrictions are placed on the upward movement o f any student An individual
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may climb the education ladder as high as his or her desire, abilities, and educational
achievements will take than. It was well into the twentieth century, however, before
aO three layers were firmly in place and educational opportunities at all three levels
were widely inclusive o f all races and social classes. A t the end o f the nineteenth
century only the first rung o f the ladder, the common elementary school, had been
established. The expansion o f secondary and higher education opportunities had not
kept pace with those at the primary level, but there was also not a requirement or
demand that they should during the early 1800s.
This is consistent with Kaelble’s findings for France, Germany and Great
Britain during the same general period. He determined that an increase in postprimary
educational opportunities was not associated with economic growth and development
at the early stages o f industrialization, that linkage only coming later with more
advanced industrialization and the requirement for a more educated workforce, and
as scientific and technical knowledge became critical to further economic growth and
development. Another source o f demand was the growing administrative state, to fill
the swelling ranks o f its civil service. From the standpoint o f consumer demand for
secondary and higher education, Kaelble found it was not until the twentieth century
that aspiring individuals from all classes came to recognize postprimary education as
a gateway to greater socioeconomic opportunity (1981,241-3).
In the early nineteenth century there was not much call for educational
opportunities beyond the primary level. The educational requirements o f
industrialization and the administrative state were still decades away, and it would be
even longer before there would be any significant consumer demand. In terms of the
opportunities that actually existed, secondary and higher education were very far
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from being the second and third rungs o f the American education ladder, and
government was not under pressure to change this situation by creating new
opportunities in the public sector. It did not matter that common secondary schools
did not exist in numbers sufficient to receive iD those children w in had completed
their primary education. O f the few that did go on to attend a secondary school,
many did so only to augment their primary school education, not more; and with that
their formal education would end. Some would go on to university, but not many.
America's first public high school did not even open until 1821, in the city o f Boston,
hi terms o f growth as measured by new public school facilities, increasing
participation rates, curriculum development, and even compulsory attendance laws,
progress came later and much more slowly at the secondary level, its take-off not
coining until the second half o f the nineteenth century. It would take some time
before secondary level educational opportunities matched and were synchronized
with those at the primary level
Secondary education has a dual mission in American society today, one that
has evolved over two centuries. The first is to provide terminal education and training
to all children who have finished elementary school. Right into the current era, for
many, formal education has ended with high school The other is preparation fix’
university studies, a function that has increased much in significance over the years. A
signal event in this regard was the 1862 Morrill Act which established the land-grant
college, the basis for America's system o f state universities and agricultural colleges.
Implementation o f the Morrill Act had the effect o f completing the structure o f
America’s education ladder, and particularly that o f the public sector. By making high
school preparatory to studies at a land-grant college, the Morrill Act created a new
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and growing demand fix’secondary education, and it achieved a functional linkage
between primary, secondary and higher education.
Despite their later start, secondary schools in the public sector grew to
outnumber those in the private by the beginning o f the twentieth century. The
political activism and zeal for reform o f the Progressive era figured prominently in
this expansion; it gave it momentum. The popular American attitude toward
education at that time is captured well by the works o f the philosopher and reformer
John Dewey, and for today as well. That view holds that an educated citizenry is vital
to a good society, to democracy and national prosperity, as well as to individual
growth and development A good education system combines preparation for a
productive life with the making o f good citizens; it is a gateway to opportunity for
both the individual and society.22 Therefore, state investment in educational
expansion and opportunities is a good thing as it can contribute to making a more
productive and better citizenry.23 Educational expansion and achievement, as
measured by increasing secondary level enrollments and graduation rates, would

^Jam es L. Nolan, The Therapeutic State: Justifying Government at
Century's End (New York; New York University Press, 1998X 140-5.
^ I t may also be argued that school expansion, beginning in colonial times,
was a vehicle to maintain foe class structure. Therefore, foe political conflict
perspective “should not be overlooked” as an important explanation for the
expansion of schooling because “concerns with social destabilization and keeping
structure (class included) in place as a result o f growing immigration, urbanization,
legacies o f the Civil War and liberation o f slaves, decline in westward migration,
socialism/populism/trade unionism, etc. can be considered.” Also, “John Dewey with
his idealism and democratic rhetoric was only one of and not the most influential (in
real terms) reformists of that time. Charles Eliot and his doctrine of efficient
management o f education and building social stability by means of widening
educational opportunities were o f major importance then and now” (Elena
Lisovskaya, dissertation defense o f author, notes and detailed comments, 10 July
2002, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo).
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seem evidence that this was a philosophy acted upon. At the beginning o f the
twentieth centuiy only 10 percent o f the nation’s youth received any secondary
education at iQ, and very few graduated. This changed rapidly with the
implementation and growing enrollments in comprehensive secondary schools. By
1940 more than half o f those eligible were enrolled and almost 40 percent completed
their studies. Enrollment was well over 90 percent by the 1990s, and the graduation
rate nearly 7S percent (Ignas and Corsini 1981, 5; OECD 1995,135,214).
Higher education was the last level o f the American ladder system to undergo
a wide-scale expansion o f opportunities in association with an increasing state role,
the last to see the public sector finally overtake the private. American higher
education finds its beginnings with Harvard College, chartered by Massachusetts
colony in 1636 as a school o f liberal arts. The founding o f Harvard was followed by
several more colleges before the Revolutionary War, including: the College of
William and Mary in 1693, Yale in 1701, the University o f Pennsylvania in 1740,
Princeton in 1746, Columbia in 1754, Brown University in 1764, Rutgers in 1766,
Dartmouth in 1769, and Dickinson in 1773. This list is really indicative of the early
dominance of the private sector in that all but Rutgers and William and Mary were
independent colleges, i.e., not state-related or controlled. Moreover, even though
William and Mary and Rutgers were both state institutions, the first state university
was not chartered until 1785—the University o f Georgia, which opened in 1801. The
first state university to actually hold classes was the University o f North Carolina at
Chapel Hill, chartered in 1789 and opened in 1795. For some time, the public sector
would continue to lag the private in higher education facilities and opportunities.
Even as the country expanded westward after the Revolution and during the early
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1800s, most o f the new colleges were established by private and religious
organizations. Today, however, state universities and state-supported colleges and
universities are found in every state—and they outnumber the private sector in
ftdhties, opportunities and enrollments. More directly than it aflfected the growth o f
secondary education, the 1862 Morrill Act was pivotal to this development
The Morrill Act of 1862 that created the land-grant college, was a critical
step toward public sector predominance o f higher education; it helped to provide the
means to that growth. Through this legislation the U.S. Congress gave federal lands
to state governments, 30,000 acres for each o f their congressmen, to support colleges
that were to provide military training as well as faculties for agricultural, mechanical
and home economics studies. While the national government had given land to the
states for educational purposes before, this stipulation for their use was unique.
Intended to see the establishment o f at least one college in every state to teach
"agriculture and the mechanic arts," marry o f America’s great universities are landgrant colleges. There are 70 such schools today. This number includes the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Michigan State University and Ohio State
University. A second Morrill Act was enacted in 1890 to provide animal federal
funding to higher education. Morrill only helped set the stage, though, a great
expansion o f opportunities in higher education did not immediately and automatically
follow its enactment Just as the requirements of the workplace and customer demand

24The American government o f the Revolutionary War period, operating
under the Articles o f Confederation, legislated that land be set aside in the new
western territories to support education. According to the Ordinance o f 1785 and the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, a 1/16 section of every township was designated for
that purpose. How that land would actually be utilized was left to the states and their
local governments.
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were not there to stimulate the expansion o f opportunities at the secondary level, it
would take even longer for there to be similar pressures for higher education.
World War n marks a critical turning point in U.S. education policy, and
especially for higher education. It was during the immediate postwar period that the
large-scale expansion of enrollments and opportunities in higher education really
began, and that coincided with a new policymaking role for the federal government in
educational affairs. In particular, the take-off in higher education is associated with
passage of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act in 1944. Popularly referred to as the
“G.I. Bill,” this federal legislation offered financial assistance to college-bound
military veterans. Between 1944 and 1951 over 2.2 million ex-servicemen benefitted
from this program. In response to the Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite, and other
scientific achievements, Congress passed the 1958 National Defense Education Act
(NDEA) to provide financial assistance and encourage education in the physical
sciences, in mathematics and engineering, in the social sciences and the humanities.
Over the longer term, the increase in student enrollments that are associated with the
G.1 Bill and other educational assistance programs like the NDEA—for veterans and
non-veterans alike—inaugurated a period o f expansion in American higher education
enrollments and opportunities that continued into the 1990s and beyond. Almost 14
million students were enrolled at the nation’s colleges in 1989. In 1992 nearly 39
percent o f those in the 18-21 age group were participating in some public or private
program at the tertiary level, 25 percent at universities and almost 14 percent in non
university programs. What is remarkable, and truly indicative o f the open-ended and
inclusive nature o f the opportunity offered by America’s higher education system, is
the part o f this expansion that may be attributed to the growing participation o f older
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non-traditional students. While the enrollment of students aged 24 years and younger
rose by 24 percent between 1970 and 1989, those o f students older than 24 increased
by 141 percent over the same period (OECD 199S, 153; Valverde 1994,6541-2).
Employment and Vocational Training Programs in American Education
A separate institutional structure fix employment and vocational training like
and with the magnitude of the German dual system was never established in the
American education system. There are now and have been vocational programs,
however. As was noted earlier, the 1917 Smith-Hughes Act provided federal
matching funds to states fix vocational training programs below the university level.
In 1963 Congress passed the Vocational Education Act requiring each state to
establish a Board of Vocational Education, with federal funding made available to the
programs those bodies might establish. In 1973 Congress adopted the Comprehensive
Employment and Training Act (CETA) to combine the funding for the different
training programs of the federal government into a single block grant However,
CETA was abolished by the Congress in 1981 amidst complaints it had mainly
become a public program fix the employment of the most job-ready, and not job
training. In 1982 Congress tried again with the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA),
a program to provide federal funds to local programs that retrained adult and offered
summer jobs for young people. But the JTPA, like similar efforts, has never really
taken root like vocational programs in many European countries.

It has been

observed o f the more recent history o f vocational education that “the decline in

b e n ja m in Ginsberg, Theodore J. Lowi, and Margaret Weir, We the People
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 729.
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vocational program enrollments in the 1990s was to a great extent the result of
extreme inefficiency of vocation education programs to prepare for jobs or to
guarantee a jo b ”26
In the final analysis, the primary function o f the American education system
is—and has been—to provide a general education, not terminal vocational training or
any other specific preparation o f the nation’s youth for the workplace. This objective
is reflected by the relatively standard general education curriculum found in primary
and secondary schools across the nation, and it is borne out by the statistics cited
earlier, that 60 percent o f all high school graduates moved directly into higher
education in 2000, and that only 225 of America’s thousands o f high schools are even
considered vocational (Marlow-Ferguson 2002, 1511; Valverde 1994,6542).
Because educational achievement is defined today as having a college education, the
purpose of the secondary curriculum has become the preparation of students to
advance to that next level That requires a general education including courses in the
physical sciences, mathematics, history, the social sciences, languages, and the
humanities. Whatever the differences borne of decentralization and local
implementation responsibilities, this emphasis is very consistent in the curriculum
offerings o f education systems across the United States.
Education Reform
The expansion o f postprimary educational opportunities is central to
America’s welfare strategy. Educational achievement is encouraged by American

26Elena Lisovskaya, dissertation defense of author, notes and detailed
comments, 10 July 2002, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo.
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society and through public policy as the key to personal fulfillment, socioeconomic
success and security, the alternative to reliance on the safety nets o f state-supported
social insurance programs. While America’s social welfare system is minimal in
comparison to most other Western nations, no other country invests so heavily in
public education relative to its other social programs.27
Given the pivotal role given the education system in the American welfare
strategy, the call and movements for school reform must be viewed as natural to its
national politics. Few other policy areas command such continuous and widespread
attention on the political agenda at all levels of government With educational
attainment so encouraged as the leveler o f social inequalities and great gateway to
socioeconomic opportunities, the education system is a ready issue for the political
process and a logical target for reform. Although the problems cited and the solutions
are many and varied, the goal of reform can typically be distilled to a single and
common objective: an education system o f the very highest quality that leaves no
individual behind in their preparation for an independent, productive, and successful
adult life. Whether the solution advocated is additional funding for the Head Start
program, higher school taxes, facilities renovation, hiring more teachers, curriculum
revision, standardized testing, or vouchers, this seems to be the common theme that
joins all reformers. The dilemma comes in reaching any agreement on particular
problems and a specific definition o f the education mission—what the objectives and
curriculum of a “quality” education system are, and whether the education system

27

No assumptions are made about the efficiency o f that spending, how that
money is distributed, or about real outcomes in terms o f the distribution of
educational opportunities and achievement.
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should be “one size fits «0” or somehow targeted to certain individual and group
requirements. Absent such a consensus about the education problem and mission, it is
little wonder these has been tremendous disagreement over the necessary solutions.
The quality o f the education product delivered by the nation’s public schools
is foremost among the concerns o f many calling for educstion reform today. The
poor performance o f public school students on standardized tests like the Scholastic
Aptitude Test (SAT) are frequently dted as proof o f this problem. Along with
insufficient funding, poor teachers and substandard facilities, singled out as a major
contributory cause are the “anti-intellectual” curricula so prevalent today, educational
programs and policies that downplay academic excellence (Ravitch 2000). What is
required instead, so the argument goes, are the high standards o f a rigorous academic
curriculum. Only with an academic curriculum will students undergo the necessary
intellectual development and receive the preparation required to succeed in the
workplace, in higher education, and for life in society at-large. Having a national
standard for education would be best, with standardized tests utilized to measure
student progress and school performance (Ravitch 2000). Whatever the merit o f this
recommendation, implementation would be difficult given state and local
responsibilities for education.
More controversial are proposals for “school choice,” allowing parents to
choose the schools their children will attend. Proponents of school choice argue that
children would receive the quality education to which they are entitled with such a
policy, often adding that the market-like competition that would ensue between
schools to attract students would ultimately lead to a better education product Many
critics o f school choice counter that such a policy would only make worse existing

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

288
inequalities in funding between schools tnd school districts. They point out that
school choice does not address the problem o f educational quality, that it would
simply reward schools that were already well-financed with even greater funding
while penalizing the poor and underpetfonning schools with even less. Opponents o f
school choice argue that free market analogies do not apply to education. Many
parents, and especially the poor, are unable to take advantage o f school choice
opportunities. Transportation may be a problem and, even with vouchers, they cannot
afford a private alternative to the public school system. The answer, they claim, is in
providing a quality education in the public school system and that is where the focus
and effort should be. Moreover, many would insist that public monies going to
private and religious schools in the form o f vouchers, or indirectly as tax credits,
violate the constitutional separation of church and state.28
School choice proposals and implementations have taken several forms over
time and across the nation. Home-schooling is a traditional option open to parents in
many states. Today, though, the most popular may be the experiment with charter
schools. Created first by Minnesota in 1990, charter schools are funded by state tax
dollars and operate under state guidelines independent o f local school boards. These
schools are given considerable freedom in designing their own curricuhims, in
staffing, and to spend as they see best fits their mission. As a real school choice
option for parents, however, demand has exceeded supply. Although by 1998 over
165,000 students were enrolled in almost 800 charter schools that had been opened in
twenty-three states and the District of Columbia, many schools determined

28For an extended discussion of the school choice issue see Jeffrey R. Henig,

Rethinking School Choice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
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admissions by lottery while others “counseled out” students they determined ill-suited
to their programs.29 Another state and local implementation o f school choice permits
parents to choose the public school their chQd will attend in the school district of
their residence. This has sometimes been extended to include nearby public school
districts that agree to be part o f such an arrangement At least sixteen states have
adopted such an out-of-district school choice option. Another version extends school
choice to private and religious schools, with parents given state vouchers or tax
credits that can be applied to tuition costs. Milwaukee and Geveland currently
support voucher programs. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in June 2002 that
Cleveland’s voucher program did not violate the constitutional separation o f church
and state.30
The 2000 presidential campaign found both the Democratic and Republican
candidates calling for a greater federal role in public education. Republican George
W. Bush called for malring schools more accountable, tying a school's federal aid to
the performance o f its students in grades three through eight on standardized reading
and math tests, ha association, Bush proposed an increase o f approximately $10
billion in federal spending to support reading programs for disadvantaged youth,
teacher recruitment and training, charter schools, and new technologies acquisition.
He also favored vouchers and federal funding to help parents pay for the costs o f

^ o r additional statistics and discussion on the topic of charter schools and
school choice more generally, see Thomas Toch, “The New Education Bazaar,” U.S.
News & WorldReport, 27 April 1998,35-46.
30A detailed discussion o f the current status o f both the school voucher and
charter school programs is provided by Gerald W. Bracey, “The Condition o f Public
Education,” Phi Delta Kappan, October 2001, 157-169.
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private schools. Democrat A1 Gore’s education plan focused on “fixing” the public
school system. He also advocated greater school accountability, saying that foiling
schools should be closed and reopened under a new leadership if they did not meet
specified standards. Like Bush, Gore favored the creation o f charter schools, but not
vouchers or federal assistance that would go to the private sector. Gore also talked
about standardized tests to measure student performance, but he would have made
them voluntary. Under Gore’s plan, federal aid would not be made contingent upon
mandatory testing. Gore also wanted improve the quality o f America’s teachers,
especially in low-income rural areas and the inner-dties. To do so he proposed hiring
more teachers and increasing teachers’ salaries, in-service training and evaluation,
and a plan to provide $10,000 scholarships to college students who would teach in
“high need” schools for four years following their graduation.
Concerns about the quality of the nation’s education system and calls for
reform did not go away after the 2000 elections. Education reform is an ongoing
process in America, not an event, and it continues to hold a prominent position on the
political agenda at all levels o f government However, because education is a state
and local function, it is unlikely any national standards will finally be set for
institutional structures, curriculums, or student performance. Experiments will
continue with vouchers, charter schools, and parental choice across and within the
fifty states. There may be more standardized testing nationwide, but it is unlikely
there will be a national standard. Although the Bush administration has been
successful in seeing the enactment of legislation that attaches federal monies to the
results o f standardized tests conducted by the states, it remains to be seen how this
new policy will be implemented. It has largely been left for the states to decide.
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A nim iarinn of American Education Policy
The logic of industrialization does not help explain the spread of mass
education in nineteenth century America. Educational expansion often took place in
rural areas before more industrialized sections o f the country. In the antebellum
period much o f the growth in public schooling occurred in the rural Midwest In the
Mid-Atlantic and more developed New England areas h began even before largescale industrialization (Bengtson and Achenbaum 1993,47). Nor can the actions o f a
ruling elite, the mobilization of working class interests, or the power o f the state
explain this phenomenon. Educational opportunities began to expand at the primary
level prior to large-scale industrialization, when political parties were in their infancy,
and before the modem administrative nation-state. Neither the states nor the national
government were greatly involved in education policy.
Arguments that " mm education systems were created as instruments o f ruling
class domination—through the concerted actions o f a unified economic elites—or by
modem administrative states, lack historical foundation. Any “concerted action” by
capitalist interests was highly unlikely in early America (Fuller and Rubinson 1992,
11). In his study of the causes for educational expansion in the United States,
Rubinson (1986) claims that “class analyses have foiled because (1) they neglect the
role o f the political process in transforming class interests into institutional patterns,
and (2) they neglect the process by which political structures themselves become
important determinants o f class formation” (519). Such explanations tend to overlook
the infancy of the United States government, the weak national party system o f the
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1800s, and that class-based politics have never been a salient feature o f American
politics.
A better explanation may be found in the localism that is often characteristic
o f American politics, a legacy o f the early nation and its state-building. There was not
a powerful central government in the early years o f the United States. Very often,
even the ability o f state and local governments to effectively rule was tenuous. The
geographic spread o f the nation, the physical insecurity o f frontier environs, poor
communications and difficult transportation, all these encouraged localist tendencies
and a reverence for individualism. To seek local solutions in answer to local
requirements—like education o f the young—was the norm, not an exception.
Localist tendencies were reinforced by the federal design o f the Constitution and then
by the evolution o f the American federal state.
As for the expansion and increasing public support o f secondary and higher
education opportunities that began in the early twentieth century, this development
really cannot be considered apart from the emergence o f the American welfare state
and its social programs. New educational opportunities and social entitlements grew
in parallel. Skocpol goes so far as to contend that even the education benefits offered
to veterans o f the armed services should properly be considered within the
framework o f social programs undertaken by the government to promote the general
welfare o f society (1987,352). Indeed, for those who took advantage o f its
provisions, the 1944 G.I. Bill represented a great socioeconomic opportunity. The
same may be said for other tuition grants and student loan programs that are
promoted by the states and federal government to encourage greater enrollments at
the nation’s colleges and universities. The priority of higher education as a national
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objective is underscored by the level o f financial support it receives from the federal
government. Whereas the national governmen ts contribution to combined primary
and secondary funding represents only 7.6 percent o f the total, its share o f spending
for higher education is 36.2 percent (OECD 1995,117, 118).
A welfare strategy that stigmatises public assistance, emphasizes self-help,
and encourages educational achievement goes a long way to explain the absence o f a
comprehensive social welfare system in the United States. Indeed, it has been argued
that state support o f educational expansion and opportunity in the America is, and
has been, an alternative to other social programs (Heclo 1985; Janowitz 1976; King
1973; Welter 1962). Beyond recognizing the right to a basic education as a core
citizen entitlement, legislation adopted by the federal and state governments has
encouraged—but not guaranteed

educational achievement as the way to individual

economic independence and security. This was the case with the G.L Bill and so
many other financial grant and student loan programs supported by the states and
federal government. The effort to achieve an equitable distribution o f educational
opportunities has not been without problems, however. Over the years there have
been several instances o f legislation and judicial rulings intended to promote greater
equality, to advance or protect minority civil and political rights, and otherwise
encourage individual achievement by opening up and expanding educational and
other socioeconomic opportunities—particularly for minorities and women. The U.S.
Supreme Court’s Brown decisions o f 1954 and 1955, Lyndon Johnson’s “war on
poverty,” and the civil rights legislation o f the 1960s and beyond provide excellent
examples. Likewise does the conservative welfare backlash o f the 1980s and 1990s,
the reforms undertaken by many states to reduce their welfare rolls, the Welfare
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Reform Act o f 1996, the plans for education reform o f the Clinton and Bush
administrations, education reform as a central issue in the 2000 national elections and
beyond, the school voucher and “choice” movements. All these indicate a continuing
commitment by America’s government and political leadership to a minimal welfare
state and an

instead, on self-help through work and educational attainment.
Conclusions and Discussion

Explanations for Education and Social Welfare Policies: Germany and America
The adoption of social insurance and other income maintenance programs
took place much later in the United States than Europe. In the particular case of
public health and housing, the American lag in social legislation was for longer than a
generation and the benefits provisions have been for more limited, both in
comprehensiveness and the portion o f the population covered (Heidenheimer 1973,
316-17). With respect to spending, while European states have committed a greater
and growing proportion o f their GDPs to implement social programs over recent
years, social expenditures by the United States have not grown as much (Lane,
McKay, and Newton 1996).
On the other hand, America set the pace in the expansion o f public education
at the post-primary level. The expansion o f secondary level educational opportunities
began long before the “big bang” o f the New Deal. A generation passed before
Europe followed the 1890s “takeoff* o f secondary education in the United States
(Heidenheimer 1973,316,319). Likewise; in the early years after the Second World
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War, the United States led the way in the expansion o f opportunities in higher
education.
On the surface, a structural socioeconomic explanation for the sodal
programs adopted by Germany in the 1880s and the United States in the 1930s seems
appropriate. It is difficult not to argue that those social reforms were undertaken as
state responses to the effects o f industrialization, that they were measures undertaken
to preserve order and the status quo. They certainty were, to a large degree.
Industrialization had been underway for some time in each country, especially in the
United States. In both nations, major and initial social welfare legislation was
preceded by a period of national economic crisis and enacted during a time of social
unrest Germany’s social programs o f the 1880s came after a series o f economic
problems in the 1870s, America’s New Deal social legislation during the Great
Depression o f the 1930s. However, it is just too simple and deterministic to leave the
explanation with the logic o f industrialism or as the response of a state controlled by
a capitalist elite intent on maintaining the social order. Politics mattered too, and a
great deal, both for the timing o f social reforms and the substantive result Skocpol
and Ikenberry (1983) have proposed that
Pioneering social insurance innovations, especially, were not simply responses
to the socioeconomic dislocations of industrialism; nor were they
straightforward concessions to demands by trade unions or working-class
based parties. Rather they are best understood. . . as sophisticated efforts at
anticipatory political incorporation of the industrial working class, coming
earlier (on the average) in paternalist, monarchical-bureaucratic regimes that
hoped to head off working-class radicalism, and coming slightly later (on the
average) in gradually democratizing liberal parliamentary regimes, whose
competing political parties hoped to mobilize new working-class voters into
their existing political organizations and coalitions (90).
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For both countries the political process was very important, and especially
their political leadership. The leadership and actions of Bismarck and Roosevelt were
critical to the legislative process and outcomes, probably more so than the
institutional activities o f either the German Reichstag or the U.S. Congress. It was
not democratization or leftist governments, but the actions of conservative
authoritarian and centrist political leaderships that made social reform possible in
both countries. Although leftist party rule was not a factor in either state, their
political influence and that o f organized labor and a restive working class most
probably were—and moreso in Germany than America. The political constellation o f
forces was changing in both nations and the actions o f the political leadership may be
seen as indicative o£ and a reaction to, economic developments and a changing
domestic political context—hard times, working class discontent, and the growing
attractiveness in the political mainstream of social policies championed by the left
Similarly, a structural socioeconomic explanation does not suffice for the
expansion o f educational opportunities in Germany and America. Mass education in
Germany and America took place long before large-scale industrialization, in rural
areas as well as urban. It was independent o f industrial requirements. Therefore, the
logic of industrialism is not an acceptable explanation. Nor was the growth of
educational opportunities at the primary level a function o f political regime type, of
government organization, or particular partisan control. Instead, most scholars tend
to concur with Boli, Ramirez, and Meyer (1985)—the “John Meyer'’ school—that
mass education is best associated with the process o f modem state-building. The
expansion of secondary and higher education represents a decidedly different case,
however. Industrialization, the political process, partisanship, democratization, the
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emergence and growth o f the administrative welfare stale are all important variables.
Educational expansion and reforms at the postprimary level correspond and appear to
be asiodated with advancing industrialization, increasing democratization, and
partisan control by those who championed social welfare programs and greater
socioeconomic opportunity for all members o f society. The SPD was behind many o f
the initiatives and reforms in Germany that expanded educational opportunities, hi
America it was the partisan control of government by Progressives and the
Democratic party, with their agendas for socio-political reform and greater
socioeconomic opportunity.
It was also not increasing democratization that triggered social reforms, as the
pluralist variant o f political conflict theory would predict, for that would have put
America ahead o f Germany in the legislation o f social insurance. A more inclusive
and participatory government does not explain the different timing. When Germany
undertook major social reforms in the 1880s, male suffrage was still very limited and
women could not vote. By comparison, the American political process was far more
inclusive even though women were also denied the franchise. Part o f the explanation
can be found in the different political movements and party systems o f the two
countries. Germany’s earlier adoption of a social security system may wed be
attributable to the catalytic influence of working class mobilization, the rise of social
democratic politics, and the anticipation o f greater enfranchisement, factors that did
not play a similar role in development of the American welfare state. Hage,
Hanneman, and Gargan (1989) argue that countries with democratic governments,
like the United States, may be late in social policy development for lack o f a
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necessary consensus, while more authoritarian governments—like Bismarck’s—may
act sooner out o f their concern for legitimacy (132).
The United States does not have a tradition o f labor-based and socialist
parties, nor o f conservative politics comparable to Germany’*. There has never been
a political movement or programmatic political party in the United States Glee the
SPD in Germany that mobilized and represented the interests o f the working class
and organized labor, had a chance to win elections, to form a government, and
control the legislative agendas at the national and local levels. Although American
labor has frequently been found aligned with the positions o f the Democratic party,
particularly since the 1930s when that party won the White House and a majority in
the Congress, this has not meant the rise o f working class consciousness or laborbased leftist parties as it did in Germany (cf. Hicks, Misra, and Ng, 199S).
At the same time, however much they were politically conscious, organized—
or not—and represented in the political process, the working class and labor were the
major beneficiaries o f social reform in Germany and America. That remains so today
and now also includes the middle class. What has been different are the roles o f the
working class and labor-based political parties at the front-end of the policymaking
process and within the government. The growing influence o f social democracy and
labor-based politics spurred the conservative Bismarck to action, in order to blunt the
left’s growing political support he preempted its social welfare agenda. Later years
would see a change in political fortunes, and it would be the SPD as the party-ingoverament that would implement social programs in the name of labor and working
class interests. Labor, the working class, and Social Democracy have had no
comparable impact in American politics. Although there was clearly apprehension
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about communists, socialists and organized labor in some Washington circles during
the time o f the Great Depression, it was not fear o f the left that was the motivating
force fix the Roosevelt administration*! New P e e l Indeed, Roosevelt required a
political consensus o f the center and the right, not pressure from the left and labor to
advance the social welfare interests o f the working class. Indeed, as the story goes,
the support o f organized labor may have been tough to get anyhow; important labor
leaders like Samuel Gompers preferred to keep and pursue labor and working class
interests as part of their negotiations with industrial management (Heidenheimer
1973,318-9).
Despite their different origins and timing, however the government was
moved to action in the first place, Bismarck’s social insurance initiatives o f the 1880s
and Roosevelt’s New Deal of the 1930s similarly put social welfare on the permanent
government agenda in both countries. It is no exaggeration to say that the German
and American welfare states of today represent the institutionalization o f that agenda.
Likewise, the welfare state has not become the instrument and servant o f working
interests; neither country manifests an absolute convergence o f working class
and state interests in its social programs—and it would hardly be expected to be
otherwise. Germany’s social insurance programs emphasize the collective
responsibility o f groups for the welfare o f their members. Social safety nets are
comprehensive in their coverage and broad in their inclusiveness, but they operate to
protect and maintain the status quo; and they tend to perpetuate the existing class
structure and inequalities. America’s social welfare provisions are intended to
encourage individual responsibility for one’s own welfare. Benefits are minimal and
educational opportunity is encouraged as an alternative means and gateway to
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individual social security. Like Germany’s, the American welfare system tends to
perpetuate the existing socioeconomic order and its inequalities.
Enuring institutions and organizations also played a central role in the welfare
legislation o f the United States and Germany. New social programs were not created
out of thin air. Private and religious groups were involved in the business o f social
assistance before the state in both countries, and local and regional levels o f
government before the national. The social policies o f the German and American
welfare states were built upon the experience and example o f these local and regional
programs. Germany had the model o f the guild associations upon which to structure
its government-brokered social insurance system. America had the experience o f the
states and local governments to draw upon. They were the incubators and
laboratories for the social policies of the New Deal’s "big bang.” The point is,
whether from an existing federal arrangement or as the result o f a commitment to
decentralization, the social welfare provisions o f both countries drew upon local and
regional experiences with public assistance, and they still reflect those local origins
and influence today. That legacy is evident in the administrative decentralization o f
many social programs and the continued preference for local solutions today,
including education. The implementation o f a federal frame for government in both
countries has overlaid this local foundation.
Looking bade, it seems dear that much o f the policymaking for social welfare
programs and education—Bismarck’s social insurance initiatives, school reforms
during Weimar, health care insurance as part o f Roosevelt's New Deal, medical
coverage for just the elderly and poor under Lyndon Johnson, implementation o f the

Gesamtschule—reflects the tenacity of existing institutions to structure and resist
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fundamental change, as weil is the reality that politics is often the “art o f the
possible.” As time passes, current policy and institutions explain very much o f
subsequent policymaking, for defining the stnicture and rules of the game—what is
possible. Clearly, neither Bismarck nor Roosevelt invented anything very new in
social welfare. Instead, to their credit and advantage, they evaluated what policy
solutions were already "out there,” judged what was politically feasible, and built
upon that—social security programs already implemented locally. Likewise, one
might argue that the limited health care provisions adopted under Lyndon
Johnson—Medicare and Medicaid—were all that could be accomplished given the
particular politics and institutionalization o f American welfare state at that tune.
Institutions like the welfare state are the legacy o f prior political activities, but
they are not the stuff from which history is made and written. Institutions only affect,
they do not determine political behavior and outcomes. Although institutional
structuring is a very important factor in determining what is “politically possible”—
what may happen at a moment in time—that opportunity is modified, made greater or
less, by the occurrence of particular events and/or the presence of certain individuals.
Institutions can help to explain the “how” and “why” o f political phenomena but, at
best, it is a partial account. Institutions do not tell the “who,” “what,” and “when”
that is the substance o f history, nor do they provide the human component o f the
“how” and “why.” A more complete and satisfactory explanation for political
phenomena also includes consideration for the individuals who make history—the
Bismarcks and Roosevelts—and the cataclysmic events—like economic depressions
and war—that are the stuff and shapers o f history. In this respect, Kingdon’s (1995)
model o f the policymaking process may bring something essential to explanations o f
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social welfare and education policies in the United States and Germany. His
hypothesis that a “window” for policymaking may open when particular problems,
policy solutions (ideas), and political opportunities (mandates and political
entrepreneurs) come together helps to separate and highlight the variables o f interest,
to ascertain the timing and decisive nature of the context in which policies are
produced—history is made.
The separate streams o f problems, policies, and politics come together at
certain critical times. Solutions become joined to problems, and both o f them
are joined to favorable political forces. This coupling is most likely when a
policy window—an opportunity to push pet proposals or one’s conceptions
o f problems—is open.
Policy windows are opened either by the appearance o f compelling
problems or by happenings in the political stream. Hence, there are “problems
windows” and “political windows” (Kingdon 1995,194).
The institutionalization o f a welfare state and the development o f its social
programs depends very much upon the circumstances of origination. Appreciation for
existing institutions is certainly important, but recognition o f “compelling problems”
and “happenings in the political stream” is essential to any meaningful explanation of
welfare state development and policymaking in Germany and the United States. As it
concerns social welfare policies, the state of the economy, unemployment, partisan
politics, and the role o f individuals in political leadership are especially significant.
For Germany o f the 1880s and the United States in the 1930s, the state o f the
economy, political institutions, political leadership, and the existence o f local
solutions were decisive factors in social welfare outcomes. It has not been the same
for education policy, however. Like the welfare state, postprimary educational
expansion can be associated with economic development. But the history of
educational expansion and reform has been mostly of gradual change, not o f sudden
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“big bangs.” The state o f the economy and unemployment levels can have a
temporary effect on enrollment*—with student populations growing during times of
rising unemployment—but without being a catalyst for education reforms or a
permanent expansion o f educational opportunities. Although partisan politics have
been important to educational reform in both Germany and America, the role o f
specific political leaders has been much less a factor, especially at the national level
Education policy in Germany and America has been more subject to the influence o f
local forces and politics than social welfare policy. It has tended to evolve slowly,
building on the cumulative experience and lessons learned at the state and local level.
One might be able to point to a state—or a school district—that “started the ball
rolling” in education reform, but nothing in education policy happened all at once in
every state across either nation.
The Awnetation Between Education and Social Welfare Policies:
Germany and America
Only a limited number o f scholars have actually addressed a specific
relationship between state provisions for social welfare and education (Castles 1989;
de Swaan 1988; Furiker, Johansson, and Lind 1990; Ginsburg 1992; Hage,
Hanncman, and Gargan 1989; Hedo 198S; Heidenheimer 1973,1981; Janowitz
1976; Lindert 1994). O f the literature that does exist and is relevant to this
discussion, more has been written about Germany than the United States.
While it is certainly for more than mere conjecture, the policy association that
exists between social welfare and education in Germany and America—and other
Western societies as well—must largely be established by inference. Although
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education and other social welfare policies reflect common societal objectives, there
is not a specific and ongoing empirical linkage between the two—within the political
system, the organization o f government, the legislative process, or in administration
and support. Indeed, and once again, it would be unusual to find a single government
official or agency that has real and comprehensive authority over both policy areas.
This does not mean to say that political leaders and others within government do not
have or do not advocate complementary policy stances on social welfare and
education—in fact, they often do, and what they have to say and how they act is most
telling o f the relationship that does exist between the two policy areas—but no one
individual or group has the power to implement a particular policy strategy for
education and social welfare. Bismarck attempted to do so, but he foiled in his
attempt to implement a strategy for social welfare and education that would make
them both instruments o f state power for societal control. Indeed, there was effective
resistance to his linkage o f social and education policy—from the working class, from
local and religious authorities, from partisan opposition and other vested interests,
because o f the implementation and institutionalization o f government, and from the
bureaucracy (Mitchell 1991,49-50; Nevermann and Richter 1983,85; Rimlinger
1971,114-15,126-9; Wehler 1993,116-21). As powerful as the German chancellor
and American president are, those offices are no exception.
In Western nations the decisionmaking authority and implementation
responsibilities for education and social policy are normally divided and shared
between branches and levels o f government. Primarily it is legislatures and
parliaments that make policy—through a partisan process that often includes
specialists and other vested interests—and then some government bureaucracy is
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charged with the task o f program implementation. Education and social programs are
normally administered by bureaucracies that are functionally separate, even in cases
where they have been agencies in the same government ministry or department31 It
is also very common to find decisionmaking authority and implementation
responsibilities decentralized—particularly for education, but also for social
welfare—even absent a federal arrangement or some other constitutionally mandated
division o f governmental powers.
The Problem With Federalism
The federal attribute o f the German and American states makes it more
difficult—but not impossible—to identify the linkage between education and social
policy. It is a challenge because the responsibility for education and social programs
is divided and shared between branches, organizations, and levels o f government.
Education is primarily a state and local function in both Germany and the United
States. Social welfare, on the other hand, has a decidedly national character. It is far
more pronounced in Germany with its more mature and comprehensive social
insurance system than in the U.S. with its hodgepodge of social programs, where the
protection of social safety nets can vary so greatly from state to state.

First created as an agency within the Ministry of the Interior, in 1817 the
Education Ministry o f the Prussian government was moved to department status
within the Ministry o f Religion, Education and Public Health, with separate divisions
for primary, secondary and higher education. Only in 1969 did the German federal
government finally establish a Ministry o f Education. In the United States, education
was included with other social welfare programs when the Eisenhower administration
established the Department o f Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) in 19S3. A
separate Department of Education was established by the Carter administration in
1979.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

306
The constitution o f neither country includes any instructions about a
necessary association o f education with social policy. If (me is looking for specific
institutional linkages or common policymakers and processes, then the governmental
organization and delegations o f power that are detailed by each federal constitution
offer very little to illuininate that relationship. As a nutter o f fact, the provisions of
neither constitution really ted exactly how the federal system actualty works, how the
policymaking for education and other social programs actually takes place, or how
those programs have finally been implemented. In both countries the executive and
legislative bodies that were given constitutional authority over social welfare and/or
education policy at the national and state levels have delegated much o f that power to
bureaucracies and lower levels of government, that were then made responsible for
program administration and support In both countries there are participants and
processes in the policymaking for education and social policy that are not
constitutionally defined.
But even without a constitutional road map, the linkage between education
and social policy is clear in the manner those programs were developed,
implemented, and institutionalized overtime, across and between levels of the
German and American federal systems. In the first place, the current education and
social programs o f each welfare state developed in response to many of the same
political and socioeconomic forces. Whatever the functional separation of
governmental responsibilities for each policy sector, they were products of the same
political system and the same world. It makes sense that they might reflect
complementary societal objectives. Second, such a linkage is supported by the history
o f government organization and policy administration in both countries. For extended

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

307
periods of time in both Germany and the United States, the government offices
charged with educational affairs were agencies within the ministries or departments
responsible for other social programs. A separate federal Ministry o f Education was
not esfrhliriMd in Germany until 1969, and a U.S. Department of Education was not
created until 1979. Third, the lines o f debate for the partisan conflict over social and
education policy have been fairly constant in both countries over time. There has
been a remarkable continuity in the platforms o f the major political parties and the
policy positions that their leaderships have advocated over the years.
The individuals and groups that have made and administered education and
social policies in Germany and America represent strong evidence o f the association
between those two policy areas. The division of responsibilities in a federal
arrangement does not mean that elected and appointed public officials, even
bureaucrats—whatever their function in government—have not formed a coherent
opinion that brings together education and social welfare programs. This is
particularly true o f those holding or seeking elective offices. Candidates for public
office are normally pressed to declare their policy positions as a matter o f public
record during the campaign process, so that the electorate might evaluate and
determine which candidate should receive their vote to participate in the
decisionmaking process for education, social welfare and other public policy matters.
Moreover, federal systems see a good deal of personnel movement, within and
between the local, state and national governments. Over the course of a public career
it is likely that elected and appointed office-holders—and many bureaucrats,
too—will become exposed to and involved with education or social welfare
policy—and frequently both. For legislators, who often advance from state-level seats
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to national, it is normal. I would argue it is not illogical to conclude a
complementarity to the social and education policies a legislator might champion.
Judges likewise, who may be elected or appointed to a number o f benches
throughout the state and federal systems during their career, may preside over cases
concerning both education and social programs. There are not separate courts for
social welfare and educational matters. One would presume some consistency o f
thought in their legal decisions.
It is a nation’s political leadership, though, who may best illustrate at the
individual level the relationship between education and social policy. They are
expected to have a comprehensive view of education and social welfare. Moreover,
with political careers that often have roots in state and local government, they
typically have experience with the substantively different issues and programs o f
education and social welfare at the state and national levels. In this regard, four o f the
last five U.S. presidents saved as state governors—Carter, Reagan, Clinton, and
G. W. Bush—before moving on to the White House. This applies as well to the
German chancellor and to the leadership o f the Bundestag and U.S. Congress. Those
individuals, the policies that they and their national political parties represent, speak
loudly to the harmony that exists between education and social policies.32

32This is not meant to imply that the education and social welfare policies o f
Germany and the United States are or should be perfectly matched, that they
represent the precise implementation o f one or another party’s plan for education and
social policy, or that there are no logical inconsistencies between the two policy
areas. A welfare state’s portfolio of education and social policies is a slow-to-evolve
work-in-process. Its education and social programs were not all given birth at the
same historical moment by the same government with the same societal objectives in
response to the same socioeconomic and political forces, after which time all
provisions remain forever unchanged. Although I would argue that there is a
(continued...)
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As well as at the individual level, there is another important policy linkage at
the group level—one that operates both within and outside the government. Political
paities develop policy positions on social welfare and education in order to mobilize
electoral support, win elections u d run the government Their campaign platforms
and rhetoric o f the major German and American political parties provide excellent
examples. Germany’s Social Democrats might be associated with calls for > more
generous social welfare system and a more egalitarian education system, the
CDU/CSU for sodal insurance that supports the existing socioeconomic order and an
education system to match. From the American Republican Party are heard calls for
reform o f the nation’s social welfare programs, for private insurance alternatives,
greater personal responsibility, and support o f educational opportunities that would
include an expansion o f private sector alternatives. Republican president G.W. Bush
is representative of the belief in personal responsibility, less and minimal public
assistance programs, and a greater reliance on private market insurance alternatives.

32(...continued)
common theme to the social and education policies o f each welfare state—EspingAndersen (1990) has described three general types—a theme that becomes ever
stronger as the welfare state matures and institutionalizes, its prognuns need not ever
be in complete harmony in terms o f their societal objectives. Individual education and
sodal programs will reflect their enactment as a response to different sodoeconomic
forces at different points in time by different partisan governments for different
sodetal objectives—all which affect a program’s implementation, institutionalization
and subsequent path dependence. However, as the welfare state continues to mature
over time its portfolio o f education and sodal polides can be expected—as a
consequence o f exposure to the same sodoeconomic and political forces, and
because o f subsequent legislative amendments and reforms—to converge within their
separate policy sectors. The provisions of new programs will tend to reflect similar
objectives and methods of implementation. Germany’s long-term care insurance is a
good example. If a prescription drug program for seniors is adopted by the U.S.
government, it will likely build upon the existing foundation o f Medicare and
Medicaid.
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As a strategy o f education reform he supports a market-like competition for students
by the nations public and private schools, with vouchers given to parents that would
permit them to make a school “choice.” Democrats also make the case for welfare
reform, but they would advocate a broadening o f the social safety net and champion
its expansion to include new provisions for health care. Their notion o f education
reform means improving the quality o f the public school system. Former vicepresident and presidential candidate A1 Gore advocated reforms o f the current social
welfare system that he believed were necessary to put it on firm financial ground for
future generations, expansion o f its safety net—particularly in the area o f public
health—and “fixing” the public schools over the expansion of private sector
alternatives.
In the final analysis, although the policy linkage is very real, individual
politicians and bureaucrats generally have only very limited or no simultaneous
policymaking authority over both education and social programs. There is no one
individual or agency of government in the United States or Germany that is
completely in charge and responsible for either and all areas of social or education
policy.33 Even a president or chancellor whose party also controls the national and
many state governments, the political agenda and decisionmaking process, is limited
in his or her ability to create or modify the public polity for education or social
welfare in any wholesale fashion. The U.S. president and Congress have no formal

Governors of American states may come closest, with some powers and
responsibilities in each policy area. However, not only is a governor’s authority
typically very limited—checked and circumscribed by other organizations and layers
o f government—but it does not touch on all social welfare and education programs
supported by their state and the federal government
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authority over the policymaking and administration of local school districts, and local
school boards have no control over the administration o f Social Security or
Medicare. A «mn«r rr>mp^,t m*frt«t;'y*tlf>tl o f social welfare and education programs
exists in Germany, and it is unlikely to change. This structural separation o f education
and social policy sectors is institutionalized in both countries, it is the way things are
done; and it will naturally resist change that is too fast or too radical a departure from
the existing rules o f the game.
Summary Conclusions
The difficulties o f federalism aside, what can be said about the social and
education policies of Germany and the United States? What is the nature o f the
association between the two policy areas in each country, and what differences can be
cited between Germany and the United States? There are several points that stand
out

First, and certainly the most obvious, the social welfare and education
systems o f the two countries are not the same. Germany and the United States are
two very different kinds o f welfare states, with unique education and social policy
profiles that reflect distinctive societal goals and objectives. The institution of
Germany’s welfare state presumes the collective responsibility o f groups for the
general welfare and social security o f their members. Its comprehensive suite of
compulsory social programs were structured to ensure that protection, and
simultaneously to perpetuate the existing socioeconomic and political order. The
state’s primary role is that o f broker in a social insurance system where employers
and employees are the primary contributors and administrators. Benefit levels are
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determined by one’s occupation group and what has been “earned.” Dependent
family members arc covered under the provisions of the working family member's
insurance coverage—who is assumed to be male. Only a marginal private sector
exists, to service the insurance needs o f specific professions and those individuals
with greater economic means.
Germany’s education system complements the social policies o f its welfare
state despite the different local, state, and national responsibilities for the
implementation of those programs. Even considering the substantial expansion o f
opportunities over the last fifty years in secondary and higher education, the German
education system still tends to mirror and serve the preservation o f existing
socioeconomic divisions. Even though the education system may be tuition-free from
primary through the university level, the gateway and access to greater educational
opportunities remains restricted. “The considerable expansion o f the higher education
system is not in itself a sufficient indication o f greater equalization o f opportunities in
German society” (Geflert 1996,317). There is still a clear class bias in the distribution
o f educational opportunities, one that is institutionalized in the “socially
discriminating” tripartite secondary school system (Dichanz and Zahorik 1998,71). It
is an education system with a greater commitment to vocational training for the many
and lower classes than greater access to higher education—the vehicle o f upward
social mobility. At the tertiary levd, students from working class backgrounds remain
disproportionately underrepresented in traditional universities, while those from
middle class backgrounds or whose fathers were graduates o f a university arc
overrepresented. The converse is true for the newer Fachhochschulen, where the
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working class is overrepresented and the upper strata of German society is
underrepresented (GeOert 1996,313-7).
In comparison to Germany, the American welfare state is minimal. It is
reflective o f a society that emphasizes personal responsibility for one’s outcome. The
old-age retirement system (Social Security) provides only a minimum pension.
Benefits for unemployment and work injury insurance are employment-based and
eamings-related. Eligibility for income assistance programs is determined by meanstesting. There are no provisions for universal health insurance or long-term care. The
state-supported health coverage that does exist is available only to those who meet
age or means-tested requirements. It is a welfare state where the private insurance
sector remains a most important and necessary alternative for work injury insurance,
income protection, old-age pensions, and health care services.
In the United States, public policy encourages educational achievement over
reliance on broad social safety nets. Generous public investment in educational
opportunities represents educational achievement as the gateway and vehicle of
upward social mobility, an alternative means to individual socioeconomic security
that is functionally equivalent to state-supported social insurance. Indeed, and with
the additional economic benefits that may be realized through educational
achievement, it is expected that individuals will be in an even better position to ensure
their own income security and protection through private sector investments and
insurance products. This alternative welfare strategy is supported by a public school
system that is tuition-free through the secondary level. Although higher education is
not tuition-free, it is heavily subsidized by public funding and financial assistance is
widely available to students from both public and private sources. There are not
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formal obstacles to educational advancement and achievement like a differentiated
system o f secondary schools otm Abitur?* Although bias has not been eliminated in
the distribution o f educational opportunities, progress has been made against past
discriminations based on differences on class, race, and gender.

Second,' the relationship between social and education policies has been o f a
specific and enduring nature since the origins o f each nation’s welfare state. In both
countries social and education policies complement one another. From their
beginnings, and still today, Germany’s social insurance and education policies have
tended to support perpetuation o f the existing social order. The occupation-oriented
guild structure for social insurance has been retained, even to providing the basic
design for long-term care insurance in 1994. To a great extent the German education
system has mirrored and continues to reproduce the existing socioeconomic order. In
the United States, on the other hand, there has been a greater emphasis on general
education—the gateway to university studies—and for less on separate vocational
training alternatives. In America, there is not an two-year “orientation phase” at the
primary level, at the end o f which students are directed into a class-biased tripartite
secondary system with very specific vocational training and general education
curricuhnns. There are not secondary level “leaving” examinations in the United
States, nothing comparable to the German Abitur that restricts the gateway to
university education. A low Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) score may limit the

34Germany is not alone. Other nations also employ exit or admission
examination systems that may restrict educational advancement and achievement
Japan and the United Kingdom are among that number. Others have instituted
differentiated school systems, including Ireland, Switzerland and the United Kingdom
(Elena Lisovskaya, dissertation defense of author, notes and detailed comments, 10
July 2002, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo).
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number o f colleges an American student may be admitted to, but it is unUkdy to
the opportunity to attend any and all institutions o f higher education.

Third, in both countries politics and powerful politicians mattered greatly to
social reform. Groundbreaking social welfare initiatives are associated with
individuals who played central and pivotal roles in their nation’s political
history—Bismarck in Germany and Franklin Roosevelt in the United States. It has
been less the case with educational expansion. Particular individuals have certainly
been important, but I would argue they were not as significant to the actual politics
and process o f educational reform. Wilhelm von Humboldt in Germany and John
Dewey in America did not “make it happen” in education the same way that the
leadership o f a Chancellor Bismarck or a President Roosevelt did in social policy.
The Humboldt reforms of 1810 were clearly a landmark event in German education,
they have affected the structure of the education system ever since, but Humboldt
alone does little to help to explain the timing or the politics. Neither does Dewey.
The expansion o f educational opportunities has been more the product and
consequence o f other sociopolitical forces and events—organized religion and the
tradition o f local control, state-building, industrialization, interested social and
economic groups, and programmatic national parties like the German SPD.

Fourth, although controlling education and social welfare policy for common
national purposes was clearly an objective o f German governments—in Prussia and
later in Imperial Germany—it was never dearly so in the United States, largely for
the tradition o f local control and the authority given to the states over educational
affairs within the federal arrangement What is more, the national government o f the
United States has never competed with local authorities for control of primary- and
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secondary-level education, let alone to wrest control o f the education system from
organized religion.35 Although the politicians o f both countries have shown an
appreciation for the importance o f the nation’s education system to socioeconomic
development and political sodatization, it was not always the same way or for the
same reasons. Bismarck saw the German education system as an instrument for
societal management that could service his political agenda and facilitate his statebuilding task; for this he had no counterpart in American politics. Even though
education policy has been, and is, the object o f political rhetoric by national
politicians in the United States, real governmental authority for educational affairs
falls within the sphere of state and local politics, and for primary and secondary
education is most often delegated to district school boards.

Fifth, education has traditionally been a state and local matter in both the
United States and Germany. In America, the federal government subsidizes statelevel activities and it is responsible for the achievement o f national political objectives
in education policy—primarily, to ensure the equality o f educational opportunity.
Although Germany’s national government has had greater responsibilities than the
American fin- higher education since 1969, education policy is also primarily a state

^ h e federal government has certainly interfered, however. The U.S.
Supreme Court ordered the desegregation o f the nation’s public schools in its 19S4
Brawn decision, and it outlawed prayer in the public schools in its 1962 Engel v.
Vitale ruling. It also weighed in to given its approval to busing children away from
their neighborhood schools as a remedy to segregation, and allowed the government
to assist parochial schools by funding such things as textbooks o f a secular nature,
special education programs, school lunches, and health services. The Court has also
ruled on affirmative action, but not definitively, and school vouchers are currently on
its agenda. The interference o f Congress and the executive branch is no better
indicated than by all the Civil Rights laws enacted over the years and the actions
taken to enforce that legislation. Recent years have also seen the Clinton and Bush
administrations, with the Congress, promote national education reform.
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and local matter. Both countries also share common features o f decentralization and
federalism in the making and administration o f their public policies. However, and
unfike the United States, “Germany is one o f numerous European systems that
operates without local school boards or significant community influence on education
policy” (Heidenheimer 1997,87). This has probably tended to give German political
parties organized at the state level a greater role in education policymaking than in
America. Educational expansion and reform has also been very different. Germany’s
tradition o f state control over educational affairs, its federal arrangement, the greater
policymaking role o f its political parties in education, and the traditional tripartite
structure of its education system has contributed to a much livelier debate between
and within the Lander about the goals o f the education system and its reform. This
dialogue is given meaning and reinforced by the different state governments—by their
constitutional provisions and partisan control—and the education platforms o f the
Social Democratic, Liberal, and Christian Democratic parties. While the power
exercised by local school boards in America has not muted the national debate over
the education system and its reform—and the chorus is very loud—it sings with many
voices about many different and contradictory things, and without political
organization and coordination.

Sixth, the United States has never had a national political party like the
German SPD representing labor and working class interests, an ideological party that
was a real competitor for control o f the national and state governments, with a
platform that actually associated and coordinated an agenda for social welfare with
that for education. Political parties, particularly those o f an ideological bearing like
the German SPD, that are organized at the state and national levels and share a
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common policy agenda, represent a different opportunity for coordinated
policymaking and implementation, one which the highly decentralized and fragmented
American party system does n o t

Seventh, increasing secondary and higher education opportunities in Europe
during dm nineteenth and twentieth centuries were linked with industrialization and
the personnel requirements o f the swelling administrative state (Kaelbie 1981,242).
It was the same with America, but the take-off o f secondary level enrollments came
sooner, at the beginning of the twentieth century. It happened first in a country where
education was very early considered a public good. America’s experience with public
education was very different than the European, where churches and private
organizations had played pivotal roles in mass education. In America, citizens looked
to and expected government to be the primary supplier o f educational opportunities.
Private and parochial schools were important, albeit as alternatives and lesser
components o f the total education system. The private sector was too small,
exclusive, and financially prohibitive to satisfy the expanding educational needs of
America and aO its citizens. That left it for government to satisfy the expanding
requirement for educational opportunities as consumer demand grew.
The American take-off in secondary education was also associated with an
earlier and higher level o f democratization relative to Europe generally, and
particularly to Germany. This was coupled with a growing American consciousness
sooner, across classes, that postprimary educational achievement was “a transmitter
o f social status” (Kaelbie 1981,243). So it was that democratic government across
the United States began responding sooner to rising consumer demand for
postprimary education. Not only were secondary education opportunities much
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expanded, but postprimary cunicuhnns were also broadened to include new lands o f
education and training programs that would be beneficial in the workplace, serve as
preparation for tertiary level education, and otherwise supportive o f individual
socioeconomic opportunities.

Eighth, organized religion was an early and important factor in welfare
assistance and the elimination o f mass illiteracy in both Germany and America.
Religious organizations were involved with public assistance long before government
Many of the first schools established in both countries were run by religious
organizations and members of the clergy. However, I would argue that the role o f
religion in the politics and administration of social welfare and education followed
very different courses in the two countries. Especially in the field o f education over
the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, organized religion played a more
important role in Germany than in America.
Just as the church figured prominently in the early development and
structuring o f Germany’s education system, I would argue American education
evolved on a different track for the rather weaker role of religion in society and
politics. In the first place, im m education came later to America, not taking off until
the early nineteenth century. There was no counterpart in American society to the
educational mission of the church in Europe, no organization that made mass
education a goal at an earlier time. When the initiative was finally taken, it was by
state and local governments to satisfy the new and expanding educational
requirements o f a society at the initial stages o f industrialization and experimenting
with democratic government. Given the scale o f the state’s response to the public’s
demand for new education services, the little competition and institutional presence
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o f church-based alternatives—and the private sector, as well—government quickly
became the major provider and dominant force in U.S. education. There was never a
contest between church and state for control of public education like that in
Germany. Religious instruction did remain a curriculum staple in many American
public schools for some time, but it was not a priority o f the education system.
Instead, common schools with their more secular curriculiuns proliferated to become
the nation’s predominant educational form.

Ninth, religion has been a conservative political force in both Germany and
the United States over the years, but it has had a much greater influence over the
politics, on the party system, and on the government and public policy o f Germany.
One cannot speak of a separation between church and state in Germany, or less
generally between religion and politics, that is even remotely comparable to the
American experience. Although organized religion has always been able to pursue its
interests within the American political process, it has never been as a permanent
participant in the continuing and general political competition, nor has it been
institutionalized in the party system. Organized religion and religious issues have just
never been as important in American politics, and this is reflected by the political
party system. More important in differentiating between parties in United States are
the different political philosophies, socioeconomic interests, and specific issues they
represent.
Religion has not provided the basis for any meaningful distinction between the
major American political parties and the education policies they supported, not like
that between the SPD and Catholic Center party during Germany’s Weimar period,
or between the SPD and CDU/CSU more recently. There has never been a major
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political party in the United States representing a religious denomination like the
Catholic Center party at the turn o f the twentieth century, nor one like the SPD that
made the elimination o f rdigious influence in the nation’s schools one o f its primary
goals. More conservative German political parties and governments have tended to
champion and protect vested class and rdigious interests. They have been less
disposed toward the expansion o f education systems and opportunities. Conversely,
more leftward German parties and governments have generally been associated with
social democracy and secularism. They have been more supportive o f educational
expansion and greater equality in educational opportunities.
Looking back to their origins and as works-in-progress today, Germany and
the United States have produced very different lands o f welfare states, with education
and social policy profiles reflecting unique societal goals and objectives. The legacy
o f nineteenth century Imperial Germany remains strong in the welfare state o f the
FRG. One hundred-plus years o f tumultuous change and increasing democratization
have not “rubbed out” the lasting effects o f that paternal state, the essence of its
education polity and social insurance programs. The German welfare state o f today
stfll emphasizes the collective responsibility of groups for the welfare o f their
members. The government remains the primary broker for, what is now, a
comprehensive social insurance system that is still occupation-based and supportive
o f the status quo. Benefits are based on one’s occupation, work record, and earnings.
Education policy complements the social, also tending to reinforce and reproduce the
existing socioeconomic order. Educational achievement is less encouraged by public
polity as a vehicle o f social advancement and means to socioeconomic security.
Albeit for limited reforms in some Lander, the gateway to secondary and higher
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education opportunities remains restricted and tends to fsvor the already well-off
This is changing, but only gradually. As Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth (1992)
would put it, the German welfare state has been, and is, a “sticky” institution, its
policies self-perpetuating and resistant to change. It also enjoys widespread popular
and bipartisan support Therefore, although recent budgetary pressures have seen
changes in eligibility requirements and benefits coverage for certain social and
education programs (e.g., old-age pensions and student grants), it is very unlikely the
German welfare system faces dismantlement or that any o f its major planks will be
eliminated.
The education and social welfare policies o f America are likewise
complementary. The American welfare state emphasizes individual responsibility,
encouraging self-realization and individual achievement as the key to one’s
socioeconomic security. The provisions o f the social welfare system are minimal.
Eligibility for many public assistance programs is means-tested, its recipients
stigmatized. A comprehensive social security system does not now exist, nor is it
foreseeable. Private insurance solutions are preferred, encouraged, and represent a
significant alternative to state-sponsored social insurance programs. Rather than
broad social safety nets, state investment in educational opportunities is encouraged
as the gateway and vehicle o f social mobility, the means to economic security for
every able individual TAe the German welfare state, that o f the United States is
deeply entrenched and will naturally resist any changes that would threaten to alter or
diminish its current institutionalization in any major way.
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CHAPTERVI
CONCLUSION
Discussion and Recommendations
A Summary o f the Research Problem and Findings
The goal o f this work has been to determine if Western welfare states display
distinctive patterns o f support for education just as they do for social insurance. In
particular, can the three kinds o f welfare regime identified by Esping-Andersen
(1990)—liberal, conservative, and social democratic—be finked with characteristic
profiles for education policy, and is there evidence o f a trade-off between investment
in educational opportunities and other social programs? It is not an attempt to
address the appropriateness o f those policies, the issues o f welfare dependency or
gender, nor what many currently refer to as the “crisis” o f the welfare state (Cox
2001; Esping-Andersen 1996,1999; Marmor 1993; O’Connor 1996; Skocpol 2000;
Stephens, Huber, and Ray 1999). Although certain o f these issues are addressed
below, they should really be judged apart from the balance o f this undertaking. That
said, the significance o f this research is established in the following four objectives.
The first is to increase our knowledge of the Western welfare state by learning if
there is an association between the kinds o f social programs and education policies
those regimes support. Demonstration of such a relationship would effectively extend
the boundaries o f the welfare state’s policy definition to include education with its
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other social programs. Second, and following with the first, given general agreement
within the scholarly community that Western welfare states can be classified
according to the similarity o f their social security systems, it would contribute to our
further understanding o f the welfare state to know if welfare states with comparable
social security policies can also be identified with similar kinds of education systems.
Third, it is important that policymakers, as weO as scholars, are aware o f and
understand the relationship that exists between education and social welfare policies,
of the consequences o f alternative policy choices and strategies. Fourth, it is crucial
that citizens appreciate the nature o f their country’s social security and education
systems, the way those systems are associated and how they may affect the lives and
opportunities o f individuals, families, and other social groups. Students and the
parents of school-age children can then make more informed decisions about school
choice and curricuhims, about academic and vocational career paths. Individuals can
better plan and prepare for the security o f their retirement years during their working
lives. I would argue that with such knowledge the quality o f citizen participation in
public affairs and government can be improved, and perhaps the frequency of
participation as well. Voters could better decide how to cast votes for candidates and
on issues, as it meets their own social welfare and educational needs and interests.
Some citizens might even choose to participate more directly in the policymaking
process—within or outside the government—as the best way to give expression to
and advance their own policy preferences for social welfare and education.
Following Titmuss (1974), Heclo (1985), and Esping-Andersen (1990), I
have argued that three kinds o f welfare states may be distinguished in Western
societies by the similarity o f their social policies. I have identified these welfare state
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types as liberal, conservative, and social democratic, just as Esping-Andersen (1990)
depicted them. I have gone a step further, however, by claiming that education
should be included with social security programs in the policy profiles of those
regime types because a state’s education policy is associated with, and an integral
component ot, its overall welfare strategy. Education policy both affects and reflects
the welfare strategy o f the state. Educational achievement is widely recognized as a
vehicle of upward social mobility (Becker 1964; Janowitz 1976; Kaelbie 1981), and
the socioeconomic benefits an individual may realize through educational
achievement—particularly at the postprimary level—can be functionally equivalent
to, and even exceed, that which may be secured with social insurance. As a result, an
individual’s long-term reliance on social insurance may be lessened by their
educational achievement—and so can a welfare state’s long-term financial
requirements for income assistance and other social programs. Therefore, I have
argued that preferential state support o f educational opportunities or social insurance
programs may be viewed as alternative policy strategies welfare regimes may choose
to follow. It thus follows that the characteristic policy profile Esping-Andersen
ascribed to each o f the three welfare regime types—liberal, conservative, and social
democratic—should be expanded to include education with other social programs,
extending the boundary o f the welfare state’s definition.
Like Esping-Andersen, I have been less concerned with specificity and an
exhaustive classification o f welfare regime types and more with general similarities. In
particular, I have been more interested in the way Western welfare states tend to
gather into three “clusters” because o f their similar policy profiles for education and
social security. I contend that two o f those three clusters, the liberal and
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conservative, exhibit alternative welfare strategies. Liberal regimes demonstrate a
tendency to encourage and invest in education, as a gateway to individual
socioeconomic opportunity, over social insurance programs. In conservative states,
on the other hand, educational opportunities as a vehicle o f social mobility tend to be
more restricted, and social insurance is emphasized instead as a device to protect and
perpetuate the existing social order. As weQ as a quantitative analysis o f the
education and social insurance data for 18 OECD nations, I performed case studies
o f Germany and the United States to examine more closely and test the utility o f
Esping-Andersen’s typology and my hypothesis o f alternative welfare strategies. The
U.S. exemplifies the liberal type, where educational achievement is portrayed as a
vehicle of upward social mobility and state investment in social welfare programs is
relatively less. Germany is representative o f the alternative model, where social safety
nets are relatively wide, but educational opportunities and social mobility are more
limited. In the third type, the social democratic, there is a greater state effort to
support both social welfare programs and educational opportunities. A
comprehensive social security system is intended to guarantee “a socially acceptable
standard o f living independent o f market participation,” but without discouraging
individual ambitions or denying the opportunity for socioeconomic achievement
(Esping-Andersen 1990,26-8,37). State policy also invites educational achievement
as a vehicle o f social mobility and gateway to greater socioeconomic opportunities,
but as an option to the individual and not a substitute for the protections o f the social
insurance system.
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As s test to determine if Esping-Andersen’s welfare state model might be
expanded to include education policy, and to examine the relationship between the
social insurance and education policies o f Western welfare states, an analysis was
performed on the spending data for education and social insurance by eighteen
advanced industrial nations between 1960 and 1990.1 That study demonstrated the
utility o f Esping-Andersen’s model as an explanation for variation in social welfare
and education spending by Western welfare states, and that there is a significant
association between education and social security programs in the kinds o f welfare
regimes he described. The data confirmed both that policy linkage and the usefulness
o f Esping-Andersen’s welfare state model. Western welfare states exhibit distinctive
patterns o f support for education just as they do for social insurance. There is a
significant association between the kinds o f social insurance systems supported by
Western welfare states and their expenditures for education. The data indicate that
welfare state type and social insurance expenditure data are powerful predictors of
spending levels for education. Likewise, welfare state type and education
expenditures are powerful predictors o f spending for social insurance. Liberal nations
tended to spend relatively more on education and less on social insurance programs
than conservative or social democratic welfare regimes.2 Liberal welfare states also

An attempt was made to collect data for 1995 and 2000, but the required
variable data were not sufficiently available for all eighteen nations beyond the 1990
time period.
2Only public expenditure data were analyzed. I recognize that private
spending for education or insurance may be relatively greater where the state’s
financial support o f those programs is relatively less—and vice versa—but it was not
the object o f this study to evaluate the total national effort to support education and
(continued...)
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had the highest rate o f secondary-level participation in general education curricuhims,
by such a significant margin it suggests that an emphasis on general education or
vocational training are alternative education strategies that Western welfare regimes
may choose to follow. On the other hand, conservative regimes tended to support
broader social safety nets than liberal nations. They funded education at a lower level,
and were found with for greater enrollments in vocational programs at the secondary
leveL Social democratic states exhibited the highest level o f public “effort” to fund
both policy areas, with enrollment rates in vocational training approaching that of
conservative regimes. Even with their expansive social safety nets, social democratic
regimes also provide a high level o f support for education programs. However, the
potential socioeconomic benefits o f educational achievement are offered as an option
to the individual; they do not replace the protections of the state’s social insurance.
These findings are supportive o f my argument that the boundary of the
welfare state's policy definition should be extended to include education with its
social security programs. The data o f Chapter III also support my hypothesis that a
preference to invest in education or social insurance programs may represent
alternative policy choices of Western welfare regimes. Liberal and conservative states
exhibited a statistically significant inverse association between spending for education
and that for social welfare. Furthermore, the different emphasis on secondary-level
general education or vocational training also indicates a policy choice, one supportive

2(...contmued)
social security programs, only that o f the welfare state. The inclusion o f private
funding data would have changed this from an investigation o f spending tendencies
by welfhre regime type to one examining total expenditures for education and social
insurance by nation. Therefore, in order to isolate the financial activity attributable to
the welfare regime, it was necessary to exclude private funding data.
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o f the welfare state’s social insurance system. Higher rates o f genenl education
enrollments in liberal nations tend to be associated with relatively lower levels of state
investment in social insurance programs. The socioeconomic benefits an individual
may realize with educational achievement—particularly at the postsecondary level—
may become functionally equivalent to, and even exceed, what may be secured with
social insurance. Conversely, higher rates o f vocational training enrollments in
conservative and social democratic countries tend to be associated with a relatively
greater public investment in social insurance programs. The typical individual’s social
security—income maintenance, medical coverage, etc.—depends fin less on
educational achievement and private market alternatives than is the case in liberal
welfare states.
Additional support for these findings was provided by the case studies of
Germany and the United States which examined their welfare state expansion and the
development of their education and social welfare systems. At least for those two
countries, the historical record showed that preferential state support and investment
in social safety nets or educational opportunities are alternative policy paths that
Western welfare regimes may follow. Germany, a country with a comprehensive
social insurance system that Esping-Andersen has identified as conservative, was a
pioneer among Western nations in the area o f social welfare and a laggard in
expanding access to postprimary educational opportunities. The United States, on the
other hand, a country with a minimal social insurance system that Esping-Andersen
has identified as liberal, was a leader among Western nations in the development of
postprimary educational opportunities and a laggard in the area o f social welfare.
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The Future of the Welfare State
While this study it significant mainly fix its attempt to provide a better
explanation for the social security and education policies o f Western societies, it is
also important for the duea it may provide about the future o f the welfare state.
Indeed, I would argue that the finding* o f this examination are not limited to an
arbitrary window defined by the 1960-1990 data or to the period covered by the two
case studies. It is not so restricted in time and space. Far more than a snapshot
without meaning beyond its moment, I would submit that this is a status report about
a work-in-process in Western societies—-the welfare state and its associated
education and social programs. This work-in-process reflects long-term policy
development and deeply-rooted institutional arrangements that have and are likely to
endure and change only slowly (Pierson 1994,1996; Stemmo, Thelen, and
Longstreth 1992). As the case studies show, the history o f social welfare and
education programs precedes the emergence of the welfare state. When the welfare
state assumed social welfare and educational functions it often took over
responsibility and expanded upon programs that had already been implemented on a
smaller scale elsewhere within society and at lower levels o f government. Instead of
breaking new ground, this transfer o f policy authority represented another step in the
continuing evolution and institutionalization of existing social welfare and education
systems, now within the additional and greater institutional framework of the modem
administrative welfare state. Rather than greatly altering or weakening the existing
social welfare and education systems, the welfare state tended to “harden” those
systems—made them more durable and resistant to change—as they were
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institutionalized within its structure. This property has been referred to as “the
‘stidriness’ of historically evolved institutional arrangements” (Stetnmo, Thelen, and
Longstreth 1992, IS). This “stidriness” and process o f “hardening” has characterized
the expansion o f the institutional welfare state as new social welfare and education
programs have been enacted, implemented, and as those with a vested interest in the
programs of the welfare state have grown in numbers and political power (Stephens,
Huber, and Ray 1999,167).
In the sense that the welfare state is identified by a political regime’s
institutionalization of certain types o f social programs, it is as much the product as
the maker of policy. “Welfare state” is the name that has been given to political
regimes that support particular configurations o f social policy. It is not a neutral
term, however. To each land o f welfare state he depicted, Esping-Andersen
attributed different objectives for the social welfare programs they supported. Such
differences also cany to the individual level, and find expression by those in politics
and government Although “welfare state” describes for some what good and proper
government is aU about, to others it is a pejorative term used to characterize a host o f
social programs and regulations that are held to be too expensive, too wasteful,
ineffective and a drain on the economy, in addition to being a questionable exercise o f
the state’s legitimate power. To its most adamant opponents, the welfare state is a
thing that if it is not completely dismantled should at least undergo major reforms. As
it concerns the real and ever-rising cost o f the welfare state’s programs, even its most
ardent supporters would agree that changes are necessary (Stephens, Huber, and Ray
1999,193).
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The cost o f the welfare state and those in opposition to its programs are the
catalysts for political action today. Together they will undoubtedly affect the
adoption of cost management measures and certain reforms over the near term,
perhaps even influence the direction o f subsequent policy development, but they will
not control that process. The welfare state is too deeply entrenched I would contend
that, although the future o f that thing called the “welfare state” is by no means
certain—and it is dearly under attack from many quarters—it will not be dismantled
or fundamentally altered. The education and social welfare systems found in Western
societies today began to evolve and institutionalize long before the emergence o f the
welfare state that they are now associated with (Esping-Andersen 1990,1996). They
are certainly not immune to change, but the durability and resistance o f those systems
to radical reform over time suggests they are a solid indicator o f how state polides
and programs will continue to look for some time to come (Esping-Andersen 1999;
Pierson 1994,1996).
Existing social and education polides very much determine the parameters for
new programs and the modification or reform o f existing ones. Germany and the
United States provide excellent examples. Germany’s occupation-oriented guild
structure for social insurance, a system with pre-industrial origins, continues to define
the German welfare state, even to providing the basic m odd for the long-term care
legislation adopted in 1994. In America, education is and has traditionally been a
state and local matter. Despite all the rhetoric during the 2000 presidential campaign
about school and education reform and, particularly, o f a pivotal new role that the
federal government would play in that policy field, education will likely remain a state
and local issue. A new and for greater role for the national government in the
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country’s education system would <fictate a major ahentkxi o f the current federal
arrangement. It would mean massive changes to the tsx «nd administrative structures
that now have state and local foundations. An institutional transformation o f such
mammoth proportions would not just require constitutional amendments for
implementation, but also a complete change in the mind-set o f the American people
about government and responsibility for the education function
Recommendations for Subsequent Welfare State Research
A detailed specification o f the education systems that are characteristic of
liberal, conservative; and social democratic states, like those that Esping-Andersen
(1990) described for social insurance, was beyond the scope o f the current project
Such an undertaking is not only appropriate as a next stage, but essential to more
detailed comparative analyses. Second, given the findings o f this work, I argue a
better theoretical and methodological approach to the study o f the Western welfare
state would join the literature and competing theories for education and social policy
together in a single modeL AH three schools o f thought examined in this study—
structural, political conflict, and institutional—made valuable contributions to a better
explanation o f welfare state development and its policymaking for education and
other social programs. Rather than a question about which theory performs better or
worse than the others, the issue really boils down to deciding which explanation is
most appropriate for a given situation, and in what combination with the others.
Third, and also based on the results o f this study, there is good cause to claim the
same model for social and education policy can be utilized for Germany, America,
and other Western welfare states. The great similarity of the scholarly literature, of
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the theories and variables used for the explanation o f both social programs and
education policy, suggests a single model may be appropriate for both policy areas.
The case studies o f Germany and the United States showed that comparable political
and socioeconomic variables and events, although associated with different policy
outcomes, were common to the histories and explanations for their social and
education programs. The different and distinctive policy profiles o f those welfare
states can be attributed to differences in the salience o f particular variables and
events, i.e., socioeconomic development, social democratic strength, religion,
bureaucratic development, federalism and centralization, general education
enrollments, economic depression, war, etc.
A Classification o f the Education Systems Found in Western Welfare States
The production o f a typology o f the education systems found in Western
welfare states is a logical follow-on to this work, a preliminary to subsequent
comparative analyses. Such an enterprise, as well as further detailing and clarifying
the distinctions between kinds of Western welfare states, would also serve to validate
the real similarity—or not—o f education policies within welfare regime type.
Because this study identified certain statistical “tendencies” in the education policies
o f liberal, conservative, and social democratic welfare regimes—and not specific
education systems in a qualitative sense—it is possible that unique education profiles
within those groups were “averaged out,” or that an education profile common
across all welfare state types was not recognized. Another kind o f welfare state might
even be identified, because o f some particular combination o f social and education
policies. Only additional analysis will tell. Such a classification would also provide the
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basis for comparisons o f welfare state performance, both individually and
comparatively by type. As an example, individual and group dependency on public
programs could be compared across lands o f education systems by welfare
state type. For another, the data from studies o f academic performance that have
been conducted on a national level with such testing instruments as the 1994-95
Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) and 1998-99 repeat o f
HMSS (TIMSS-R) could be evaluated by kind o f education system and welfare state
type to determine if there is a relationship with academic achievement
A Synthesis o f Competing Explanatory Theories in a Common
Welfare State Model
My second point about future research concerns a better theoretical approach
for the study o f Western welfare regimes, one that would bring together the major
theoretical streams o f social policy development and educational expansion into a
single and comprehensive model o f the welfare state in advanced industrial societies.
Each o f the three main schools o f thought examined in this study—structural,
political conflict, and institutional—has something to contribute. More than any one
approach being better or worse than the others, the question really comes down to
which one was most appropriate for a given situation, and in what combination with
the others. Clearly, far greater specificity was required than that provided by the logic
of industrialism. Knowledge of the who, what, when and how—the particular
players, institutions, substance, and timing o f social and education policymaking—
was required for a more satisfactory explanation. Theories o f the mid-range, like
political conflict and historical institutionalism, are o f particular help in this regard.
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So also is the policymaking model ofKingdon (1995). His policymaking paradigm
offers the opportunity for a synthesis, bringing together the explanation offered by
the logic o f industrialism with those o f the political conflict and institutional theories.
His notion o f “policy windows” that are opened by the coming together o f problems,
policies, and political “streams” is very useful in this respect It improves our
awareness o f where to look, at who, what and when.
Structural theories describe the conditions o f a likely event but they cannot
predict if and when such an event will actually occur. Thus, while the logic of
industrialism correctly depicts the socioeconomic conditions most often associated
with new social legislation and higher levels of state investment in social programs, it
cannot determine if and when a government will actually respond. There is not a
specific point within the process o f industrialization or a particular level of
development that automatically triggers government activity—if at all. Neither can
the logic o f industrialism predict the strategy of the political regime or the specific
policy outcome. However, foreknowledge that specific socioeconomic conditions
may be associated with certain other political events does constitute recognition o f a
“problem” that may cause the government to respond. What is still required for a
“policy window” and policymaking to occur, according to Kingdon’s paradigm, is the
“political opportunity” and “policy alternatives.”
The strength o f political conflict theory is its identification o f the “political
opportunity” and associated “policy coalitions,” those groups and interests that are
active, organized, have access to and can affect the policymaking process (Weir,
Orloffj and Skocpol 1988). Recognition o f new social groups, increasing interest
mobilization, or changes in the partisan control of government may indicate the
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presence o f a new "political opportunity” that, combined with a particular "problem,”
may lead to the opening of a “policy window” By identifying the mobilization and
activity o f significant social and political actors, political conflict theory may add to
the explanation o f the timing for important junctures in social welfare and education
policies, to changes in direction or new initiatives. However, while political conflict
theory can help to make clear the policy preferences o f those with the "political
opportunity,” it foils to address marry other policy alternatives that are also available
and perhaps more likely, or the constraints on preferences imposed by institutions and
the political process. It is here that institutional theory can make its contribution.
Institutional theory adds clarity to the “policy window,” a better
understanding of the actual political opportunity and real policy alternatives. It brings
together the “streams” of problems and political opportunities with political
solutions. Institutions and institutional organization introduce rules and structure to
the political process that affect policy outcomes (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth
1992). State institutions, particularly bureaucratic organizations, may have vested
interests in certain policy solutions and important influence over the selection
process. As they represent the legacy o f prior policies and political struggles,
institutions are predisposed to path dependence, to a limited policy options and
incremental change (Esping-Andersen 1990; March and Olsen 1984, 1989; North
1990; Skocpol 1979, 1985; Weaver and Rockman 1993). Very often, it is
institutional differences that best explain the cross-national variation in educational
expansion and social policy development As an example, and the U.S. and Germany
are excellent examples, the policy authority and activities of states in a federal
arrangement may dramatically affect the implementation o f national policies.
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In the last analysis, I judge that all three theoretical streams—structural,
political conflict, and institutional—contribute to a better understanding o f the
welfare state and the development o f its social security and education policies.
Structural-functional explanations accurately depict the societal context, the
circumstances, issues, and problems brought by industrialization and modernization.
Political conflict approaches help explain the who, what, when, why and how of
policy development Politics and politicians matter greatly, especially for new policy
initiatives like those o f Bismarck in the 1880s, the paradigm shift o f Roosevelt's New
Deal in the 1930s, or Johnson’s “Great Society” programs o f the 1960s. “Political
parties and politicians link ideas, political institutions, and policy” (King 1992,242).
Over the longer run, although “they are not a substitute for interests and ideas as the
ultimate motors o f political action” (Hall 1992,109), it is institutions and path
dependence that begin to explain more and more about the making and shaping o f
education and social policies. Incremental change becomes the political norm and
certain ways o f doing things become institutionalized. The long-term care legislation
enacted by Germany in 1994 was adopted on the model o f social insurance
introduced by Bismarck in the 1880s. Over time, institutions and the programs they
support also tend to create vested interests, both in government bureaucracies and
clientele. Public bureaucracies are recognized to have a life and policy agenda o f their
own (Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman 1981; Rourke 1986); and the old-age
pensions o f the U.S. Social Security system has become the “third rail” o f American
politics, one that no politician or political party dares to touch.
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A Common Welfare State Model for Education and Social Policies
Esping-Andersen's (1990) typology o f welfare states and Castles’ (1989)
model to explain the variation in education expenditures between OECD nations
provided the starting point for the regression equations and other statistical analyses
of this study. Also useful as reference and as potential foundations for future research
have been the works o f Cameron (1978), Hicks (1994), Hicks and Misra (1993),
Hicks and Swank (1992), Huber, Ragin, and Stephens (1993), Lindert (1994),
Pampel and Williamson (1988), Western (1989), and Wilensky (1975) who
operationalized variables and developed regression equations for the explanation o f
social program spending by advanced industrial democracies.
Based on the results o f the regression modelling, data analysis, and other
findings o f this study, I would argue it is logical that education should be combined
with social security programs in describing the policy profile o f the Western welfare
state. In other words, the boundaries o f the welfare state’s policy definition should be
extended to include education. Moreover, because of the linkage that has been shown
to exist between the education and social policies o f the Western welfare state, there
should not be separate welfare state models and typologies for its education and
social security programs.
I have provided evidence o f the association between the welfare state’s
education and social security policies in a review of the relevant literature, by
quantitative analysis, and through case studies. The two literatures show that
explanations for the development o f social welfare policy and educational expansion
share similar, if not the same, explanatory theories and variables. The same holds for
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education and social welfare spending. I illustrated with “cluster charting" and
statistical data the association that exists between the education and social policies of
Western welfare states. I demonstrated with regression analyses that education and
social insurance data can be usefully combined in the same analytical model. As I
hypothesized, with knowledge o f welfare regime type, state spending for education
and social insurance programs are strong predictors o f one other. The case studies of
Germany and the United States showed that preferential support given to the
expansion o f educational opportunities or social insurance programs are alternative
policy trajectories along which welfare states may develop.
A single analytical model for the welfare state makes more sense. It is
appropriate, more powerful, and provides a simultaneous explanation for both social
and education policy. Finally, I would submit that education and social security
programs should be combined in the same model because both are policy instruments
that welfare states can employ to accomplish functionally equivalent objectives. The
social mobility and economic benefits an individual may realize with their educational
achievements—over the long run—may be equal to, and even exceed, those o f statesponsored social welfare provisions for such programs as old-age pensions, disability,
unemployment compensation, medical and long-term care.
Therefore, both in general and as it applies specifically to the familiar welfare
state model o f Esping-Andersen, a depiction o f the education system as an agency of
social mobility and policy alternative to social insurance should be added to the
description of a welfare regime's policy portfolio. In this study I have used for that
purpose the data for general education enrollments at the secondary level and the
spending tendencies for education and social security programs. Although the list of
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variables could certainly be made longer, subsequent research could investigate
participation and completion rates by course o f study in lecondary and higher
education, broken down by race, ethnic group, gender, and class. Welfare state
performance could also be examined, both individually and comparatively by type. As
an example, socioeconomic outcomes snd dependence on social insurance systems
could be evaluated, within welfare states by societal groups by level o f educational
achievement, and across societal groups for individuals with the same or similar levels
o f educational achievement. For another, changing levels o f educational achievement
and dependence on social insurance systems could be compared by welfare state type.
Esping-Andersen’s index o f decommodification for a welfare state’s social security
programs may also warrant another look. A new index that also included a
measurement of the decommodification that might be achieved by a state’s education
policies could be very useful in helping to distinguish between and classifying lands of
welfare regimes.
In the Introduction to this dissertation I argued that education should be
included with other social programs in defining the policy profile o f the Western
welfare state. A state’s education policy is associated with, and is an integral
component o f its overall welfare strategy. Education policy both affects and reflects
the welfare strategy o f the state. That is because the socioeconomic benefits an
individual may realize with educational achievement—particularly at the secondary
and tertiary levels—can become functionally equivalent to, and even exceed, what
may be secured with social insurance. As a consequence, an individual’s long-term
reliance on social insurance may be lessened by their educational achievement—and
so can a welfare regime’s long-term requirements to support income assistance and
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other social assistance programs. I argued, therefore—following upon the scholarship
ofHddenheinier (1981), Heclo (1985), and Janowitz (1976)—that preferential state
investment in educational opportunities over social insurance might be viewed as an
alternative policy strategy Western welfare regimes may choose to follow. I claimed
that evidence o f such an alternative policy strategy could be found in the kinds o f
welfare regimes that Esping-Andersen (1990) identified in advanced industrial
societies—liberal, conservative, and social democratic. I argued each type o f welfare
regime could be linked with a distinctive profile for education policy just as it could
for social insurance programs, and that there was evidence o f a trade-off between
investment in education and other social programs in liberal and conservative regime
types.
In the chapters that followed I presented evidence to support these
propositions. Case studies of Germany and the United States explored the historical
development and association of social insurance and education policy in welfare
states Esping-Andersen classified respectively as “conservative” and “liberal.” Those
examinations showed Germany and America to be very different welfare states, each
wife a distinctive policy profile for education and social insurance programs.
Germany’s welfare state supports a comprehensive social insurance system. Germany
was a pioneer among Western nations in area o f social policy, but it has been a
laggard in the development of postprimary educational opportunities. On the other
hand, the United States has been a leader in the expansion o f educational
opportunities, and educational achievement has been encouraged in a welfare state
where the social insurance system is minimal. For these two countries, the record
does demonstrate that welfare regimes may develop along alternative paths: one that
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favors the expansion of educational opportunities over social insurance, as with the
United States; and another that supports the building o f social safety nets over
increasing access to educational opportunities, as was the case with Germany.
Next, I analyzed education and public expenditures data for eighteen Western
industrial nations over the 1960-1990 time period to test the explanatory power of
Esping-Andersen’s welfare state typology, the nature o f the relationship between
education and social insurance programs, and the "trade-off* thesis ofHeclo (1985).
The results indicate an association does exist between the education and social
policies that Western welfare states support Specifically, the kinds o f welfare
regimes Esping-Andersen described—liberal, conservative, and social democratic—
can also be linked with characteristic education policies. Liberal welfare states have
the highest rate of secondary-level participation in general education curriculums, by
such a great margin it suggests an emphasis on general education or vocational
training are alternative education policies Western welfare regimes may support On
the other hand, conservative nations tend to have broader social safety nets than
liberal nations. They fund education at a lower level, and have far greater enrollments
in vocational programs at the secondary level Social democratic states exhibit the
highest level o f public “effort” to fund both policy areas, with enrollment rates in
vocational training approaching that o f conservative regimes. There is also evidence
o f a “trade-off” Conservative and liberal welfare regimes exhibit a tendency to invest
relatively more either in social insurance or education, respectively.
The unique patterns and association of social welfare and education systems
that this study has identified in Western societies are the products o f long-term
development Both systems, social welfare and education, are characterized by
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enduring social arrangements and institutional settings that, as they structure the
policymaking process and influence its outcomes, naturally resist massive system
changes. With respect to Western welfare regimes today I agree with EspingAndersen (1999) that "existing institutional arrangements heavily determine, maybe
even overdetermine, national trajectories” (4). Nevertheless, just as change is
inevitable with the passage o f time, so wQl social welfare and education programs
continue to evolve. It is even very likely that marry countries will enact certain
reforms and corrective measures in the near term, to address the particular "crisis” of
their welfare state. It is unlikely, however, barring some unforeseen and calamitous
event of immense proportions, that the substance o f any welfare state’s education and
social insurance systems, much less the structures and rules for political competition
that affect those programs and the policymaking process, will radically change in the
near term. The welfare state will continue to evolve, but it will certainly not be
altered or dismantled beyond recognition.
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The calculation o f social insurance as a percentage o f total public
expenditures is based on ILO data for social insurance as a percentage o f the GDP
and knowing the ratio between education as a percentage o f total public spending and
education expenditures as a portion o f the GDP. Real social insurance dollars per
capita is the product o f social insurance as a percentage o f the GDP and the GDP per
capita, it has been divided by 100 in order to be in the same meter as other GDPbased statistics. Social insurance as a percentage o f total social spending is calculated
by dividing the value o f social insurance as a percentage o f total public spending by
the sum o f social insurance and education as shares of total public spending.
Likewise, education as a percentage o f total social spending is derived by dividing the
value o f education as a percentage o f total public spending by the sum o f social
insurance and education as shares o f total public spending. Real education dollars per
student is the product of education spending as a percentage o f the GDP times the
GDP per capita, divided by the percentage o f the population who are aged 5-29. This
age group most accurately reflects a nation's student population—those who are
eligible, attending, and actually receiving public education benefits. Because of the
variety o f functions and demographic groups that social security programs serve, it is
not possible to similarly identify a specific population group that is the primary target
o f those programs. Consider, for example, the combination o f groups covered by oldage pensions, sickness and maternity benefits, and unemployment compensation.
Therefore, social insurance expenditures were distributed over the entire national
population, calculated as the product social insurance spending as a percentage o f the
GDP and the GDP per capita, divided by 100 for metering. Although not distributing
total social insurance expenditures over the smaller eligible population has the net
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effect of understating the tiue per capita figure, it in no way affects the findings o f
this analysis.
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